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This dissertation analyzes critical utopian discourse in nine American novelists, making 
the claim that in American literature, at least, we have of necessity entered a postethnic 
stage of the communal imagination.  Beginning with theories of utopia offered by 
Mannheim, Ricœur, Bloch, Moylan, and Jameson, this study claims, in its introduction, 
that a thoroughgoing critical utopia must rethink whose ideals count as the ideal toward 
which we all should work.  Collectively raised by Werner Sollors, David Hollinger, Giles 
Gunn, and Caroline Rody, the problems of identity and solidarity call our attention to the 
urgency of interethnic or, differently, postethnic cooperation.  Some principles for such 
cooperation are here outlined with the help of Elaine Scarry, Jean-Luc Nancy, Judith 
Butler, and Dipesh Chakrabarty.  The three main parts of this study are organized along a 
temporal axis.  Part one traces the critical reimagining of the past in novels by Tony 
Morrison, Philip Roth, and Leslie Marmon Silko; part two charts imaginative “present” 
cartography in novels by Michael Chabon, Richard Powers, and Gerald Vizenor; part 
three turns to future-writing and the prophetic voice in novels by Octavia Butler, Kurt 
Vonnegut, and Ursula K. Le Guin.  Throughout, it is argued that, due to contemporary 
socio-demographic and ecological dynamics, we can no longer productively imagine our 
ideal worlds in the interests of only one, particular community.  The afterword concludes 
postethnic utopias urge a recursive, compassionate, and critical imagination that h elps 
human beings tend to everyday and long-term tasks “ecosocially” as members of a 
broadly inclusive community. 
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FOREWORD / REFOUNDING UTOPIA AFTER IDENTITY 
American literature continues to evolve in multiethnic and international 
directions.  Liesl Schillinger points out that ―three of the five candidates in the fiction 
category‖ of the 2009 National Book Awards ―were not born in this country; two of those 
three live abroad‖ (2009).  It seems clear that we have stopped defining the American 
novel only by the boundaries of descent and residency.  Schillinger attributes the 
internationalization of American authorship to ―the American idea [that] not only 
translates, it disregards national boundaries.‖  Sometimes called the American dream, that 
idea remains one of our most persistent and fraught utopian visions.  In American culture, 
we now see utopianism and utopian literature intersecting with new formulations of 
multicultural identity.  I argue, in the following pages, that the recent utopian imagination 
in American fiction calls for a postethnic approach.  More generally, late twentieth-
century changes in the concept of the utopian are entangled with contemporaneous 
changes in our concepts of identity.  As this transformation links to the broader 
revolutions of globalization, it pushes at the limits of ―the American.‖
1
  Since the late 
stages and end of the Cold War, we have found it less and less possible to articulate the 
American dream in monocultural terms. 
This transformation of the social imagination in American culture is determined 
by several often-overlapping factors.  In the broadest terms, the condition called 
postmodernity has altered our understanding of the world we live in; separating this 
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truism into its constituent parts, we must rethink of both what it means to be ―we‖ and 
what it means to live in the world. The problems that we face now—ecological disaster, 
social injustice—require that we confront questions of identity on the one hand and 
utopia on the other.  We can no longer imagine solutions on our own or for ourselves 
alone, no matter whether the epistemic ―we‖ is defined by race, class, gender, nationality, 
or sexuality.  This claim is not intended as a challenge to the value of self-determination 
understood as political autonomy and decision-making.  What I mean is that, at the 
present moment, few if any problems belong to or can be the solved by any one group of 
people alone.  I want to make clear this is not a moral claim that we ought to be more 
open to racial diversity or to other kinds of inclusivity, but rather a pragmatic claim that if 
we want successfully to negotiate emerging issues and crises in our cultures and changes 
in our environments, we will of necessity have to do so together. 
Our identity groups remain, of course, powerful organizing principles in our lives, 
and problems that confront us are still shaped as they have been by race, gender, class, 
and nationality.  As I explain in detail in my introduction, postethnic utopia is anything 
but a non-ethnic utopia or a blithe utopian blindness to ethnically configured problems.  
Although by focusing on novels in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century I limit 
the scope of my analysis to literature—strategically, as my introduction will show—this 
should not be mistaken for a sign that ethnically shaped problems are simply a matter of 
culture, of perception.  While we may agree that we are living in new times, ones that I 
argue have led to a postethnic turn in utopian discourse, we probably will not agree about 
exactly what this entails.  With the election of the first nonwhite president of a majority 
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white nation, we cannot deny that race (and with it, ethnicity) continues to change.  We 
should not, though, rush to declare a ―postracial‖ America without taking care to qualify 
what this means.  Fred McKissak Jr.‘s account of his family‘s reaction to the election of 
Barack Obama is an illustrative case in point.  ―Moments after CNN declared Barack 
Obama the next President of the United States,‖ he writes, ―I called my parents.  I could 
tell my father was beaming. Through Obama he could see the future for his grandsons 
and their peers—a collective sense of inclusion that has eluded the race for so long‖ 
(2008).  This collective sense of inclusion, and the new future that it opens up, is 
precisely what is required now.  Yet it may be tempered by the fear—which has since 
been substantiated—that this victory can be leveraged in unwelcome ways.  The election 
clearly marks a new step forward in American society, but while this is a step that comes 
after past struggles for racial justice, it cannot legitimately be thought that all such 
struggles are behind us now.  ―I couldn‘t help but think,‖ McKissak continues, ―that now 
we‘re going to hear…the absurd talk about post-racial America.  Exactly how can we be 
in post-racial America when nearly 40 percent of black children under the age of five live 
at or below the poverty line?‖  This statistic is one of a litany that McKissak produces to 
demonstrate his point, with which I thoroughly agree, that even as titanic shifts have 
taken place at some levels of our culture or society, these have not yet been fully felt as 
justice all the way through. 
Not unlike postracial, postethnic does not mean—cannot mean—that ethnicity is 
over as a ground for political action or a category of critique.  In fact, turning a blind eye 
to ethnicity is precisely the problem that postethnic utopianism rejects.  McKissak 
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attributes the ―absurd talk‖ of postracialism to ―those who insist that the gap in wealth, 
income, health care, and education is due to an inherent culture of victimization.  If 
people of color only worked harder, they‘d be fine, we are told.‖  This is, of course, the 
familiar method of blaming the victim, a tactic well suited to neoliberalism because it 
allows for an expression of empathy—a recognition of suffering, even of doing work to 
try and fix what is ―wrong‖ with those who suffer, for example through job training—
without challenging the beliefs that supports the social system benefiting the empathetic 
observer.  In my afterword, after having gathered resources from the novels in parts one, 
two, and three, I will return this question of the balance between taking individual 
responsibility and mobilizing systemic critique.  When appropriate, throughout my 
project, I try to point out where the postethnic walks the line between an asystemic 
―blaming the victim‖ and a historicist ―blaming the system.‖  The historicist position, 
which invests historical processes and superpersonal entities with mechanistic 
inevitability, is no more helpful than finding fault in individuals.  The latter lets the 
observer off the hook, and the former mutes any revolutionary call with the idea that no 
one person could make a difference, even in his or her own life.   
Such a need for a theoretical and cultural position from which to speak has been 
demanded and denied by industrialization and globalization.  These technological 
evolutions under the pressures of late capitalism have altered ideas first formed circa the 
inception of modernity at the close of the Renaissance.  More specifically, this alteration 
can be attributed to the ways in which space-time compression brings us individually into 
contact with different ways of life with increasing frequency; these encounters have often 
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unfolded systemically through subjugation and massacre, with the history of modernity 
being also the history of colonial empires.  In Europe and America, discourses of ethno-
racial identity have underwritten colonization, genocide, and slavery, as the Christian 
empires of Europe forced the conversion of ostensibly less civilized ―heathen‖ peoples to 
their economic and ethno-religious communities.  Whether this alibi for conquest has 
been framed  in religious or evolutionary terms, the history of utopia and modern identity 
are entangled with each other through the question of what ―man‖ ought to be.  In other 
words, no matter if the dominated groups were demonized as savages, primitives, or 
heathens (or, often, all several of these), the civilizing mission of Empire or, in the 
American context, Manifest Destiny, clearly proceeded on utopian terms. 
In the twentieth century, in the wake of the horrors of trench warfare and the 
Holocaust, new social and philosophical movements have questioned of the identity of 
modern, rational subjectivity.  Decolonization has opened up new areas of inquiry into 
identity critique, such as subaltern studies.  On a different front, the dystopian subgenre 
has taken shape in response to the menaces of the new century, especially fascism.  
Along the same lines, the critique of the Enlightenment—as advanced, for instance, by 
Adorno—is also the rejection of Enlightenment-style utopian social engineering.  Both 
European existentialism (in the wake of the world wars) and American pragmatism 
(arguably initiated with Henry James in the wake of the Civil War) gave us, respectively, 
anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist means for living in the world around us.  And, 
concurrently, we have increasingly questioned the demands of tribe and culture to name 
an essential or foundational individual identity.  As this study sets out to argue, with 
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evidence in the works of several late twentieth century American novelists from an array 
of backgrounds and ostensible allegiances, we can no longer imagine utopia as the ideal 
world for people ―like us.‖  Increasingly, our imaginary communities have to include, of 
necessity, people different from ourselves.   
My introductory chapters survey the current state of utopian studies alongside 
identity studies, specifically in the general framework of ethnicity.  In utopian studies, 
arguments about the merits of utopia that marked the early and middle twentieth century 
have mostly been replaced with an active exploration of the utopian spirit in the time of 
postmodernity.  Theorists have given us several ways to understand the changes in utopia 
in the twentieth century, including the rise of dystopia (M. Keith Booker [1994]), the 
countercultural praxis of ―critical utopias‖ (Tom Moylan [1986], Bill Ashcroft [2007]), 
and the decentering of utopia‘s Western location (Ralph Pordzik [2001]).  Chapter one of 
the introduction examines the dialectic of hope and critique that has organized utopian 
theory.  I argue, then, that the change in utopianism we are witnessing can be attributed to 
and described in terms of contemporaneously emerging new understandings of identity.  
Chapter two explores two widespread terms for this new understanding: interethnic and 
postethnic.  I then bring these two fields together in chapter three, in which I ask what a 
inter-identitarian or postethnic utopia might look like, turning for help to recent 
philosophies of the literary artifact (Elaine Scarry), community (Jean-Luc Nancy), 
fragmentation (Dipesh Chakrabarty), and identity (Judith Butler).   
The three main parts of this study offer necessarily brief but close readings of 
novelists who use, to varying extent, the tropes of postethnic utopia.  I must be brief in 
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these readings because of the number of examples—and I wanted to include a sizable 
amount of material in order to give my reader a sense of the postethnic utopia‘s scope.  
More importantly still, this ―excess‖ is required by the argument I am making, that our 
utopias are currently best thought of and worked on through the contingent arrangement 
of many fragments of identity.  These novels range from 1985 (Kurt Vonnegut‘s 
Galapagos) to 2008 (Toni Morrison‘s A Mercy).  In doing so, they span the time period 
from the late Cold War to the election of Barak Obama.  This moment is marked in 
several interesting ways that are worth a preliminary mention.  Many of my critical-
theoretical texts, especially the major ones, date from the same period.  I believe that both 
the theorists and the novelists are responding to the same thing: the finalmost stages and 
end of the USSR, the proclamation of a ―New World Order,‖ with America as the one 
superpower, and the sudden curbing of that vision in the collapse of the World Trade 
Centers.  I have called this period ―post-Cold War‖ in some places, and the late twentieth 
century in others.  Neither framework is satisfactory, leaving off the earliest or the latest 
novels in turn.  Yet the novels do cohere, I argue, in that they reimagine communities 
along postethnic lines.  That is, they give us a different vision of community, individual 
identity, and how these are temporally configured.  This new, utopian vision is a break, I 
submit, with the monolithic vision of the Cold War: a world divided in as little as three 
pieces, with its fate depending on the brinksmanship of two national-imperial 
superpowers.  It is the rejection of this worldview in its Cold War formulation up to the 
1980s, its New World Order formulation in the 1990s, and its neo-conservative 
formulation in the Bush doctrines for the ―War on Terror‖ in the years 2000-2008. 
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I have arranged these novelists on a chronological axis based on when their 
novels are set, in the past, present, or future.  Surprisingly, this places some of the older 
novels last and the newer ones first, disrupting the cultural-narrative sequence I have just 
implied.  However, it is the imaginative chronology of the novels, not their dates of 
publication, that is more salient to understanding how postethnic utopia ruptures time and 
space.  A changing spatiotemporal matrix—sometimes called space-time compression, 
although it is more than this—transforms our narrative understandings of utopia and 
identity, requiring new versions of the meaning of our collective past, present, and future.  
This triptych structure means that I will need a set of subarguments, no less than three, 
because each of these temporal locations is disrupted in a different way, using different 
counter-terminology.  Although I work with through ―local‖ arguments in each of these 
sections, my ―global‖ thesis remains that each novelist creates, through the utopian 
imagination, a postethnic expression of how the world is to be inhabited.   
Not all these novels are utopias proper.  I deploy utopia as the name for a broad 
discursive field rather than a particular genre.  In this, I follow Bill Ashcroft‘s strategy of 
choosing ―works deeply imbued with utopian thinking‖ rather than pure ―formal utopias‖ 
(2007, 415).  Certainly, in the following chapters there are alternative histories (Philip 
Roth‘s Plot Against America and Michael Chabon‘s Yiddish Policeman’s Union), but 
these are joined by imaginative settings that evoke utopian tropes (Leslie Marmon Silko‘s 
Garden in the Dunes) and general interventions in a conventionally utopian discursive 
sites (Morrison‘s A Mercy).  There are also, especially in part three, science-fiction 
stories, which I have included broadly without the parsing out of generic differences 
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between science fiction and utopia that a different argument would require.  I have 
intentionally left out some of the most notable American utopias in favor of those works 
that deal with utopia and identity as problems for literary work rather than forms to hold 
particular literary content.  So, at first glance, this argument appears to be about utopia 
and time, but at its heart the concern is with identity and location or, as I will come 
afterwards to call it in my concluding remarks, ecology.  This overabundance of 
categories and axioms can be organized simply with the statement of a problem: the 
entanglement of our changing utopias, which are stories about ourselves and the world 
we live in. 
In part one, personal, national, and ethno-cultural histories are reimagined as a 
malleable unfolding of contingent events rather than as a revelation of inevitable 
teleological progress.  I am not, in this section, concerned with actual history or a 
historiography that one validates with archival proof or evidence of what ―really 
happened.‖  This lack of concern does not mean that the imaginary past must always 
blithely contradict the facticity of our ancestry or our ethnic descent communities.  
Rather, what is important here is how these writers imagine living in a world with a past 
that must be reconciled or how they imagine the past in order to cope with the demands 
historical precedent brings to bear on present-day living. Benedict Anderson‘s second 
appendix to his 1991 edition of Imagined Communities usefully frames the question in 
terms of national community: ―how, and why, [do] new-emerging nations imagine 
themselves antique?‖ (xiv). In the early modern period, he argues, nations were felt as 
new, revolutionary forms, as was the temporal ―stuff‖ called history.
2
  As nationalism 
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emerged, nationalists reconfigured preceding revolutions as historical precedents for their 
own, adopting the trope of an ―awakening‖ national consciousness (194-95).  Rather than 
seeing themselves inventing a community, they gained the (re)assurance of 
―rediscovering something deep-down always known‖ (196).  Thus nationalism formed in 
the crucible of modernity as a bizarre new sense of how we exist in relation to the past: 
―Awareness of being imbedded in secular, serial time, with all its implication of 
continuity, yet of ‗forgetting‘ the experience of this continuity—product of the ruptures 
of the late eighteenth century—engenders the need for a narrative of ‗identity‘‖(205).  
We can see, here, the creation of a sense of teleological identity or even, I would insist, 
the historicist dialectic as a response to the identity crises caused by modern, scientific 
notions of time.  This is also, anticipating Jean-Luc Nancy, our sense of individual and 
communal destiny or purpose, which locates our identity in a work to be done. 
At this point, I am most interested in the implication that modern, ethnicity-
centered identity, in this case specifically ethno-nationalism, can be seen as a solution to 
a problem—the inadequacy of medieval identity to life in the modern world.  Insofar as 
the new conception of history (empty, secular, serial time) was a cause of this loss of 
identity, its resolution would have to also address time, would need to invent a historical 
narrative of origins to replace the origin myths of medieval belief systems.  In other 
words, the nation—so often personified as a sentient being—needed something like a 
buildungsroman to explain itself to itself.  In American history, this narrative has its core 
episodes in the 1776 Revolutionary War, the Civil War, the settlement of the West that 
we may choose to remember as the Indian Wars, and World War II.  Each of these 
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episodes, which are utopian in the mythic sense, has been used discursively to define a 
particular, patriotic American national identity.  In part one I offer examples of several 
novels that reimagine these moments postethnically.  In chapter one, Morrison‘s A Mercy 
remembers a forgotten diversity in the time of the ―founding fathers‖ and colonial 
resistance to monarchy.  In chapter two, Roth‘s The Plot Against America imaginatively 
reverses the utopian moment of ―the greatest generation‖ and the role of global liberator.  
In chapter three, Silko‘s Garden in the Dunes complicates the story of the ―pioneers‖ and 
the progress of Manifest Density.  I place the Silko‘s turn-of-the-century novel last in this 
sequence, achrononistically, because her non-linear sense of time indicates the spacing 
rather than the timing of inter-cultural contact and the negotiation of utopias, and her 
ecological garden trope prepares us for the geographical focus of the next part.  
In part two, the geography of the present becomes negotiable as the important 
features of our landscape are made available for inventive cartography.  That is, if no 
longer defined exclusively in terms of our innermost identities or inextricable station in 
society, our ―place‖ in the world must depend upon something between utterly free 
choice and resignation.  In other words, postethnic cartography is a balance between 
thinking that the world depends only on our descriptions of it and the opposite thought 
that our redescriptions cannot change anything.  In my introduction, I take up in greater 
detail Nancy‘s proposal of ―inoperative community,‖ which defines community as a 
spacing of individuals.  This spacing offers us another way to think through utopia and 
identity, but can quickly give way to idealism and objectivism if we insist too strongly on 
either consciousness or experience as the arbitrator of our locations.  An important 
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additional concept here is Chakrabarty‘s proposal for a theory of ―fragments without 
wholes,‖ a paradigm that allows for the theorization of communities of proximity rather 
than identity (his terms).  In this model, my community comprises the people with whom 
I interact rather than people like myself, people with whom I share a ―background.‖  The 
difference here is between relating to people actively and passively being related to them, 
e.g. by blood.  This guideline creates a very different map of the world than the one that 
obtains when we survey only from the point of view or in the interests of one ethnic 
group. 
In part two, chapter one, we see the conjunction of proximity and destiny, 
relationships and boundary marking in Michael Chabon‘s Yiddish Policeman’s Union, 
which opposes a ethno-religious utopian imperative with a personal choice.  The 
autonomy of the postethnic individual to have some choice in how to see the world and 
his or her place is also a principle tenet of existentialism but too often gives way, in the 
constructed nonethnicity of whiteness, to a panoptical hubris—to the colonial or 
anthropological tourist.  In chapter two, I argue that ostensible nonethnicity can be dealt 
with if its privileged authority is more deeply questioned.  Richard Power‘s connectivist 
imagination, exemplified in Plowing the Dark, retools the all-seeing, dislocated 
existential observer as an embodied, relational point of view.  This embodiment of the 
artist entails an ecological paradigm of art not as the ethnocentric adjudication of 
experience but rather as the interpersonal, postethnic sharing of the world around us.  
Thus the artist becomes an actor in the world, but his or her actions are indirect insofar as 
they act through symbol or art.  This ―trickery‖ holds both the key to why imaginative 
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language works and what it is able to accomplish.  The jester figure emerges here as an 
important herald of postethnic transgression, which I explore, in chapter three, through 
the novels of Gerald Vizenor.  The trickster, here specifically the Anishinaabe cultural 
hero Nanabozho, is an ―amoral‖ survivor, thwarting alike the forces of evil that threaten 
culture and the sacred traditions that constitute a culture.  The trickster walks, 
postethnically, the line between defending a people and being their internal voice of 
critique.  Trickster tactics—what Vizenor would call teases—are a strategic intervention, 
one that opens the possibility for both libratory and destructive transgression.  This 
radical openness to cultural rupture ties into Paul Ricœur‘s theory of utopia as the rupture 
of identity.  It is the rupture of the ethnocentric, static identities in favor of an always 
ongoing—always present—postethnic process of identification. 
The future, in part three, sees both the rhetorical acrobatics and ecological 
grounding of postethnic utopianism emerge more clearly.  This is partly due to a well-
known predilection for the apocalyptic or cataclysmic narrative in environmental 
rhetoric.
3
  Although I work, in this chapter, with both the two oldest novels in my 
argument, the fasciations of ecological collapse narrative shows no sign of abating, as the 
popularity of Cormack McCarthy‘s The Road can attest.  But I argue, in the context of the 
postethnic, that the future must be seen simply, radically open.  The postethnic 
prospective denies that there is one history of progress that could predict the future, or 
that there is one person, the prophet, to whom it may be revealed.  The future is the 
ultimate ―post‖ because, qua future, it is always post-now.  The future does not exist only 
for the sake of those now living, but will also be decided on by those who live in it, who 
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do not live now.  For us in the present, this means that we cannot make our decisions only 
for our own generation.  We have to confront problems intergenerationally, like good 
ancestors, as for example in the renowned (and recently commercialized) practice of 
deliberating consequences unto the seventh generation.  This is, in different terms, what 
Jacques Derrida means by a ―messianic without messianism‖ in The Spirit of Marx, in 
which his only mention of utopianism has the usual pejorative cast.  Derrida rejects the 
―blackboard‖ paradigm in which we can map out on a blank slate the solutions to all our 
problems (1994, 97).  What he argues for, instead, is an intergenerational commitment in 
terms of a conjuration by the past that haunts us and a noncommittal stance to remain 
receptive to whatever comes, the arrivant (81). This is a dedication, an oath, to justice 
without a pledge to see only a particular, preconditioned outcome as justice.  It is, I insist, 
a postethnic commitment to someone else, someone who is not necessarily like me.  It is 
worth pausing too to notice that Derrida‘s figure of the ghost is none other than the figure 
of Hamlet‘s father, the father of arguably the first literary representation of a modern 
individual with an interior identity.  Thus what haunts us here haunts us as identity-
bearing beings, who sense ourselves as selves that might or might not be.  Moreover, 
remaining thoroughly open to what we have yet to meet, that which arrives, means that 
we cannot insist on a conformity or commensuration of the unmet stranger to our 
selfsame identities or our self-interests.   
In part three, I return to the question of teleology, but this time at the other end of 
the axis: what is at stake is not the myth of origin but the revelation of prophecy.  How 
can we be exhorted to reform if we must remain open to any kind of future at all?  One 
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could argue that we ought not to imagine any particular future because that image might 
be used to make certain forcible demands in the present.  But there is, I argue, a way of 
imagining the future that turns on the playful rather than the speculative imagination, 
using a sense of wonder to explore rather than a destiny to fulfill rigidly, in a pre-
determined fashion.  In chapter one,  Octavia Butler‘s apocalyptic, survival novel 
Parable of the Sower imagines a future religion, Earthseed, that makes a spiritual virtue 
of embracing change rather than transcendental certainty.  This spiritualism is reversed, 
in chapter two, in the anti-spiritual apocalypse of Kurt Vonnegut‘s Galapagos, a future in 
which the human species is changed ―back‖ into what we recognize as animals rather 
than moving ―forward‖ to the stars.  Reading these two works alongside each other, we 
see a range of future-writing, from the expansive to the implosive, but each evokes a 
cooperative and negotiable sense of community.  The best articulation, to my knowledge, 
of future-writing that welcomes whatever strange things may come is Ursula K. Le 
Guin‘s Hanish cycle.  Le Guin‘s science fiction projects a future communitarian structure 
called the ―Ekumen‖ which lets readers play with long, non-teleological views of time 
and wide-open, generous conceptions of humanity.  The theme of this imaginary future is 
the ―household,‖ which shares etymological roots with economy and ecology, along with 
the sense of keeping things in balance.  This ―housekeeping,‖ I propose, is the best 
inoperative model for doing good in a world in which no one ideal work can be 
universally applied to everyone all at once. 
In the afterword to this study, I remark that a postethnic utopia, as it is being 
written in recent and contemporary American novels, has become a political urgency in a 
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world whose problems are not longer confined to traditionally separated kinds of human 
experiences.  The problems of the poor are also the problems of the rich; what confronts 
the oppressed also confronts the empowered; the problems of women are also the 
problems of men; the problems of the East and South are also the problems of the West 
and North.  More specifically, no one ―ethnicity‖ gives us the high ground, the location 
from which to survey the damage and direct the solution.  The challenges that confront us 
now are increasingly overdetermined by the productions of late capitalism and cannot be 
easily separated into agendas for human rights or environmentalism.  Social justice and 
environmental justice must be consubstantial, and the last boundary that a robust 
postethnic utopianism must transgress is the dividing line between the human and 
nonhuman systems of the planet.  Our challenges arise in the interconnectedness of all 
things and, in particular, of all ethnicities; it is there that we must try to imagine the 
answers. 
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INTRODUCTION / UTOPIAS, IDENTITIES, COMMUNITIES 
Chapter 1: The Spirit of Critique and Hope 
Utopia is a literary genre, a cognitive operation, and a field of discourse.  It is also 
simply and most famously a pun on homophonous prefixes—the Greek eu and u— that 
could indicated both the good and the nonexistent.  The utopian literary genre, narrowly 
defined, is a fictional narrative account of a fantastic world constructed against the 
backdrop of the real world.  As Darko Suvin‘s specific and, to my mind, supremely 
useful definition has it, in terms that already link up community and temporality, 
traditional straight-up utopias are ―the verbal construction of a particular quasi-human 
community where sociopolitical institutions, norms, and individual relationships are 
organized according to a more perfect principle than in the author‘s community, this 
construction being based on estrangement arising out of an alternative historical 
hypothesis‖ (1979, 49).  Whereas naturalist fictions might give us imaginary 
representations of the real world, utopian fictions give us imaginative constructions of 
worlds that are unreal and cued for comparison to the real.  Such comparative activity can 
unfold not only along the ―more perfect‖ line that Suvin defines for utopias proper but 
also includes contrastive relationships that produce dystopia and anti-utopia as well.   
This comparative operation makes utopian fiction at once fantastic and political; thinking 
about the present world in terms of what it is not opens the door on utopia as a cognitive 
operation.  This cognition, utopian thinking, has been theorized and categorized in as 
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many different ways as the utopian literary genre has been named.  We will take up two 
major threads of the theory utopian thinking, hope and critique, in this chapter.  
Otherwise, let me note that utopia as a genre of writing and utopia as a process of 
thinking form the matrix for utopia as a field of discourse.  By this, I mean simply that 
some of our interactions can be defined within the terms of utopian writing and thought, 
especially in the American context where so many utopian tropes are part of our national 
vocabulary. We talk about the good that we would like to achieve, whether it is the good 
that we all agree on, and whether it is the good that our ancestors (or simply our parents) 
wished for us to have.  I argue, in subsequent chapters, that we can no longer have such 
conversations only within a selfsame identity group.  Increasingly, utopian discourse 
must cross the boundary lines between our sociocultural categories, an activity that I 
approach through the lens of ethnicity and solidarity.  The need to continue such 
conversations seems always more urgent in the face of a crowded, fast-moving, and 
perilous world.  Yet we remain cautious, and rightly so, because many if not all of the 
perils that confront us now are the products of the utopian discourses of the past. 
We have in mind infamous totalitarian and domineering projects when we use 
utopia pejoratively to indicate an idealistic dream or scheme created by one or a few 
privileged individuals who presumably intend to improve the lives of everyone.  
Idealistic, revolutionary utopias are seen either as sad, if they result in failed communes 
and abandoned ―intentional communities,‖ or terribly dangerous if they lead us to the gas 
chamber and the Gulag.  While many if not all scholars of utopia rehabilitate the term to 
mean precisely that which might keep us safe from totalitarianism, the pejorative sense of 
19 
the word is not without warrant.  In Plato‘s Republic, when Socrates is asked what the 
ideal kingdom would look like, should we be surprised that the philosopher responds by 
describing the rule of a philosopher king?  ―The beautiful portrait of the sovereign,‖ Karl 
Popper observes, ―is a self-portrait‖ (1965, 155).  Popper invites us to adopt a human 
Socratic irony, to take compassion on Plato, ―who had to be satisfied with establishing 
the first professorship, instead of the first kingship, of philosophy‖ (155).  But this is, of 
course, a strategic compassion, for although Popper exclaims, ―what a monument of 
human smallness is this idea of the philosopher king‖ (156), the entire thrust of The Open 
Society and Its Enemies is against the very great harm this idea of greatness has caused, 
and against the great threat it still poses.  Popper‘s opposition to Platonic totalitarian 
justice and ―utopian engineering‖ is apt, and I will return to it.  The link between total 
theory and the utopian scheme à la Plato is clear: what we must ask is what becomes of 
our utopias after our theories have become fragmented.  
It is startling to find how central ethnicity and ethnic separation are to Plato.  His 
ideal republic is legitimated by, as Popper writes it, The Myth of Blood and Soil.  This 
―noble lie,‖ this basic propaganda, dupes the people with a story that reifies their stations 
in life as their essential natures: the rulers are imbued with gold and silver, the peasants 
with iron and copper.  Aldous Huxley‘s Brave New World reworks this idea in a toxic 
―utopia‖ where the noble lie has been made true: Alphas, Betas, Gammas and so on are 
genetically engineered for their particular roles in society.  This Republic appears as a 
serious description of Plato‘s ideal social order,
1
 which places a privileged, all-knowing, 
and benevolent authority (the philosopher) in charge of the ignorant masses (the people 
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duped into contentment).  The noble lie, of course, is a kind of ―ethnic ideology,‖ an 
outgrowth of Plato‘s conviction that a harmonious social order depends upon keeping 
different kinds people in different kinds of places or roles in society.  This harmonious 
economy was consubstantial, for Plato, with Idealism in epistemology and aesthetics, as 
Popper argues throughout.  The current diversification of our political worlds—and our 
social worlds as well—is a kind of ethnic fragmentation.  We cannot now as easily 
believe ourselves to be part of a community of people completely and only like ourselves, 
and this is why at the end of the introduction, we will return to the problem of the 
fragment—historical, personal, aesthetic fragments— and how a thinking of the fragment 
is required for a rethinking of utopia along ethnically fragmented, or, postethnic lines. 
Plato‘s propaganda myth makes the citizens of the Republic happy with the way things 
are because they accept them as the way things must ―naturally‖ be.  This kind of myth is 
becoming less and less tenable today, even where it has been tacitly assumed.  This 
means two things: one, we are less likely to believe that society should serve in the 
interests of one kind of person, and two, we must become accustomed to the fact that no 
one point of view will be able to see the solution to our most urgent social, political, or 
ecological problems. 
The Republic is the kind of Romanic utopia resulting in the imagination of an 
ideal or a perfect life, a kind of utopianism directed towards the ―end of history,‖ the final 
unchanging product of the historical dialectic and its necessary upheavals, of biological 
evolution and its necessary extinctions.  Importantly, there is also a tradition of utopia as 
satire—Northrop Frye called it a kind of Menippean satire, a fantastic, often frenetic 
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satire on the arrogance of knowledge.  Frye‘s now dated definition of utopia emphasizes 
the quality of a ―single intellectual pattern‖ fixated on a central problem and solution that 
the utopian writer satirizes (1957, 310).  For example, in Edward Bellamy‘s Looking 
Backward, solving the problem of distribution and monopoly holds the key to the future; 
in B.F. Skinner‘s Walden II, behavioralist pedagogy is the key; in Ernest Callenbach‘s 
Ecotopia, it is sustainability and holistic naturalism.  The two faces of utopia, the 
romantic and the satiric, with their various inflections through the lenses of eutopia, 
dystopia, anti-utopia, and so on, do not differ in their basic assumption of what Popper 
calls ―utopian engineering.‖  Both the romantic dreaming and the satiric mockery of 
utopia have been conducted from a single point of view and towards a single problem.  
This paradigm was true for most utopias through the mid-twentieth century and is the 
paradigm described by Frye and critiqued by Popper.  Arguably in the wake of such a 
critique, but more likely in the wake of the sociopolitical violence Popper abhorred, this 
Idealism and simplicity would no longer do.  We shall see, in fact, the reconfiguration of 
utopia, in critical theory, as something precisely the opposite of the totalitarian idealism 
of Plato.  
This reversal should not be as surprising as it sometimes is: the change is the 
advent of new descriptions as much as it is a shift in the practice of utopian writing itself.  
This is not to say that utopian writing is not, on balance, different today than it was long 
ago.  What I mean is that we can find traces of what we now call ―critical utopia‖ long 
before the late twentieth century.  In the following chapters, I take up the discussion of 
utopia not as a literary genre but rather a discursive field, and so many of the novels I 
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examine in detail are not utopias novels per se, but all of them address the question of 
utopia as it has been developed in American culture.  In other words, the focus is on the 
writing of utopia, not utopian writings, and so before introducing utopianism in American 
literature and culture or surveying theories of critical utopia, I digress to illustrate what 
will become an important distinction between the philosophic or blueprint utopianism I 
have been describing and its doppelganger, utopia as a rhetorically situated, strategic 
practice.   
Let me clarify with an example.  In contrast to the example of Plato above, we 
have, for instance, the utopian storyteller Hythloday who is featured in Book I of More‘s 
Utopia.  The interlocutive situation presented by More is quite different from the one 
presented by Plato.  In Book I, Hythloday describes an imaginary banquet in which he 
persuades an influential Cardinal to place a moratorium on capital punishment partly with 
the example of Tallstoria, an imaginary kingdom in which capital punishment has been 
abolished with good results (1965, 51-54).  In The Republic, the utopian scenario is a 
philosopher‘s serious attempt to describe the best social order overall; in Utopia, the 
utopian narrative is a rhetorical strategy to persuade an advisor to the King who is 
accorded king-like respect and power.  Morus, More‘s first person persona in the Latin 
text, urges Hythloday to actually take his account of utopia to court, but Hythloday 
refuses.  He offers two scenarios in which he might use a utopian narrative (of Nolandia 
and Happiland, in turn) but would fail to persuade the kind to change his mind against the 
kings own material interests.  More frames this as a horizon for the prospects of social 
reform in societies with private property: what catches my attention, in both cases, is that 
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these scenarios feature utopian narrative situated in a particular political situation (57-65).  
The utopian scenario here is never a specific plan for revolution, let alone a vision of the 
product of revolution.  Moreover, the utopian story is called for by rhetorical asymmetry, 
the overwhelming political authority of the king, and the principle of kairos, 
―opportunity.‖  In the opportune moment, a courtier or advisor might make use of a 
utopian yarn to shake up the royal decision making process.  In this way, More‘s sense of 
the use of the utopian imagination is closer to what we now call a ―critical utopia.‖ 
This does not mean that More‘s writing is complete free of the kinds of policies 
that we associate with domination and conquest, and we should ask how, if at all, the 
noble lie of essential ethnic or class identity changes from Plato in Book II of Utopia.  
Whereas Plato‘s racialism kept the iron and brass peasantry separate from the silver 
aristocracy, and even the aristocracy separate from the supreme race, the golden 
philosophers, More‘s Utopia is more concerned with claiming essential national identity.  
It does this by assuming a certain character of the ―utopians‖ placed in contrast with 
those on the mainland or ―here in England.‖  More‘s Utopia actual frees up internal class 
hierarchies—most famously through communal property—but does sketch out the 
imperial-national-colonial ideology of race that would come to mark both history and the 
history of utopian writing for the next several centuries.  Amid the jests and jibes about 
golden toilets and so on, More sneaks in several social policies that would have been 
progressive for the court of Henry VIII, but which we now recognize as the forerunners 
of colonial ideology.  On the one hand, the citizens of Utopia are free to travel without 
the king‘s written permission.  On the other hand, they have a policy of seizing the land 
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from lesser nations on the mainland if those nations are not making good use of it.  Based 
on particular beliefs about what land is for in the first place (e.g. a particular kind of 
productivity), this land seizure prefigures justifications for the theft of immeasurable 
resources from colonial territories up to the present day.  Utopia stands, then, at the end 
of royal monarchy and at the threshold of colonial empire. 
More‘s utopianism contains both serious reforms (e.g. freedom to travel, 
communal living) and playful satire (the gold chamber pot bit) with a will for total 
management that we would later come to regard as principally colonial and, in some 
sense, modern.  This sums up the ambivalence of utopia, a figure of not only 
libertarianism vis-à-vis monarchic authoritarianism but also totalitarianism for the sake of 
exhaustive problem-solving.  Utopias since have continued to oscillate between these two 
functions, and we have tended to call ―utopias‖ only those that are more literally minded.  
Francis Bacon takes up again the philosopher king in The New Atlantis, although revising 
the elite to a council of scientists called ―The House of Solomon.‖  But Maragaret 
Cavendish imagines an outright silly Blazing World that has more in common with Lewis 
Carol‘s fantastic wonderland than a speculative utopia like Bacon‘s.  The feminist 
utopian tradition, perhaps the strongest revolutionary subgenre, occupies just about every 
iteration of the form from fantasy to romance to dystopia.  Blazing World, published in 
1666, brings us near the historical setting of Morrision‘s A Mercy in colonial America.  If 
we define a first wave of utopias energized by the excitement of European exploration 
and ―discovery‖ of new worlds, then we can identify a second wave of utopias energized 
by the revolutions in America and France.  This revolutionary utopianism generated more 
25 
serious blueprints than the earlier, more deliberately fictional forms.  Fourier, for 
example, was sincere about his phalanxes, and Bellamy spent the rest of his life after the 
publication of Looking Backwards trying to make its imaginary reforms actually come 
true.  As time went on, people began to believe in utopia in a different and more 
dangerous way. 
Accordingly, many of the utopian tropes and slogans in American culture are 
taken for granted as the commonground of public discourse.  The shining city on the hill 
is perhaps the oldest and most potent among these.  But also ubiquitous and still powerful 
is the ―land of immigrants‖ and the ―melting pot.‖  Over and behind all these of course is 
―the new world,‖ which returns again and again to proclaim both new frontiers of 
opportunity and the more sinister overtones of a ―New World Order.‖  In the new world, 
the colonial mission to tame the land and civilize the natives is welded tightly to the 
promise of personal growth and fulfillment.  The indispensability and impossibility of a 
melting pot utopia is indicated by Kenneth Roemer in the introduction to his landmark 
edited collection America as Utopia.  Roemer concludes with a convincing explication of 
the centrality of America to utopian studies and vice versa.  As he argues, 
…studies of American utopian literature are essential for anyone who wants to 
understand America.  The inclusiveness of the utopias and their revelations about 
basic hopes and fears make them fascinating indices to American attitudes. This is 
especially so because American history is in part a history of potential dystopias 
and eutopias: the dystopian aura of the ―howling wilderness,‖ the genocide in the 
name of Manifest Destiny, the horrors of slavery, the nightmares of rampant 
commercialism, technology, urban squalor, Vietnam, Watergate, and energy 
shortages; and the eutopian impulse of Winthrop‘s ―City upon a Hill,‖ Jefferson‘s 
Declaration of Independence, the possibilities for rebirth in the ―virgin‖ West, the 
idealism of youth and civil rights movements, New Deals, New Frontiers, and 
Great Societies, and the technology and spirit that sent Americans to the moon 
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and a bicentennial Viking to Utopia. To know America, we must have knowledge 
of America as utopia. (1981,14) 
 Although Roemer gestures to the ―inclusiveness‖ of American utopias, his list of 
eutopian and dystopian elements in American life quickly reveal inclusiveness to be the 
principal problem, the very point at which utopias clash.  We cannot forget that ―the 
possibilities for rebirth in the ‗virgin‘ West‖ take place on the same ground as ―the 
genocide in the name of Manifest Destiny.‖  As far as I can see, up until recently, one 
person‘s utopia was always another person‘s dystopia, and this is one of the reasons the 
present study aims at discovering, in American novelists, the ways in which utopias or, to 
use a less ambiguous term, the social imaginary ideal can no longer be ―for‖ only one 
kind of person.   
Utopianism in America unfolds along several fronts, including political rhetoric, 
actual intentional communities, and literary utopias.  Above, Roemer already outlines the 
utopianism of the American national narrative: the New World, the City on a Hill, the 
Frontier, the Union, the American Dream.  One could say that every American 
community has been an intentional community, from the first colonial settlements to the 
Shakers to the all-black towns such as Rosewood.  Communities like the Amish still 
conduct their lives against the general grain of American society.  But we tend to reserve 
the phrase intentional community for smaller isolated projects, usually of a communal-
agrarian nature.   The most famous of these nineteenth-century Massachusetts Brook 
Farm, which fostered several counter-cultural agendas including women‘s rights and 
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abolition.  Thus Americans have quite often answered the at-large utopian political tone 
with many smaller, politically radical communities within the American landscape.   
The ―real‖ utopianism, large and small, of American lives intersects with the 
American literary utopia most strikingly, and painfully, in Nathaniel Hawthorn‘s The 
Blithedale Romance, which is based on the author‘s experience living at Brook Farm in 
1841.  In that novelization of an intentional community, Roy Male writes, ―Hawthorne 
arrived at his definitive criticism of the recurring American efforts at transformation 
without tragedy‖ (1978, 297).  This is the effort that Roemer underscores, and it is an 
effort to which American literature has often responded.  American fiction, like American 
politics, has not often been able to avoid some utopian inflection.  We could argue, along 
these lines, that any regional or frontier fiction—any writing with a strong sense of a 
circumscribed and unique place—participates in the ―local‖ utopian spirit of American 
communities.  We could also argue that any progressive novel—any writing that 
responds to a particular wave of social upheaval or uncertainty—evokes the ―national‖ 
self-image of America as innovative, revolutionary, forward-thinking, or ―utopian.‖  
American literary utopias must then be only a part of American utopian discourse, which 
infuses all American literature, not only the utopian genre.  While there is a rich tradition 
of utopian novels per se in American literature, it is this broadest category of utopia as 
discourse that I deploy in selecting the American novelists as evidence for the arrival of a 
postethnic utopian sensibility.   
Rather than a simple demonstration of the volume of American utopian writing, it 
may make the point better to observe simply that many American writers accorded 
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canonical standing include a utopian work or two in their catalog.  This does not mean 
that there is not a preponderance of neglected utopian work in noncanonical American 
literature.  One of the few exhaustive period studies in the ―recovery‖ mode is Jean 
Pfaelzer‘s The Utopian Novel in America, 1886-1896: The Politics of Form (1985).  
Pfaelzer convincingly argues that a boom in utopian literature, largely forgotten today 
with exception of Bellamy‘s 1888 Looking Backwards, responded to the socio-cultural 
rupture of reconstruction.  In other words, utopia is not only that which undercuts the 
norm, but it can also be the formal maneuver that steps in when a disrupting event has 
occurred.  This is a similar approach to the one taken by Jennifer Burwell in Notes on 
Nowhere: Feminism, Utopian Logic, and Social Transformation (1997), in which critical 
feminist utopian novels are read alongside feminist political revolutions in American 
culture, neither simply predicting nor reacting to them.  It may or may not be 
―exceptionalist‖ to say that American society has always been transforming in one way or 
another.  Of the best known American utopias, some are written by famous, canonical 
writers such as Hawthorne‘s Blithedale Romance, Mark Twain‘s Connecticut Yankee in 
King Author’s Court, William Dean Howell‘s A Traveler from Altruria, Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman‘s Herland, Jack London‘s The Iron Heal, and Lewis Sinclair‘s It Can’t Happen 
Here.  Most utopias after the mid-twentieth century, with some notable exceptions such 
as Callanbach‘s Ecotopia, are shelved in the science fiction section.  And a small but 
significant set of American utopian writers are known for their contributions to other 
discursive fields outside of literature: objectivist philosopher Ayn Rand (Anthem), 
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behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner (Walden Two), architect and urban designer James 
Howard Kunstler (World Made By Hand).   
Utopianism continues to jump the fence between literature and politics on a 
regular basis.  Thomas Peyser‘s Utopia and Cosmopolis: Globalization in the Era of 
American Literary Realism is an important link in understanding the paradoxical 
articulation of utopian idealism and realist pragmatism, which in American history is also 
known as progressivism.  The unifying principle of both utopia and pragmatism is ―the 
idea that society was in some fundamental way a construction (like a building) rather than 
a natural formation (like a leaf)‖ (1998, 3).  Peyser‘s basic observation that both 
utopianism and realism allowed for a progressive constructivism to shape a global or 
cosmopolitan worldview can help us understand why the term utopia would show up in 
the pragmatism of Richard Rorty‘s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.  Peyser details 
convincingly how writers of utopias and realism are united by a desire to pull the veil 
from the audience‘s eyes, to show that the world is a construct and as such is susceptible 
to reconstruction (8-10).  Given the acronym IROS by prominent utopian theorist Ruth 
Levitas (2007), this imaginary reconstitution of society is only half the story.  Perhaps we 
should be satisfied to let the reconstruction be reified and thus always await a new 
generation of ―strong poets‖ and ―utopian revolutionaries‖ to tear it down again; these are 
the prophets that Rorty calls for and the prospect he seems satisfied with under the banner 
of ironism.  Then again, we might want to think about the possibility of an image of 
society that needs less reification of the social as the natural because it does not believe 
these are so different that one can mask the other.  In terms of identity and the prospect 
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for the good life, the social and the natural return as questions of nature versus nurture.  
And, in the more specific terms of my argument, opening up the prospects for the good 
beyond the values of any one particular socio-ethnic group would mean opening up our 
conceptions of what is possible for human nature.  Further, this possibility would be post-
identitarian in the spirit of post-humanism.  What is at stake here is precisely what we 
will count as ―natural‖ in both the green and essentialist senses of the word.  But the 
question of how natural our social reifications actually are brings us to the relationship 
between the demystification of critique and the mystical experience of hope, and thus to 
the intersection of utopia and critical theory. 
A new wave of utopian studies emerged in the late 1970s and into the 1980s as 
critical and literary theorists responded to cultural representations tied to the postcolonial, 
civil rights and counterculture movements, as well as, into the 1990s, the end of Soviet-
style communism.  That Marxism had ever been utopian is a controversial claim: 
certainly, Engels drew a sharp contrast between doing the hard work of real revolution 
and playing pretend with fantasies of perfection (1880/1970).  But Ernst Bloch and later 
Fredric Jameson have worked the Marxist-utopian line, and even in the seeming victory 
of capital we can still speak, with Derrida, about a utopian ―spirit of Marx‖ that continues 
to haunt us despite the fact that we can no longer legitimately imagine a workers‘ 
paradise after the finale of communism‘s historical dialectic.  Thus, with the foreclosure 
of many earlier waves of utopianism, scholars at the end of the twentieth century have 
reaffirmed utopia‘s rhetorical and discursive functions over its speculative and totalizing 
ones.  Whereas earlier writers were able to imagine a total ideal in the terms of one 
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particular group—whether generically Anglo utopians, or women (Gillman‘s Herland), 
or workers (in Marx)—we cannot do so anymore because, as we return to the rhetorical 
or interlocutive uses of utopia, we find that we are no longer addressing a singular king, 
authority, regime, or political body but rather a polity made up increasingly of many 
different kinds of people. 
One useful heuristic for charting the field of utopian theory, I might offer in light 
of this return, is the counterbalance of hope and critique.  Perhaps the best, certainly the 
most sweeping explication of utopia as hope is with Ernst Bloch, who, as I have already 
mentioned, tells us that Marxism itself is a kind of utopian project.  Bloch‘s ―principle of 
hope‖ is not limited only to the vision of a proletarian revolution, however.  The first 
words of The Spirit of Utopia existentially evoke identity and community:  ―I am. We 
are. That is enough. Now we have to begin.‖ (1964/2000, 1).  This stirring line indicates 
the communitarian commitment not only to communism but also to hope and life that 
extends beyond oneself in others.  We might label this the optimistic, centrifugal force of 
utopia, which is nothing less than ―the right thing, for which it is worth to live, to be 
organized, and to have time‖ (3).  Drawing on the vocabulary employed by Jean-Luc 
Nancy, we can see that this utopian spirit calls us to a communion in a worthy cause 
rather than a less mystical communication and cooperation of our several needs and 
desires (1991, 19).  Bloch‘s principle tends toward not only one hope, or hope for all 
people, but even a unified hope of all people.  To his credit, Bloch does not often 
proscribe what this hope should be, only that it should be recognized in art and literature.  
It is precisely in the prescription of the singular hope, by the philosopher king, that 
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utopianism leads to its uttermost horrors.  Those horrors, some of which I have already 
mentioned, sharpen one critique, Popper‘s, of utopianism as the ideology of empire.  The 
other critique, Engels‘s, sees utopianism simply as another kind of opiate that distracts 
the revolutionary with daydreams.  The only way to redeem the utopian hope, here, is to 
inscribe it with the oppositional and the active.  This is precisely what Karl Mannheim 
does in his pairing of utopia and ideology, and it is on this contrarian footing that we 
begin to shift from a the theory of utopia-as-hope to one of utopia-as-critique. 
We have already had occasion, with Frye, to connect utopia and epistemology in 
the riots of Menippean satire.  Not coincidentally, Mannheim‘s principal topic is a 
sociology of knowledge, a material epistemology that ―seeks to comprehend thought in 
the concrete setting of an historical-social situation‖ and also a communal one because 
―men living in groups…think with and against one another.‖  For Mannheim, the 
differences between ethnic groups are merely the differences in the ―particular style of 
thought‖ developed ―in an endless series of responses to certain typical situations 
characterizing their common position‖ (1949, 3).  In this setting, ideology and utopia are 
not complimentary ways of thinking against the present moment: ideology ―conceals the 
present by attempting to comprehend it in terms of the past‖ while utopia ―transcends the 
present and is oriented to the future‖ (86 n. 2).  Thus both ideology and utopia are 
―incongruent‖ with present reality, but whereas ideological incongruencies are ―effective 
in the realization and the maintenance of the existing order of things,‖ utopian 
incongruencies ―burst the ends of the existing order‖ (173).  We can take this 
incongruence to mean something like the independence of the image from its ostensible 
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referent.  Mannheim tells us that ―society is possible…because individuals in it carry 
around in their heads some sort of picture of society‖ (1964, xxiii).  This picture or 
image—importantly located within each individual—leads us directly to Louis 
Althusser‘s famous first thesis, according to which ―ideology represents the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence‖ (1971).  The utopian, 
here, is one aspect of the incongruence that makes this an imaginary relationship rather 
than a mechanical coupling.  What Althusser christens as the ―ideological state 
apparatus‖ is particularly dedicated to maintaining the status quo, making the future as 
much like the present as possible.
2
  What maintains the order of things, at least 
sociologically, then, is not an essential identity adhering to its own true nature, but rather 
a belief transmitted through material reality.  The materiality of this transmission is, of 
course, Althusser‘s second thesis.  Shifting our vocabulary, we can say, perhaps 
simplistically, that individual and group identities are the products of a social imagination 
maintained by the symbolic action of social images and objects.  However, I will argue 
later by drawing from the work of Elaine Scarry that the images and objects around us 
transmit not only ideology but also compassion. 
A quick aside, here, will show that utopian discourse can be usefully configured 
as an identity-community problem when we underscore the potential of critical literary 
study to analyze the dynamics of social continuity or transformation.  Working closely 
from Mannheim and Althusser,  James Kavanagh instructively glosses ideology as a 
conceptual image of both society and one‘s place in it, which comes to dominate ―social 
reproduction,‖ specifically the continuous reproduction of existing class relationships to 
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the benefit of dominant class (1995, 308-309).  This process of social reproduction 
carries on through countless material interpellations, one of which, of course, is the 
interpellation of literary narrative.  J. Hillis Miller, in the same volume, arrives at the 
topic of social reproduction from the study of narrative rather than ideology, but, as with 
Kavanagh, the core issue is still the ―passing on‖ of cultural values, through the 
socialization of readers, that is, the process of making the next generation as much like 
the present one as possible.  Or, as Miller says, ―Fictions keep us in line and tend to make 
us more like our neighbors‖ (1995, 69).  At the risk of stretching the 
production/reproduction metaphor too far, I suggest that within the paradigm of social 
reproduction, ideology is something like cultural DNA.  You inherit it from your ―parent‖ 
culture(s), which may or may not leave you, in the worlds of Gerald Vizenor, a 
crossblood.  In this biological metaphor, utopia is the principle of mutation itself.   
Miller also reminds us that while ―fiction‖ can perform its ideological ―police 
function‖ because it works at the site of ideology (the images in our heads), its status as 
fiction also opens the door for radical deviation from the norm. ―In a novel,‖ the critic 
insists, ―alternative assumptions can be entertained or experimented with—not as in the 
real world, where such experimentations might have dangerous consequences, but in the 
imaginary world where, it is easy to assume ‗nothing really happens‘‖(69).  The 
flexibility (or fictionality) of language that lets it be incongruent (Mannheim‘s term) with 
reality allows for the maintenance of ideological past-directed images that prop up the 
status quo, and that same flexibility allows for the introduction of future-directed images, 
utopian mutations, contra the status quo.  This flexibility goes by other names as well, 
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and is in fact the principal tenet underwriting non-representational and deconstructive 
theories of language in pragmatism and poststructuralism respectively.  Because the 
meaning of language objects depends on something other than their referential alignment 
with the object world (e.g. on other language objects), language can leverage against 
other language to bend our understanding of that world in any direction.  Theories that 
celebrate utopia-as-critique generally approach a particular utopian text not on the merits 
of its specific hope (a speculated solution to a single problem), but rather on the general 
merits of leveraging the critical utopian imagination at all.  Generating a wealth of 
utopian writings, here, is something like fostering biodiversity.  What we are looking for, 
experimentally, is a durable mutation. 
In this way, utopia may be theorized as patently contrarian, that is, contra the 
present status quo, and therefore excellently if not inherently suited to social critique.  
Indeed, the paradigm of ―critical utopia‖ has become the state of the art in utopian 
studies, as utopists understandably want to distance their own positions as quickly as 
possible from the troubling imperial-positivist utopias of yore.
3
  For example, Nicholas 
Spencer proposes, in After Utopia, a genology of ―critical space‖ in American fiction, e.g. 
―the fictionalizations of spatiality that identify, analyze, oppose, and imagine alternatives 
to the forms of social domination implemented by American capitalism.‖ (2006, 10).  
Thus critique itself is given not only an analytical but also an imaginative dimension 
because seeing clearly what is depends also on seeing what is not.  But the term ―utopia‖ 
still retains the pejorative sense that Engels used, i.e. the impossible dream that distracts 
us from practical actions, the fantasy of perfection that is the enemy of the real good.
4
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The quieting of revolutionary desire through its displacement into the future or into a 
regulation rather than a promise is what prompts Derrida to eschew the term in Specters 
of Marx.
5
  In human rights studies, Mark Goodale points to an ongoing ―skepticism about 
the utopianism‖ that accompanies human rights universality (contrasted with 
universalism) and its ―cosmopolitan optimism...of those visionary elites who took it upon 
themselves to build a framework for perpetual peace from the ruins of mid-century last‖ 
(2009, 14).  In the context of environmentalism, David Ehrenfeld, in a book chapter on 
community no less, insists that something called the ―Utopia fallacy‖ prevents genuine 
conceptions of intergenerational justice ( 2009, 203-10ff).  I point to these three studies in 
diverse fields—literary history, anthropology and human rights, and environmental 
studies—to indicate the multifaceted presence utopia still has in our most urgent 
discourses.  For the most part, blithe hope is still held the antithesis of hard-headed 
critique, with only the desire for change as their common characteristic. 
This desired change is theorized by Paul Ricœur as the ―rupture,‖ of the status 
quo.  Building on Mannheim‘s work, early in the century, and anticipating the 
poststructural and postcolonial version of utopia-as-critique which we see presently,  
Ricœur argues it is the duty of a modern philosopher to interpret signs and ideology 
through a hermeneutic point of view between ethics and politics and focused on setting 
up basic rights in terms of wealth distribution and social justice.  Rather than Plato‘s 
philosopher kings, in Ricœur philosophers are critical thinkers who see through the 
threefold workings of ideology: reality dissimulation, the legitimating of the authorities, 
and, finally, social integration.  Ideology is always hiding the gap between the agendas of 
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those in power and the best interest of those who are subject to that power. Thus, 
ideology and utopia are reconceptualized as integration/identity and rupture/critique 
(1986).  In making this argument, Ricœur does not actually challenge the assumption that 
the stability of social order relies on the fixed identitarian loyalties of its individual 
subjects, the same assumption underwriting Plato‘s myth of blood and soil.  Yet by 
questioning the value of stability, demonstrating that critique is ―unstable‖ and causes 
identities to fluctuate, Ricœur shows us how the wild flights of hope and the nuts-and-
bolts of critique are alike in their disruption of the status quo.  I would go further by 
insisting that a thoroughgoing critical utopian mutation here must not only destabilize 
particular identities, but also be a break away from particularism itself as a form of 
essentialist subjectivity.   Which is to say, again, that critical utopias must be postethnic. 
Perhaps the most influential proponent of the utopia-as-critique school is Tom 
Moylan, who along with Bill Ashcroft deploys the phrase ―critical utopia‖ to good effect.  
Moylan has a better eye for the dark side of utopia than Bloch, Mannheim, or Ricœur, 
and he is quick to point out that earlier utopian writings were counter-ideologies rather 
than counters to ideology.  Moylan differentiates three stages in the evolution of utopian 
literature: the early ―totalizing blueprints,‖ works which set in stone every detail of the 
perfect society, leaving little or no room for maneuver or change; dystopias like Huxley's 
Brave New World and Zamyatin's We, which attack present social systems for their 
centralization of power, suppression of the individual, mass production, and materialistic 
values but offer no viable alternatives to these abuses
6
; and finally, the utopias featured 
and praised by Moylan as ―critical utopias‖ (1986, 1-12).  These are critical in a dual 
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sense: they critique existing social institutions and values and, at the same time, achieve 
the ―critical mass required to make the necessary explosive reaction‖ (10, emphasis 
original).  This last is the criterion upon which Moylan will praise or condemn a work or 
aspects of it: Does it provide a visible means or process by which change can be 
effected?  The utopian, especially feminist, literature that springs to life around 
revolutionary social justice movements is what Moylan deems ―critical‖ and has several 
defining characteristics. It is militant, often portraying the necessity of violent opposition 
to the status quo; it represents choices between multiple options rather than a fixed 
agenda; it is achieved through human will and action rather than as the result of fate or 
natural accident; and it is a continuing process with problems and challenges still to be 
resolved (41-46).  Critical utopias as an ―oppositional cultural practice‖ (12) do not 
imagine a particular change but rather offer images of change itself, outlining the 
possibility for difference.   The utopian novel, then, is a kind of mental gymnastics.  The 
result is a forced expansion in the processing power of the reader so that alternative 
values can be contemplated—an act of political consciousness-raising.   
Indeed, four novels that Moylan offers in the second half of Demand the 
Impossible force the reader to rethink the most basic assumptions about the relationships 
between science, society, and the individual at every level from the sexual and economic 
to the temporal and spatial.  Here postethnicity comes into the picture, in utopian 
literature as in the countercultural movement at large.  As Moylan describes it, 
[t]he opposition… is no longer to be found limited to that of a single vanguard 
party or, at the other pole, an expression of pure negation and terror.  The political 
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opposition, at least since the late 1960s… is made up of a variety of autonomous 
movements grouped loosely in an historical anti-hegemonic bloc. (27) 
 This is at the core of Moylan's observations that utopian projects fail to generate that 
critical edge which forces us to continually challenge the values and goals which are the 
soul of any society. The critical voice keeps society self-conscious and dynamic, keeps it 
alive, is a voice that cannot belong to any single master architect. 
We could argue over membership and pecking order in the ―anti-hegemonic 
bloc,‖ which Moylan ―divide[s] into three areas: feminism, ecology, and self-
management both of the workplace and the sphere of daily life,‖ with the third area 
including ethnic and cultural self-determination (27).  There is no lack of good candidates 
here.  We could say that feminism should lead the way against patriarchy with gender as 
the category of identification, because everyone has one.  We could say that Marxism 
should lead the way against capitalism because class struggle is the core of the historical 
dialectic, or because we think of transforming class relations in a way different from how 
we think of transforming race relations (this is the point that Walter Benn Michaels 
makes in his critique of Philip Roth‘s Plot Against America, which I address in part one).  
I follow the lead of several theorists in using ethnicity as the principle category for 
thinking about radically different forms of identity.  ―Ethnicity,‖ Stuart Hall says, and I 
agree with him, ―is what we all require in order to think the relationship between identify 
and difference‖ (1989, 18).  The difference here is not only the difference between 
peoples but also the difference between the status quo and the alternative.  Yet we must 
remember that the ―verbal construction‖ (to recall Suvin) of an alternative elsewhere is 
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grounded in its comparative relationship to our actual, present position in the world.  Hall 
continues, 
There is no way, it seems to me, in which people of the world can act, can speak, 
can create, can come in from the margins and talk, can begin to reflect on their 
own experience unless they come from some place, they come from some history, 
they inherit some cultural traditions.  What we‘ve learned about the theory of 
enunciation is that there‘s no enunciation without positionality.  You have to 
position yourself somewhere in order to say anything at all.  Thus, we cannot do 
without that sense of our own positioning that is connoted by the term ethnicity. 
(18) 
I hasten to emphasize that ―positionality,‖ for Hall and for myself, is not a monolith, a 
one-place inherently assigned or occupied by one group, tribe, or ethnicity.  I bring in this 
point now, alongside Moylan‘s critical utopia, because my core argument remains that 
our utopias nowadays, for pragmatic reasons, must be postethnic.  Nevertheless, the 
question of ethnicity, and indeed the very term postethnic, is a thorny theoretical issue in 
its own right, one that I must set aside until the next chapter.  The point, for now, is that 
critical utopias are a matter of positioning, from here to get there, and that thinking 
through both this position and any possible movement elsewhere requires a working 
concept of identity as framed by the logic of ethnicity. 
Arriving at the term ―critical utopia‖ from a political rather than epistemological 
or narrative direction, Bill Ashcroft helpfully sorts imperial or philosophical utopias 
under the heading of ―product,‖ i.e. the utopian form, and the contrarian critical utopian 
function under the heading of ―process‖ (2007, 412). (The perennial problem is, of 
course, that any process produces products.)  Thus the ―imperialism of utopia,‖ which in 
following other critics, Ashcroft ascribes to More rather than Plato, derives from the 
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absolutism of finalized production, whereas the revolutionary energy of postcolonial (or, 
anti-imperial) utopianism has the recurring energy of an ongoing, open-ended process.  I 
maintain, as the reader might expect, that More‘s Book I shows us that utopian fictions 
are a rhetorical strategy, i.e. oriented more toward process than product.  But More‘s 
Book II does, clearly, imagine the world according to a colonizing point of view, and the 
postcolonial version of critical utopia operates, in literature, as an overturning of the 
literary tradition that More initiated as a way of challenging the political history of 
empire.  The most substantial case made for such literary-political revision is Ralph 
Pordzik‘s sweeping comparative study The Quest for Postcolonial Utopia (2001), which 
underlines nicely, in fact, how the problems of national and cultural identity in 
postcolonial discourse find an analog in the problems for group identity in utopian 
projections of ideal social orders.   
The question can be usefully reiterated in the terms offered by Hall in the context 
of critical race theory: product utopias assume identity is a matter of being, whereas 
process utopias assume identity is a matter of becoming.  The need to reconceptualize 
utopia from a planned product to a planning process parallels a call to ―reconceptualize 
identity as a process of identification…something that happens over time, that is never 
absolutely stable, that is subject to the play of history and the play of difference‖ (15).   
Which is to say, also, that a postcolonial utopia would have to include a postcolonial 
model of identity, i.e. something performative, contingent, and contestable.  Traditional 
utopias imagine the people living there to be homogenously happy, that is, everyone 
happy and everyone happy for the same reason. The process/becoming model of 
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heterotropia offers instead a less finalized and ―total‖ image of the ideal.  Postcolonial 
heterotopias,
 
according to Pordzik
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, are characterized by ―fragmentation, discontinuity, 
and ambiguity,‖ so much so that here any single controlling idea is ―constantly 
undermined by the introduction of new perspective and points of reference that cannot be 
integrated into a meaningful whole‖ (2001, 3).  If utopian hope or critique is to have any 
meaning in a world that is continuing to evolve past (or ―post‖) the many assumptions 
that determined utopianism‘s forms up through modernity, it will require the ability to 
think of the good life and the common good in a fragmented world that cannot be reduced 
to a single point of view.  
 I will suggest, later in the introduction, that such strategies are already being 
developed in theories of self and community offered by Butler, Chakrabarty, and Nancy.  
In particular, the teleological formations of the self and community in narrative is exactly 
the point of contact between proscriptive and critical utopianism.  Hence, I organize 
American novels that engage critical utopian discourse along a temporal axis, 
highlighting through several sub-arguments along the way how each intervention 
undermines nostalgic and progressive teleological formations of past, present, or future.  
Although most critical utopian theory reject linear narrative, teleology, and closure as the 
representational modes of hegemonic ideology, Ashcroft insists that ―meaningful 
resistance must be framed by the possibility of change even when the idea of change 
resists teleology‖ (419).  In other words, we need a sense of change for the better which 
does not depend on a single unitary definition of the good as defined from a single point 
of view.  To match Derrida‘s ―messianic without messiansim,‖ Chakrabarty‘s ―fragments 
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without a whole,‖ Butler‘s unaccountable selves, and Nancy‘s inoperative community, 
we need, I propose, a framework for progresses without progressivism.  This would be 
something like what Ashcroft describes as the postcolonial literature of globalization, the 
―representation of a radically hybridized world [that] hovers in an unclosed space 
between critique and possibility‖ (420).  But such a literature would have to go beyond 
even the postcolonial (as I think Ashcroft‘s gesture toward Salman Rushdie indicates), 
beyond any categorical division based on existing identities or loyalties.  The sheer 
radicalism of such a move, that is both critical and hopeful at once, is precisely the 
paradox of utopia as an impossibility.
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I conclude this chapter with a comment on Fredric Jameson, who over the course 
of his career has given us one of the most compelling accounts of utopia in postmodern 
times, one that stands, I maintain, at the juncture of hope and critique.  Jameson‘s work 
on this subject is so substantial, and commentary on it so ubiquitous, that I could easily 
go on at length reviewing his contribution and what utopian scholars have made of it.  In 
general, I follow Laurence Coupe‘s reading of Jameson in continuity with Frye and 
Bloch, extending a Marxian mythos in which the end of history is also the end of 
exploitation (2009, 159-163).  Jameson is far less blithe than Bloch, and much of his 
work not only maintains utopia but also marks its limitations and loss in the production 
systems of late capitalism.  These systems, especially the management of consumerism, 
capture political aspiration in commercial desire, exhaust revolutionary energies for 
change in the endless activities of exchange, and reduce our ability to imagine a 
countercultural alternative to our mere fascination with the cultural alteration from one 
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year‘s fashions to another‘s.  One of Jameson‘s early essays speaks specifically to the 
temporal organization of the later parts of my argument.  In ―Progress Versus Utopia; or, 
Can we Imagine the Future,‖ later included in Archaeologies of the Future (2005), 
Jameson marks the limits of utopia as critique, as it extends from Mannheim through 
Ricœur and Moylan, which rather simplistically aligns  utopia with any counter, 
resistance, or alternative to the status quo.  Arguing that science fiction, fantasy, and 
utopia mark not the possibility for change but rather its very impossibility, Jameson 
reminds us that we cannot imagine the real future (i.e. we cannot speculate with 
accuracy), and therefore that our utopian writings can only be figurative gestures towards 
what we cannot know or achieve.  Moreover, no cultural production can escape being the 
product of the present circumstance in which it is produced, and ―so the effort to imagine 
utopia ends up betraying the impossibility of doing so.‖  Jameson critiques, for example, 
the famous anti-National Socialist dystopia of George Orwell for ―overstating‖ its 
warnings and thus undoing its own logic as predictive speculation (2005,  292); he also 
seems somewhat disgusted with the ambiguous utopias of Ursula Le Guin (to whom I 
turn to, emphatically, in part three) for their ―counterrevolutionary‖ anxiety (293, n11).   
On first reading, there seems to be no winning with Jameson in this essay: proper 
romantic utopias are contaminated by their present production, and dystopias and 
ambiguous or critical utopias are not revolutionary enough.  What, however, is ostensibly 
distressing in this situation I find to be a compelling hope: Jameson argues convincingly 
that utopia is the corollary of the historical novel (such as Ivanhoe), which imagines the 
present in terms of a narrative of progress.  Utopia, on the other hand, does not ally itself 
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with a narrative of progress but rather calls it into question by imagining the present as 
the past of a future.  The temporality of progress and achievement, as we will see below, 
holds the key to upsetting essentialist ―utopian‖ notions of individual and community 
identity as potentially total and stable ideals.  It is not surprising that Jameson, a 
committed Marxist, would be ambivalent about a form that offers and denies the 
workings of a historical dialectic.  Ultimately, and here I think Jameson would agree, if 
utopian discourse does anything useful at all, it gives the present a future and thus resists 
the tendency to see the present as a solid, unchanging, eternal ―what is now and ever shall 
be.‖  By opening up the ascribed communities of descent to be supplemented if not 
replaced by avowed communities of consent, the processes of critical utopian rupture 
allow for a means for alteration even if they will not establish an end or ideal per se. By 
showing the present as an historically emergent and contingent state of affairs, 
imaginative literature lays the ground work for any number of kinds of interventions from 
the reformist to the revolutionary.
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Chapter 2: Identity, Post- and Inter- 
Utopia, we have seen, has both libertarian and totalitarian or ―dystopian‖ 
tendencies, and the ambivalence between these poles has fostered a range of speculation 
from critical theorists.  Less attention has been paid directly to utopia by literary theory, 
which is not the same as saying that literary criticism has ignored the subject.  The 
juncture between critical and literary theories can easily allow, however, for a 
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transposition of ideas.  Thus utopia‘s liberating and totalizing drives are roughly 
comparable to the dual forces that Miller and others have described in literature as a 
transmitter of social normatives, and, at the same time, of ―anti-social‖ alternatives.  
Fiction, in Miller's thought, can be policing and freeing because it is just that, fiction, 
because it sets up an idea of the world and also because its world is only an idea, an 
experimental playground, a  space of symbolic action that is empty of the laws of cause 
and effect that govern real actions.  The thought-experiment of fiction, as described by 
Hans Vaihinger in The Philosophy of As-If (1924), is a process of world reduction.  That 
is, the fiction maker strips the world down to a few variables, mainly because the world 
itself is too complicated to deal with all at once.  Thus, world reduction is, according to 
Vaihinger, a problem-solving strategy.
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  This strategy that streamlines the world to a 
simpler version of itself is analogous to the utopian tradition that seeks to fix society by 
dealing with a single controlling idea, principle fault, or original sin.  One of the things 
that is most often oversimplified, in these operations, is the diversity of human identities: 
there is little difference in utopia in the same way, and probably for the same reason, that 
there is little change.  But nowadays, I argue, we can no longer solve our problems by 
imaginatively reducing the world in this fashion.
11
  Certainly, we will still need fictional 
as-if worlds, but they will have to be more complicated and messy if they are to be 
useful.  They can no longer be limited to the problems of a single national, gender, 
religion, class, or ethnic group. 
 Utopians, those folks we imagine living in utopia, have generally been race-less 
or class-less.  Utopian writers have often been silent about their personal details: at best 
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we are left with the image of a grey non-identity; at worst, and more often than not, I 
think, this non-identity silently grants all the usual assumptions that follow when 
whiteness or Europeanness has been reified as a non-racial or non-ethnic identity.  By 
erasing the difference between people that cause conflict, utopias not only imaginatively 
end conflict, but they also homogenize human identity along generally supremacist lines.  
This is not merely a symptom of the identity of most utopian writers but rather a 
structural defect in utopianism specifically and in existential, pragmatic, or constructivist 
attitudes generally.   These positions, as they have been widely disseminated, are, like the 
utopian genre itself, dedicated to human freedom and unable to protect that freedom at 
the same time.  Jameson demonstrates this in his  ―solution‖ to the question of the content 
of a Sartrean ethics, which ―affirms the Utopian character of all collective experience 
(including those of fascism and the various racisms) but stresses the requirement of an 
existential choice of solidarity with a specific concrete group: on this nonformalist view, 
therefore, the social solidarity must precede the ethicopolitical choice and cannot be 
deduced from it‖ (1994, 44).  I agree with Jameson that our relationships to others 
precede our political choices, and this reinforces my focus on ethnicity—ethnicity à la 
Hall above—because one sense of the word ―ethos‖ is one‘s place in the world defined 
by several ―ethical stances‖ or relationships to one‘s surroundings.  But I cannot be 
satisfied with a call to group solidarity that cannot exclude fascism and racism.  What we 
need, I think, are better ideas of group and place, identity and ecology, which do not 
depend on the homogeneous identity or isolation of the group members.  In this chapter, 
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then, we will look at post-identitarian and post-solidarity concepts for working out a 
utopianism that is less ambivalent about human suffering.  
As should be clear by now, I am using ethnicity as the broadest category of 
identitarian commitment, and, accordingly, my thinking about post-identitarian 
community begins with Werner Sollors.  But before turning to Sollors in more detail, let 
me explain why ethnicity, configured here in its narrower ethno-racial sense, may be the 
most useful way to investigate the broader ethno-identitarian claims of my argument.  
There is, to be sure, the etymological felicity that the root of ethnicity, ethnos, can be 
taken to mean simply ―group.‖  For the most part, we have thought of these groups called 
ethnicities in terms of race and culture, and only slightly less frequently in terms of 
religion or nationality when these categories tend to line up with racial or cultural ones.  I 
will continue, throughout this study, to focus on these categories instead of gender, class, 
or sexuality.  There are, as is well known, good arguments and strong indications that one 
way to deal with the divisiveness of race, nation, and culture is through the cross-cutting 
solidarity of gender or class.  It is no coincidence that most critical utopian theory is 
grounded in Marxism and the paradigm of class struggle, and calls for international 
solidarity among the proletariat can still be heard today.  Likewise, as could be most 
readily argued for the novels in part one, the power of feminist solidarity to cross ethnic 
lines has been richly demonstrated and productively theorized, and when I write about 
post-identity, I do touch on gender and class identity as well.  I also recognize that, for 
the most part, the problem of essentialism can take shape in any category of identity we 
49 
may use, as Plato used blood and soil, to make the present order of things seem like the 
natural, inevitable, and only possible order. 
To begin with, Sollors‘s landmark book Beyond Ethnicity established, or at least 
collected and substantiated, a theory of postethnicity in which individuals can belong to 
groups of consent rather than descent.  As the critic defines these terms, 
Descent relations are those defined by anthologists as relations of ―substance‖ 
(blood or nature); consent relations describe those of ―law‖ or ―marriage.‖  
Descent language emphasizes our positions as heirs, our hereditary qualities, 
liabilities, and entitlements; consent language stresses our abilities as mature free 
agents and ―architects of our fates‖ to choose our spouses, our destinies, and our 
political systems. (1986, 6)  
In this passage, the past-orientation of descent clearly contrasts with the future-
orientation of consent, and it follows that descent language tends toward the ideological 
maintenance of the status quo, while consent language holds the utopian promise of 
something new and other than what the past demands.  We should not overlook here the 
possibility of forming a consent community out of the past through what Stuart Hall calls 
―emergent ethnicities [that have] a relationship to the past, but it is a relationship that is 
partly through memory, partly through narrative, one that has to be recovered‖ (1989, 
19).  It is just such an emergent ethnicity, a mixture of descent and consent, of ―cultural 
recovery‖ and cultural invention, that we will see in our first novel in part one, 
Morrision‘s A Mercy. 
Without doubt, the existential freedom of the free agent in the consensual scheme 
of things can be overstated: people may be able to choose their affiliations, but those 
choices are always shaped, informed, and limited by material circumstances which exist 
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as effects of past causes.  Again, I find Hall‘s words most instructive on this point, and I 
agree with him that ―there is no way…in which those elements of ethnicity that depend 
on understanding the past…can be done without‖ (19).  A tendency to play up consent 
over descent groups does not mean that the past is utterly cast off but only that its grip is 
loosened somewhat.  Whether that claim is too loosened is a matter for debate: Caroline 
Rody, for example, finds the postethnic school somewhat blind to the felt, lived 
experience of ethnicity as an inherited identity (2009, 10-11).  And, certainly, we may 
sometimes choose solidarity within a naturalized group identity for strategic, political 
reasons.  Sollors, I think, also demonstrates a self-awareness of the limits of postethnicity 
when he writes that 
Somebody‘s claim to universalism may easily become somebody else‘s restriction 
to particularism, as long as an ideal is identified not with total human striving but 
with a place on the map or a secular interest. The rhetoric of American 
exceptionalism, while coming out of utopian hopes for the universal republic of 
man and for the return of the golden age, may easily subvert its own idealistic 
origins and speak only for one of the world‘s superpowers‘ nationalism—even 
when it is called transnationalism. (1986, 260) 
Thus begin the final paragraphs of his book, which gesture not only beyond America‘s 
nationalism but beyond nationalism of any kind and, further, toward a species-wide 
compassion and cooperation.  The problems with getting a sense of ―total human 
striving‖ has, of course, been complicated by the fact that most human striving is against 
other humans.  We should not be surprised that some, as we shall see especially in part 
three, turn to green nature here.  This is understandable on two counts: first, the ―other‖ 
of nonhuman nature can be a foil for seeing all the varieties of peoples as a single 
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biological species; second, the location in the natural landscape of the ecological web of 
life allows for an ethnicity (placement) based on proximity to difference rather than 
identity with the same.  For the sake of time and focus, I will not fully develop in this 
study the argument that an even further expansion of the circle of the ―we‖ is needed into 
the concentric realms beyond the human such as living beings, earthly beings, and even 
beings that exists at all.  But that possibility reoccurs throughout this project, and it is to 
such a post-human solidarity, I believe, that my novelists are pointing us. 
Presently, though, we would be making significant social progress even to 
imagine all people as humans or all human beings as people, depending on which term 
we see as the guarantor of rights and social justice.  There is, then, clearly a cosmopolitan 
implication to postethnic communities of choice or, perhaps, proximity.  David Hollinger 
sums it up nicely, when he stipulates that ―A postethnic perspective favors voluntary over 
involuntary affiliations, balances an appreciation for communities of descent within a 
determination to make room for new communities, and promotes solidarities of wide 
scope that incorporate people with different ethnic and racial backgrounds,‖ so much so 
that this perspective ―builds upon a cosmopolitan element…and cuts against …[a] 
pluralist‖ one (1995/2000, 3).
12
  The postethnic ―builds upon, rather than, rejects the 
ethnic‖ (6).  I am not sure that such a claim will completely calm our anxieties that a call 
to postethnicity is just another iteration of cultural genocide, part of an agenda to have 
nonwhite or non-Christian peoples reject their own ways of life in favor of ostensible 
civilization or salvation.  A thoroughgoing postethnicity will have to require whites, 
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Anglos, and others to do the same kind of cutting and building as everyone else, and we 
do not have at present a very good sense of what this would mean.   
One might think that Hollinger‘s postethnic argument, which advocates affinity 
over identity and choice over destiny, would tend to homogenize all kinds of difference 
as the same kind of different.  In fact, Hollinger remains resolutely in favor of an 
exceptionalist stance regarding African American struggles, which he defends in both the 
2000 and 2005 postscripts to Postethnic America.
13
  Hollinger‘s case for exceptionalism 
appears on the surface to contradict the tenets of postethnicity: if we think that being 
postethnic means being ―past‖ ethnicity, then there is no sense in continuing to pay 
special attention to one ethnicity or another.  Like Chris Matthews on the occasion of the 
2010 State of the Union, we might ―forget‖ that the speaker is black.  But, needless to 
say, Hollinger does not mean at all that people will somehow become nonethnic, 
forgetting and forsaking the past, nor that we will move past the problems of ethnicity, 
pushing them out of our minds and silencing urgent calls for meaningful action.    
While Hollinger and Sollors present us with the constructedness or ―invention‖ of 
the particular identities within ethnic groups and the ways in which those constructions or 
inventions continue to shift in the cultural density of postmodern globalization, scholars 
such as Giles Gunn and Caroline Rody have offered ways to rethink the affiliative ties 
between ethnic groups.  In other words, whether the groups are listed on what Hollinger 
calls the ethno-racial pentad or on some other taxonomy, rethinking our ideas about 
ethnic infrastructure within groups requires us also to reconsider the interstructures of 
cooperation among groups.  Gunn, for example, has asserted the need for an 
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interstructure ―beyond solidarity,‖ the title of his 2001 book.  He grounds this approach  
expressly in American pragmatism and features close readings of William James 
(emergent pragmatism) and Richard Rorty (revisionary pragmatism).  Gunn does not 
fully explicate pragmatism as a reaction to what we might now call a post-Civil War 
existential crisis in American identity, nor does he account for pragmatism‘s continuing 
popularity as an ongoing result of the perennial problem of American identity 
determined, in turn, as an affiliative bond across ethnicities.  He does contend, however, 
that pragmatism‘s non-essentialist, problem-solving frame of mind lends itself to the 
struggle for a form of human connection ―beyond‖ the ―solidarity‖ that can be felt within 
a given group.  By solidarity, Gunn indicates loyalty to people we have something in 
common with; he does not mean that solidarity that has often been the motto for 
programs and movements reaching across ethnic and national lines.  This does not mean 
that even ―transgressive‖ solidarity has ever necessarily been a call to reach outside one‘s 
own group: even communism‘s transnationalism banks on a solidarity among the 
proletariat.  This kind of solidarity, then, may ask us to reconfigure our loyalties, 
choosing class before nationality, but does not necessarily require us to confront our 
problems cooperatively alongside people different from ourselves. 
Like utopia, the concepts of solidarity and cosmopolitanism have rich and 
troublesome intellectual histories.  The many modifiers that are placed on 
cosmopolitanism now (―rooted,‖ ―critical,‖ ―patriotic,‖ and so on) are, as Hollinger 
reminds us, mostly there to head off objections based on the many early forms of 
cosmopolitanism that were aligned with repressive regimes (2006, xviii).  The Christian-
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colonial civilizing mission was, from one angle, underwritten by cosmopolitan ideology 
that sought to unite the world under one monarch and one god, and there is also, of 
course, the capitalist cosmopolitanism that would unite or has united the world into one 
marketplace.  Likewise, the modifiers placed on utopia now, with ―critical‖ the most 
frequent, are there to set a disruptive new version apart from a homogenizing old one.  
Hollinger heuristically differentiates solidarity, ―an experience of willed affiliation,‖ 
from community, ―a collectivity of individuals who share a distinguishing trait or practice 
or place of residence‖ (xi).  Neither of these terms quite line up with Gunn‘s exhortation, 
which we might transcribe here as the call for solidarity beyond community.  And yet, if 
we retain the double sense of ethnicity as a cultural place from which to speak as well as 
a particular kind of identity (or, better, process of identification), then Hollinger‘s 
dismissal of community as ―nothing more than‖ a shared location will strike us oddly.  In 
the next chapter, as I ask what a postethnic utopia would look like, I will argue by, 
drawing from the work of Chakrabarty and Nancy, that what we need is precisely a 
commitment to the people with whom we have contact, for no more reason than the fact 
that we have contact with them.  We can, thus, make willful affiliations even within 
unwilled circumstance and have ―at least some measure of agency‖ (xi), which, according 
to Hollinger, separates solidarity from mere membership. 
The call for an active commitment beyond solidarity only with people like oneself 
does not necessarily have to proceed in a strictly postethnic manner.  Caroline Rody‘s 
recent The Interethnic Imagination, a work to which my own is closely aligned, critiques 
Sollors‘s ―ethnicity school‖ before proceeding to argue for the kind of interethnic 
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cooperation that imaginative literature—for Rody, specifically Asian American 
literature—may foster.  I should highlight in passing that Asian American literature is 
conspicuously absent from the chapters that follow partly because I have little to add to 
Rody‘s commentary.  However, I am happy to find a cue in her introduction, where she 
indicates that the original plan for the Interethnic Imagination was broader, 
encompassing many ethnicities, which is what I attempt to do here.  According to Rody, 
then, Sollors‘s model of consent and descent  ―has tended to treat ethnicity as a mere 
structure of differences, of boundary-marking without real content‖ (2009, 10).  This 
erasure of ethnic content is, as she observes, at best unsettling and at worst 
disempowering politically and culturally.  It may well be that the stakes are very different 
when we make a claim for the inventedness of essential human identity, as broadly 
considered by anti-humanist postructuralism, compared to when we stress the 
inventedness of essential ethnic identity.  The demystification of the ―human‖ can be 
politically liberating because that ―human‖ identity had been coded as white, male, and 
European through the operations of patriarchal, colonial imperialism.  To deconstruct that 
―humanity‖ is to open up the category for broader participation or to make it more 
inclusive.  On the other hand, deconstructing ethnic identity may indeed remove grounds 
for infraethnic solidarity at the very time when it is needed to resist ethnically-framed 
exploitations or repressions inherent in the systems we have inherited from that same 
patriarchal and imperial past.   
The question, then, is whether we should proceed according to a model of 
―postethnicity‖ in which ethnic identity is purely constructed or invented or according to 
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a model ―interethnicity‖ in which ethnic groups must interact cooperatively for a variety 
of reasons, among which, as we know all too well, globalized problems that do not 
respect ethnic lines are some of the most urgent.  Whereas postethnicity deconstructs the 
essential unity inside ethnic identity categories, interethnicity deconstructs the boundaries 
and barriers between them: these are the two sites that Rody names ―roots and passages,‖ 
which are ―the paths that rooted people nevertheless follow into a syncretic culture‖ (11).  
The critique and ultimate rejection of essential fixity on both the infra- and interethnic 
sites do not seem to me to be mutually exclusive projects: in fact, rather than 
problematizing each other, each occasions the rupture or crisis to which the other can 
respond.  I do not mean to suggest that this process is easy or simple, but through 
examining my novelists, I hope to show how the imaginative breakdown both within and 
between ethnicities is occasioned by and actively responds to both the causes and the 
effects of globalization.  I prefer to name the utopian dimension of such projects 
―postethic‖ (rather than interethnic) because postethnicity has itself been a problem of 
hegemonic utopianism, which imagines an ―age of rest‖ at ―the end of history‖ chiefly by 
projecting a homogenized, non-ethnic citizenry.  It is the utopianism of non-ethnicity that 
alarms us about ―postethnicity,‖ and that alarm is principally informed by the memory of 
white hegemony that operated, and still operates, through the construction of whiteness as 
a non-ethnic ideal.  Thus, keeping ―postethnic‖ at the forefront of my argument, I hope to 
be mindful of both the utopian promise (of accord) and of the dystopian threat (of 
homogeneity) that continue to mark this kind of imaginative activity.  Such activity is 
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utopian both in its imaginative dimension and in its attempt to work actively for the 
betterment of the world. 
This future-directedness is also part of Rody‘s concept of the interethnic 
imagination.  The effect of globalization on ethnic literature, she tells us, is clear: ―what 
we have long thought of as ethnic literature is becoming interethnic literature…the focus 
of ethnic texts has begun to drift toward the borders of ethnic experience, away from 
being-ethnic as a problematic in itself, to the condition of being-ethnic amidst a hybrid 
collective, as part of a ‗difficult‘ but undeniable ‗we‘‖ (ix).  Moreover, this interethnic 
imaginary is, in my terms, utopian, since, according to Rody, ―literature still works as a 
space for the exploration of possibilities.‖  Interethnic imaginative writing displays ―a 
strong strain of the visionary, creative reimagining of the potential of intergroup contact 
and engagement‖ (xi) in ―visions of our emerging future‖ (xiii). The ability to reach 
imaginatively across lines of division between self and other has a substantial intellectual 
pedigree.  This is an power of literature importantly different from the power of 
ideological leverage we addressed in the previous chapter.  Here, literature allows for 
imaginative relations with the other.  If utopian literature allows contact with ―other‖ 
social orders that are alternative and unreal, then ―naturalist‖ literature makes possible, 
the argument goes, ―other‖ presences in society who are different and really there.  The 
imagination is the key, but the difference between critique and empathy should give us 
pause, which is why I turn to this distinction before moving on to the next chapter of my 
introduction. 
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According to Martha Nussbaum, the empathy of the literary imagination is 
nothing less than the core of democratic life.  The matrix of empathy, readership, and 
liberal democratic social behavior has been explored in other ways by other theorists 
across a range of critical temperaments, not only in contemporary works but also in 
earlier periods.  This argument assumes a literary naturalism, literature that describes life 
in the world as this world ―actually exists.‖  For example, Benedict Anderson‘s thesis 
about readership and imagined community relies on the notion that reading a widely 
distributed newspaper creates and reifies (―naturalizes‖) a perception of an actually 
existing community (1983/1991, 37-46).  On the other hand, Nussbaum‘s kind of literary 
ethics has, at its core, an attention to other people as they exist in the world around us 
even when that attention is cultivated through the contemplation of imaginary people 
living imaginary lives.  In fact, Nussbaum insists, it is the imagination itself that allows 
the leap of fancy into thinking that other people might be people at all, not convincing 
robots (1995, 38).
14
  The pertinent distinction, at this point, is between naturalism and the 
utopian imagination, between writing about how the world is or how it is not.  The ways 
we value both forms of imagination depend on certain assumptions, detailed in the 
previous chapter, about how the imaginary world-in-our-heads relates to the actual world-
we-live-in.  Whereas we have an established framework for understanding the usefulness 
of naturalism and empathy in dealing with problems of alterity or ethnicity, my argument 
here is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to connect the utopian rupture of identity and 
the postethnic revision of utopia in these terms.   
59 
Chapter 3: What Would a Postethnic Utopia Look Like? 
By arranging the follow parts of this project on a temporal axis, I indicate that the 
utopian imagination and the problems of ethnicity therein do not lie only in the direction 
of the future; however, it is clear that, whatever the temporal setting of the novel, writing 
is directed towards the future insofar as it is always to be read later (e.g. after it is written) 
and again.  This is not to simplify time and identity, as Mannheim so simply paired 
ideology and utopia to the past and future, respectively.  Although I will be arguing 
against teleology and historicism in its now antiquated sense (the sense of history as 
inevitable fate, as in Popper‘s account [1963 ,8]), I never mean to ignore cause-and-effect 
or the contextualization that Jameson has in mind when he exhorts us to always 
historicize.  Chiefly forms of pragmatism and existentialism, the non-essential 
philosophies that I rely on to answer the title question above are historical formations that 
responded to either a crisis in American identity (pragmatism, e.g. William James after 
the Civil War) or European identity (existentialism, e.g. Jean Paul Sartre after World War 
II).  Both these historical occasions can be seen as refutations of either the liberal 
democratic utopia or the Enlightenment utopia, both of which are marred with colonial-
imperial atrocities.  Including the later, poststructuralist and postmodern response to the 
countercultural shifts of the 1960s, non-essentialist reactions to such crises are, to my 
mind, always about finding a way forward after the old plans have been painfully, if 
fortunately, brought to ruin. 
60 
Two quick examples might illuminate the future-directedness of broadly defined 
postmodernism‘s approach to utopianism.  First, in the context of risk and systems 
theory, we have Anthony Giddens‘s call for a ―utopian realism‖ (1990, 154), which 
entails a sober or practical aspirational agenda not unlike Popper‘s ―piecemeal 
engineering‖ (1963, 158).  Giddens describes a broad, multifaceted set of interconnected 
social movements that respond to the ―growth of totalitarian power, Nuclear conflict or 
large-scale war, ecological decay or disaster, and the collapse of economic growth 
mechanisms‖ (171), which, I might add, draw an analogy to Moylan‘s ―historic bloc of 
opposition‖ (1986, 11).  According to Giddens, this counterculture alliance proceeds by 
local politics, global politics, ―life politics, or politics of self-actualization,‖ and 
―emancipatory politics (politics of inequality)‖ (154-158).   These last two politics are 
engaged with the interethnic and postethnic: ―self-actualization‖ deals with the politics of 
individual or postethnic identity, and inequality is a characteristic of interethnic strife.  
Thus, as postmodernity can name both a set of staggering risks and the conditions of 
possible solutions to them, in becomes clear that we must form a better sense of how 
these solutions can be arrived at postethnically.  
The second example I turn to is Best and Kellner‘s discussion of ―postmodern 
politics,‖ which they distinguish from ―modern politics…informed by strong normative 
values and utopian visions of a world of universal freedom, equality, and harmony‖ 
(1997, 271).  Postmodern politics, in their estimation, takes four forms: (1) an anti-
politics, (2) ―an emphasis on piecemeal reforms and local strategies,‖ (3) a 
―reconstruct[ion of] Enlightenment values and socialist politics thorough a logic of 
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contingency and plurality,‖ or (4) an ―identity politics‖ (271-74).  We can see a similarity 
between Best and Kellner‘s third form and Gidden‘s ―radical modernity,‖ both of which 
continue political commitments to social and economic justice but on an anti-
foundational basis.  Best and Kellner critique identity politics for ―ignor[ing] the insights 
of post-modern theory that identities are multiple and socially constructed and that they 
need to be reconstructed in an emancipatory, autonomous, and self-affirming fashion,‖ 
which is why this politics may be seen as ―seek[ing] to advance the interest of a single 
specific group‖ (274).   It is specifically my claim, in this work, that we can no longer 
favor the interests of people like ourselves when we set about the problem-solving work 
of critical utopia.  My contention is not simply that we should not be parochial but goes 
further by arguing that the globalized problems we now confront make it increasingly 
unthinkable to be so.  The final postmodern turn, Best and Kellner tell us, is both to the 
political and to the future: ―The postmodern adventure… involves a mapping of this new 
space-time continuum, situating us at the current historical crossroads where we can 
explore our options and suggest some new directions for the beleaguered forms of life on 
this planet‖ (281).  Yet again new forms of temporality and ecology—―forms of life on 
this planet‖—emerge from the analysis of postmodernity as the framework par 
excellence for cooperative problem solving.  Best and Kellner‘s final invocation draws 
our attention to the need for a situated, rhetorical postethnic utopianism wherever 
political decisions are made, which is now everywhere and not only at the king‘s court, as 
was the case when More imagined the prospect of Hythoday as a kind of utopian jester.   
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To sum up, this study is positioned at the intersection of ethnic and utopian 
studies in the context of the American novel at the end of and after the Cold War, when it 
becomes powerfully and specifically apparent that the American idea of an intentionally 
created nation of immigrants has inscribed both topics deeply in this nation‘s culture and, 
as we shall see, in its literature.  The Cold War stalemate, in some ways a clash of 
capitalist and soviet utopianism, configured our one planet as three worlds.  The ending 
of this period in history, which coincides with the consolidation of postmodern and 
postcolonial cultural transformation, occasioned a widespread re-theorization of previous 
concepts and practices of community, nationalism, and utopianism.  With so many 
gestures to the globality of the stakes at hand, then, it may seem strange to circumscribe 
my argument within American fiction; certainly, postethnic utopianism can be a useful 
angle on other national or regional cultures, and it could not exist in a world that had not 
gone global.  But it seems to me—and I follow Hollinger here—that the US remains an 
important site where these issues are being worked out in unique and innovative ways, 
worthy of a dedicated and focused attention.  For my own argument, this national context 
is apt because a consubstantial utopianism, on the one hand, and a multiplicity of ethnic 
ingredients, on the other, have always been inscribed in America‘s cultural DNA.  
In this third and final chapter of my introduction, I turn to several contemporary 
philosophers, rather marginally associated with utopia or ethnicity studies, for help in 
outlining what a postethnic utopia might be.  My readings here come from both sides of 
the Atlantic, drawing on theories informed by existentialism and pragmatism.  What 
unites these approaches is a commitment to materialism or non-essentialism.  Generally 
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speaking, I find these approaches useful because they allow us to think hopefully about 
community and the future yet without recourse to some metaphysical identity or destiny.  
The philosophical utopianism that I attributed to Plato above is concerned with the 
discovery of a true order of society, where by true we mean harmony with humankind‘s 
essential inner nature or the foundationally true nature of the world.   The rhetorical 
utopianism that I attributed to More, on the other hand, is characterized by its use the 
utopian trope to achieve a better social order than the one immediately at hand.  It takes 
little or no interest in the question of true identity or destiny, but rather focuses on 
material well being.  In this materialism or non-essentialism, it is a pragmatic or 
existential strategy.  In the following section, I outline a way of rethinking, along these 
lines, our ideas about utopia and community, as well as the imbedded issues of individual 
and group identity.  Ultimately, as we shall see, literature and imaginative interaction 
now emerge as vital to the articulation of postethnic utopia. 
By starting with existentialist accounts of writing as an exchange of individually 
experienced worlds, we can begin to see the importance of free yet conjoined individuals 
to the utopian imagination.  The most useful theoretical model, in this respect, comes 
from the work of Elaine Scarry, influenced explicitly by the existentialist humanism of 
Jean-Paul Sartre.  In ―Why Write?‖ Sartre argues that writing is a means by which people 
share their worlds.  The act of reading and writing, he says, is an act of generously 
accepting another person‘s description of the world, of opening our perceptions to the 
other‘s description.  Thus writers and readers exchange experiential worlds, each 
surrendering their own cognition of the world to the articulated perceptions and 
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interpretation of other people‘s experiences.  This surrender must be freely offered and 
taken and hence the act of writing becomes inextricably bound up with human freedom 
and dignity.  Scarry follows this line of argument, explaining that reading is, 
fundamentally, ―imagining under authorial instruction‖ (1995).  The reader imagines the 
world as the writer directs her to do so.  That our world exists for us through the 
articulation of our perceptions and experiences is a major assumption of Scarry‘s The 
Body in Pain (1985).   The most famous part of her argument is the explication of how 
the infliction of pain, as in torture, is an effective political coercion because pain 
interrupts perception, cognition, and articulation of the world.  But for my project the 
most pertinent part of Scarry‘s work is her theory of the artifact, where she expands on 
the work of Sartre by suggesting that all human-made objects, including concepts such as 
―god,‖ function as a kind of intervention in the world.  For Sartre, writing and reading 
allow individuals to shape the world together by negotiating their perceptions of the 
world.  For Scarry, artifacts, including the artifacts of writing, are actually part of the 
world itself.  Moreover, they are limited and, in Popper‘s words, piecemeal engineering 
solutions rather than utopian ones.  Like Popper, Scarry sees the prospect for world-
change as one that proceeds incrementally, by accretion. She distinguishes the sweeping 
imagination and material artifaction by relative small-scale of the later: 
While imagining may entail a revolution in the entire order of things, the eclipse 
of the given by a total reinvention of the world, an artifact (a relocated piece of 
coal, a sentence, a cup, a piece of lace) is a fragment of world alteration. 
Imagining a city, the human being ―makes‖ a house; imagining a political utopia, 
he or she instead helps to build a country; imagining the elimination of suffering 
from the world, the person instead nurses a friend back to health. (1985, 171) 
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Thus ostensibly metaphysical qualities are given physical existence in artifacts that are 
imaginative, counterfactual wishes made material and therefore more durable than 
ephemeral speech acts.  Above, in the chapter on utopia and ideology, we saw that 
literary narrative is lever for both ideological reproduction and mutation.  Following 
Scarry, though, we can say that literary artifacts (distinguished, perhaps, from literary 
texts) also transmit compassion and reassurance.  The fragmentation and specificity of 
artifacts as the transmitters of inscribed humanity hint at what will become the running 
theme of this chapter, which is to say that, in order to forego totalitarian utopian and 
essentialist identity, we must also forego wholeness or permanence through and through. 
Scarry‘s advance over Sartre, I believe, differs strongly from description of 
literature as a mirror that teaches empathy, a key assumption in Nussbaum‘s praise of 
naturalism.  Rather than instructing or cultivating empathy, in Scarry‘s model literature 
actually is empathetic.  It is, more to my point here, an empathetic intervention.  Scarry 
describes human-made artifacts in terms of their maker‘s sentience, in most cases their 
comprehension of human suffering.   The chair-maker understands the body‘s need for 
rest and support; the coat-maker, its need for warmth.  This empathy is made material in 
the artifacts themselves.  Scarry includes ―a poem‖ among the list of such artifacts but 
does not elaborate on how literary artifacts might function differently than material ones 
like chairs and coats.  She does, however, describe all such artifacts, including complex 
abstract creations like the findings in a civil court case as containing a ―counterfactual 
wish.‖  The chair is a wish to not-be-tired; the coat a wish to not-be-cold; the civil 
settlement an impossible wish that some calamity did-not-happen.  In this way, all 
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artifacts are an attempt to make the world a better place, and in this sense part of a 
utopian endeavor.  Insofar as writing is a way to share how we each see the world, we 
might conclude, then, following Sartre and Scarry, that novels represent a counterfactual 
wish that the reader would see the world a different way. 
 Let us take a closer look at the materiality of counterfactual wishes, which are 
closely related to Althusser‘s second thesis, on the material transmission of ideology, and 
which are also quasi-synonymous to Popper‘s ―‗world 3‘…the objective productions of 
the human mind…such as books, symphonies, works of sculpture, shoes, aeroplanes, 
computers‖ (1992, 8).  For Scarry, the creation of objects (imaginatively or materially) 
constitutes a movement away from pain because bodily pain is a state in which the 
objects of perception disappear: in terms of intentional consciousness, pain and the 
imagination are ―each other‘s missing intentional counterpart‖ (1985, 161-62, 169).  The 
imagination can be occasioned by pain or at least discomfort: the hungry man imagines 
and then seeks out a meal; the cold woman designs and then creates a coat.  When this 
imagined object is made into durable artifact like a coat, the counterfactual wish to not-
be-cold becomes sharable.  Making a coat for someone else to wear is an act of wishing 
that another would not-be-cold, and thus constitutes an act of compassion (298-90).  Like 
all compassion, this act is based on an imaginative empathy, a sense of what it is like to 
be cold and a feeling that the relief of another‘s suffering is important for much the same 
reasons that one‘s own relief from suffering matters.  Thus the making of artifacts is the 
making of a better world e.g., one in which people are not cold because they have coats.  
As artifacts accumulate, the counterfactual wishes can become more fine-grained (171): 
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having wished to produce manuscripts more quickly and reliably than scribal 
transcription, we invented movable type; now we are inventing artifacts like email and 
twitter to communicate ever more automatically and rapidly.  For Scarry, the action of an 
artificer is the act of encoding a compassionate sentience into an object.  Art responds to 
a need, and in this way, it is responsible.  Such a theory of literature applies to naturalism 
and utopianism alike, but we must stipulate at the beginning that not all novels engage the 
imagination in the same way.  Within the literary imagination, I propose that we 
distinguish, heuristically, the imaginative projects of naturalism from those of 
utopianism.  The difference is one of kind as well as degree.  But before I can specify 
what utopian literature does differently, we need to consider this distinction more 
critically and along with it just what ―naturalism‖ means.  
Both in terms of the canon and in terms of marketplace, the literary mainstream 
tends to be governed at least ostensibly by the hallmarks of literary realism.  Because the 
realist-style presentation of nonreal subjects is widely considered a criterion for 
excellence in fantasy writing, for my discussion, I propose, a more useful term would be 
literary naturalism.  When a contemporary work is called ―a novel,‖ we generally assume 
it is a work of literary naturalism. The obviousness of this association is not annulled by 
the substantial presence of genre fiction: the fact that mainstream literature often borrows 
from ―science fiction‖ or ―the fairy tale‖ only reifies the assumption of naturalism as its 
basic form.  Very often, writers and critics view these borrowings through the lens of 
postmodern, intertextual irony.  When writers take on the tropes of nonmimetic or 
―unnatural‖ genre fiction, the assumption goes, they do so in order to continue exploring 
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the concerns of naturalism in different terms.  The importance of these concerns is a key 
tenant in the conventional apology for the literary imagination, and many apologists do 
craft their defense in terms of what literature brings to our attention.  People are generally 
in favor of literature if it creates beneficial forms of attention; we are less clearly 
affirmative of literature that may be trivial, distracting, or merely decorative.  To return 
this question to the difference between utopian and naturalist imaginations, we can ask if 
the former pays a different kind of attention than the latter.  I believe that Scarry‘s model 
of the literary artifact shows us that it does, and that this other kind of attention focuses 
on (1) changing the world, i.e. making counterfactual wishes come true, and (2) sharing 
compassionate sentience with others.  Artifacts are, then, both utopian and communicable 
and mark the insistence that utopia be the product of multiple, recursive articulations—
even, I would add, negotiations—rather than the grand scheme of a philosopher king.  
Most notably, these artifacts that constitute a major portion of the human world – 
Popper‘s ―world 3‖—are no longer confined, if they ever were, to any one social 
position, cultural group, or ethnicity.   The exchanges and circulations, borrowings, 
parodies, appropriations, and rewritings, so ubiquitous in contemporary culture, condition 
us to share the world in a less proscriptive, more postethnic way.  The anonymity of 
information access in the age of the Internet undoubtedly has something to do with this.  
But even without analyzing the new postethnic patterns of cultural production and 
exchange, we can still observe everyday that the artifacts and counterfactual whishes that 
materially create a human world, a social space for the activities that constitute a 
community, do so increasingly without regard to keeping particular versions of the 
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human world separate from each other.  This common space, the space of community, 
must be reevaluated. 
Theorizing postethnic utopia as a new form of community problem-solving leads 
us to the neo-communitarian theory of Nancy‘s inoperative community.   ―For it is a 
thinking‖ of community, Nancy tells us, that we find in Marx, and ―not merely an idyllic 
narrative ready to be transformed into a future utopia‖ (1991, 74).  Inoperative, 
désoeuvrée, does not mean an unworking community, i.e. dysfunctional or lazy or 
unworkable, but rather a community-without-a-work, without an grand oeuvre to which it 
is dedicated and by which it is constituted.  The community is not itself an artifact 
wrought by some transcendental artificer, whether it be God,  human nature, or dialectical 
materialism; this community does not insist the individual should be subsumed into the 
group through a process of communion but rather that individuals communicate with 
each other.  Nancy describes ―the modern experience of community as neither a work to 
be produced, nor a lost communion, but rather as space itself, and the spacing of the 
experience of the outside, of the outside-the-self‖ (19).  Rather than having a work, a 
metaphysical project that we might call utopia, community for Nancy is a spacing of the 
singular beings who compose it.  ―Singular being‖ is his phrase for what we used to call 
―the individual‖ or even ―the subject,‖ and, rather than an obfuscation, I find it especially 
helpful in clarifying the ineffable boundary that marks each of us as ―one‖ even though 
we are neither indivisible or alone. 
Nancy rejects utopian community both in its nostalgic and its apocalyptic sense.  
In a play on community, communion, and communication, Nancy is directly critiquing 
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the ―worker‘s paradise‖ of utopian Marxism (and we should recall at this point that Bloch 
argues most persuasively that Marxism is a utopian vision): 
Communism—as, for example, in the generous exuberance that will not let Marx 
conclude without pointing to a reign of freedom, one beyond the collective 
regulation of necessity, in which surplus work would no longer be an exploitative 
work, but rather art and invention—communicates with an extremity of play, of 
sovereignty, even of ecstasy from which the individual as such remains definitely 
removed. (7) 
A key characteristic of the inoperative community, then, is the processes of articulation 
among singular beings, each at the edge of its own singular experience or position.  
Articulation here has the double sense of an articulation of parts and the speech-act itself 
(76).  Whether linguistically or through material artifacts, such exchanges take place 
where the boundaries of singular beings meet, at the limit of my world where it touches 
the limit of your world.  ―The call that convokes us…at this limit,‖ according to Nancy, 
―can be named, for want of a better term, writing, or literature‖ (71). 
This contingent
15
 contact, abetted by writing or something that functions like 
writing, such as Scarry‘s artifacts, ―does not pass into a common space… only the limit is 
common, and the limit is not a place, but the sharing of places, their spacing‖ (73).  This 
spatial location of limited beings in proximity to one another grounds community in the 
common (but unsharable) fact of human morality through the realization of each singular 
being‘s own limits grasped at the moment when that being fails, can go no further, its 
limit marked by the limit of another who is outside: ―it is the presentation of the finitude 
and the irredeemable excess that make up finite being: its death, but also its birth, and 
only the community can present me my birth, and along with it the impossibility of my 
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reliving it‖ (15).  This encounter with others in community ―is not a communion that 
fuses the egos into an Ego or a higher We.  It is the community of others. The genuine 
community of mortal beings…‖ (15). Thus community is, at its core, the recognition of 
oneself as a limited being among other limited beings.   
The consciousness of oneself as a singular being in communication with others, 
Nancy tells us, ―is ecstasy: which is to say that such a consciousness is never mine, but to 
the contrary, I only have it in and through community‖ (19).  This insight could occasion 
wide-ranging associations to other paradigms: to language as a community of signs, each 
having its meaning only in difference to the others; to Buddhist ideas of ―dependant 
arising‖ in which each existence disappears into the existences that frame and constitute 
it; or, again, to the South African tribal wisdom of ubuntu, the vision of self in which ―I 
am because we are.‖  I will have occasions to return to these diverse groups of thought—
the poststructuralist, the Buddhist, the tribal—in passing.  For now, I would propose that 
what Nancy calls a literature, the articulation of a community, we may understand in the 
sense of general communication or imaginative exchange.  The contact with others that 
literature marks and facilitates creates a community, and the literary artifact‘s durability 
and sharability gives the community some continuity and intergenerational direction 
forward in time.  But there is no grand scheme, master plan, or invisible hand guiding this 
movement in a teleological story of progress.  As the philosopher states, ―The 
communication that takes place on this limit… demands that way of destining ourselves 
in common that we call polities, that way of opening community to itself, rather than to a 
destiny or to a future‖ (80).  This is the temporal-spatial framework that informs the 
72 
structure of the parts that follow this chapter.  We see a transformation of not only past 
and future, but also present spatial configurations.  Before proceed to the novels, there is, 
however, something more to be said about the consequences for Nancy‘s ―limit‖ and the 
encounters with, at, or on it.  We need to better understand how a community of singular 
beings can work together without being an organized whole; and we need to better 
understand the ethical upshot of encountering ourselves as limited, as beings without a 
sustaining mytho-identity.  To this end, I conclude my introduction with two theorists 
who have made important contributions toward understanding the ethical implications of 
a community notion that rules out any sense of the interpersonal or intrapersonal whole. 
Nancy‘s community is a spacing of singular beings, and this recalls, to my mind, 
Chakrabarty‘s  ―two ways of relating to difference: proximity and identity.‖  These 
concepts arrive in the final chapter of Habitations of Modernity, which the writer 
describes as a ―a plea to keep in view—even as we write politically and in search of a 
more just world—the dilemmas of what Hannah Arendt once sagaciously called ‗the 
human condition‘‖ (2002, xxiv).  Thus the turn is both to the future and to the broadest 
possible thinking of human suffering, which is to my mind also the direction in which 
postethnic utopia is headed.  In his final chapter, Chakrabarty defines identity as the 
process by which ―difference is either congealed or concealed…frozen, fixed or… erased 
by some claim of being identical of the same.‖  Such is the mode of what Nancy would 
call an operative community, in which individuals find identity through communion, 
being-one, in a common work.  Proximity, however, is ‗the opposite mode, one of 
relating to difference in which (historical and contingent) difference is neither reified nor 
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erased but negotiated‖ (140).  The two things that proximity does not do are important: 
difference is not reified, as in the noble lie, nor is it erased as in the communion of 
selfsame solidarity.  Rather than these solutions, ―the practice of proximity‖ must be ―the 
practice of relating to historical and contingent difference by acknowledging and 
negotiating it‖ (147).  I propose that a model of proximity as a practice gestures in the 
same direction as Ashcroft‘s description of critical utopianism as a process rather than 
product.  Chakrabarty is very specific in rejecting ―utopian blueprints of social orders 
from which the evil of violence will be eternally banished‖ (143).  Instead of sweeping 
final solutions, the endeavor to mitigate violence is an ongoing negotiation requiring, in 
part, that we ―acknowledg[e] different kinds of difference, and even inequalities and 
equalities, without letting them give offense‖ (148).  In terms of critical intervention, the 
teleology of cause and effect must give way to a broader narrative description because 
―purely political and sociological histories often lose themselves in the impulse of causal 
analysis and, thus, in the designs of utopian social engineering‖ (148).  In lieu of 
recapitulating grand historical accounts, we must pay attention instead to the everyday 
negotiations of differences.  To my mind, this ceaseless task has an ascribed feminized 
character, calling to mind the work of the housekeeper who maintains the home through 
everyday chores that are never finished.  But even though there is no final analysis or end 
to the negotiations, the work of the housekeeper is still one of judgment and discernment. 
When we do change our thinking on wholeness and fragmentation, we must also 
reevaluate our estimations of surety and frailty, permanence and the need for 
maintenance.  Neighborly proximity requires constant attentiveness because, as 
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Chakrabarty concludes, ―the explorations of history and memory show that only a 
capacity for a humanist critique can create the ethical moment in our narratives and offer, 
not a guarantee against the prejudice that kills, but an antidote with which to fight it‖ 
(148).  This lack of a guarantee is not the same thing as a lack of hope, although 
Chakrabarty is clearly calling on critical rather than blithely hopeful kinds of discursive 
work.  What is most valuable here, for me, is the notion that a community comprised of 
proximate fragments can endeavor towards the good and better, and , further, that such 
endeavors can be the work of the housekeeper rather than the architect.  What is radical 
here is the idea that such fragments do not add up to a whole: they are not the remains of 
a whole that has been smashed, nor are they the pieces that will someday be reunited.  
Here I must switch to the opening chapters of Habitations of Modernity, where 
Chakrabarty proposes this thinking of the fragment.  Having built upon the alignment 
between unification, rationality, and history on the one hand, and fragmentation, 
irrationality, and memory on the other, Chakrabarty asks  
What would happen to our political imagination if we did not consider the state of 
being fragmentary and episodic as merely disabling?  If a totalizing mode of 
thinking is needed for us to imagine the state theoretically, what kind of political 
imagination and institutions could sustain themselves on the basis of a thought 
that joyously embraced the idea of the fragment?  If the statist idea of the political 
defined the mainstream of political thought, then here may be an alternative 
conceptual pole to it: an idea of the political that did not require us to imagine 
totalities. (35-36) 
Later, this fragmentation takes on a temporal structure: ―But the past,‖ he writes, ―also 
comes to me in ways I cannot see or figure out—or can see or figure out only 
retrospectively.‖  With the lack of a total (unfragmented, all-seeing) theory, he says, ―I 
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can live only practically, the future ceasing to exist as an object of analytic consideration 
(while it can always be the subject of poetic utterance)‖ (46).  My sense throughout is 
that this practical living—the daily routine of our allegorical housekeeper—is best 
grounded in non-metaphysical ways, and I find some confirmation of this in 
Chakrabarty‘s assertion that ―to live with a limited sense of autonomy is to accept 
pragmatism as a principle of living‖ (47).  He does not, of course, mean the American 
philosophical school strictly speaking, but rather the clear-headed, ad-hoc problem 
solving that that school claims as its purpose. 
To pragmatically solve the kinds of global problems that we face now—
postmodernly as well as postcolonially—requires the praxis of proximity, of cooperation 
with others nearby, our neighbors.  Our problems are not ours alone, and so neither can 
be the solutions.  Both are pieces of bigger puzzles and, given this all-embracing 
fragmentation, ―to open ourselves to such disruptive histories would require us seriously 
to grant our social life a constant lack of transparency with regard to any one particular 
way of thinking about it‖ (37).  Assuming for a moment that ―totality‖ would be the ―way 
to go,‖ no one, by act of reason or otherwise, can have a total vision, through and through 
all of the human world.  Our acts of sociopolitical imagination—what some, including 
myself, call our utopias—can no longer be written for the good of only one position 
alone.  We need, now, as many eyes as we can get on our problems.  But the limits here, 
the opacities, are not only between particular ways of thinking about the world but also 
within each singular one of us, as our personal histories are disrupted and come to us in 
ways we cannot see or figure out except retrospectively.  The fragmentation of ourselves 
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and our communities never was and never will be repaired, because it is not the sign of 
anything broken to begin with.  Thus an unthinking of any originary or future wholeness 
on the level of the community balances, in my thinking, the absence of an originary self 
or complete and exhaustive narrative of self. 
Judith Butler‘s Giving an Account of Oneself is invaluable at this point, for it 
gives us not only a description of the loss of a total internal narrative but also its 
consequences for ethics.  I might be faulted here for evoking a theorist best known for her 
work on performative gender identity, rather than a more obvious choice such as Stuart 
Hall, to whom I have referred above.  However, Giving an Account of Oneself confronts 
the problem of selfhood as identity directly, indeed existentially, without specific 
reference of gender or racial identities per se.  This work, to my mind, richly 
compliments Nancy‘s literature of the inoperative community with an ethics of the 
unaccountable self.  Nancy himself indicates, in the phrase ―singular being,‖ that the 
human being and the human self can be differentiated: this opens up the opportunity for 
us, with Butler, to insist that the self is no more an essential work than is the community 
as a whole.  The without-an-oeuvre of the community is symmetrical with the without-a-
self of the individual or singular being, which also implies, of course, that oeuvre and self 
here are being contested as metaphysical or essential totalities.  In a passage that strongly 
parallels Nancy‘s writing, Butler places the recognition of being-a-self at the limit of 
experience: ―But I become this self only through an ec-static movement, one that moves 
me outside of myself into a sphere in which I am dispossessed of myself and constituted 
as a subject at the same time‖ (2005, 115).  While Nancy offers us a model of community 
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as the articulation of singular beings, Butler gives us a notion of the singular self that in 
its unaccountability fosters a compassionate ethics. 
 On this ground, she further argues that such an ethics is based on the self‘s 
inability to fully know or account for its own being insofar as this account must be given 
in language.  Because the origins of the self precede the reflexive capacity acquired 
through language, our being exceeds our narrative reach and we can never fully explain 
how we came to be.  The recognition of this limit within ourselves requires ―a certain 
patience with others that would suspend the demand that they be self-same at every 
moment. Suspending [this] demand… counter(s) a certain ethical violence‖ that insists 
people remain who they are ascribed to be at all times (2005, 42).  Because this position 
is ―based on our shared, invariable, and partial blindness about ourselves‖ (41), Butler‘s 
ethics appears to echo Bloch‘s ―inscrutable we-problem,‖ in which ―we have no organ for 
the I or the We; rather, we are located in our own blind spot, in the darkness of the lived 
moment.‖  It is out of this darkness, he tells us, that hope arrives (1964, 200-01).  Thus, 
the utopian notion of a romantically whole and self-actualizing identity, which an 
individual romantic quest might ―discover‖ for an individual or a civilization‘s 
progressive enlightenment might ―achieve‖ for a group, disappears into the fog of 
countless individual, irrecoverable infancies.  Butler thus connects the unrecoverable 
foundational experiences of infancy with Foucault‘s non-essentialist anti-humanism: ―As 
a result,‖ of the absence of rationality at the dawn of individual lives, she writes, ―we 
cannot talk about a golden day in which there was reason and then a set of events or 
historical shifts that plunged us into irrationalism‖ (119).  A requirement to give one 
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exhaustive narrative rationalization denies the ways in which life exceed rationality, and 
thus the demand for a particular account ―will foreclose others, so that one will become 
knowable to oneself only within the terms of a given rationality, historically conditioned, 
leaving open and unaddressed what other ways there may have been, or may well be, in 
the course of history‖ (120).  Butler takes away the ―golden age‖ and the utopian 
aspiration to a perfectly rational, self-asserting, subject; she replaces it with the open-
ended utopia of ―may have been, or may well be,‖ the utopianism of alternatives to the 
world as it has been received or arrived at. 
To complete her argument, Butler turns to parrhesia, the rhetorical trope of 
indecorous speaking.  The indecorousness, or non-mimesis, of utopian writing will be, as 
we shall note, important in configuring literature‘s role in promoting the new forms of 
utopia, community, and self that I have outlined here.  Butler‘s return to the speech act—
the accounting of oneself and the yielding to the interlocutive demands of the other—
brings her again to the ineffable boundary of what Nancy calls the singular being: 
Nancy‘s articulation and Bulter‘s accounting both insist that an ethical community 
depends upon the communication among its constituent members, that both the 
community and its members are constituted by this communication.  Literary artifacts 
conduct such communication through symbolic action, and it is the disjunction of the 
symbol or the image from the real referent that gives literature its ideological leverage.  
The images and symbols that circulate among the singular beings in community do not 
add up to a whole anymore than any individual being can fully account for its own 
origins or identity apart from the accounts of the other beings that surround it.  This gap 
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or loss of the whole—of foundations or essences—represents both a rejection of one form 
of utopianism and the inauguration of another.  It would be the utopianism of an 
inoperative community that exists in the impossibility of utopia itself. 
To rethink utopia postethnically, then, I have redescribed the material 
transmission of culture to include not only ideological reproduction by also the 
accumulation of compassionate counterfactual wishes.  Further, I have resisted the notion 
that this accumulation ever adds up to a total or whole that we could then manage on a 
totalist—let alone totalitarian—basis.  I have suggested instead that community is 
constituted by a myriad of exchanges, of material and linguistic artifacts such as 
literature, which do not form a grand narrative or total work.  Yet, for one thing, I have 
rethought this fragmented community not as fallen from or destined to wholeness; for 
another, I have insisted that rethinking fragmentation as a natural state of affairs calls us 
to a renewed commitment to negotiation and cooperation, patience and generosity, as 
well as pragmatic problem-solving.  This is not, I also stress, an acceptance of a lack or 
shortcoming of the world or of others.  It is rather a self-reflexive recognition of our own 
limited location as living beings. ―An ability to affirm what is contingent and incoherent 
in oneself,‖ Butler tells us, ―may allow one to affirm others who may or may not ‗mirror‘ 
one‘s own constitution‖ (41).  To be sure, we do not even have to think that others are 
contingent or fragmented in the same way that we ourselves are.  In this paradigm, the 
hope of a shared world is open to any other being, whose similarity or identity to oneself 
is simply not part of the call to participation, although specific differences will obviously 
make specific interactions easier or more difficult on a case-by-case basis. 
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The insights and models that I have drawn from in this chapter are not, of 
themselves, theories of utopias.  The closest on this count would be Scarry; the furthest 
may be Chakrabarty, who is very careful to reject utopian social engineering, which he 
rightly associates with colonization.  Nancy, of course, is writing in the wake of 
communism and its twentieth-century utopia; his occasion is much the same as Derrida‘s 
in Specters of Marx, that is, the end of the Soviet Union.   This ending of one ―clash of 
utopias‖ is also, I submit, the postethnic occasion.  To stop being first, second, or third 
world peoples is another kind of postethnic move.  No doubt, we still must think carefully 
through the past to see its hidden architecture, even when we have no wish to erect new 
edifices on its ruined foundations.  Those foundations—of Platonic Idealism, of 
rationality, total management, stable identity, and so forth—will do us little good now.  
This does not mean that we do not need a location, a context, a past from which to speak.  
Being postethinic does not entail being totally, abysmally dislocated and thus silenced.  It 
implies that we have to keep moving, of necessity, and so we might as well learn how to 
run.  The image of a tennis player comes to mind: she runs, plants her feat, strikes the 
ball, and then runs again—it is, indeed, a running game.  The moment of fixity that 
allows her to execute a discursive interaction is only a moment, a strategy in time not 
entirely of her own choosing yet also not out of her control.  So too, as we keep moving 
through an increasingly fast and crowded world, we have to know when and where to 
plant our feet, to ―get in the position.‖  It is on this note that I conclude my introduction; 
in part one, we will see three examples of the postethnic utopian imagination that 
positions itself, contingently and strategically, in the malleable, avowable past.  
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PART 1 / ALTERNATIVE HISTORIES  
 Inevitability and Contingency 
Whether deliberate propaganda such as Plato‘s Myth of Blood and Soil or the 
―genuine‖ elements of cultural traditions, origin myths each belong to a particular ethno-
religious group.  That is, origin mythology tends to define communities of belief rather 
than gender or class identity groups, although such myths often set out to explain, by 
naturalizing, gender and class systems.  With the exception of evolutionary theory (as a 
secular origin story), most origin myths explicate only the creation of people ―like us‖ or 
include, as an episode in the myth cycle, the division of an originary people into the 
various peoples scattered about the earth.
1
  Novelists who imagine alternative origins, 
whether mythical or historical, are not only writing one story over and against another, 
but also they have something to say about the storifying of the past itself.  A teleological 
mindset will tell us that the past is either (1) a mythical narrative that explains the 
present, or (2) a historicist dialectic that inevitably leads to the present.  In this second 
case, the historicist assumes that because the past has produced the present, it must have 
done so.  This paradigm reifies the present as the inevitable result of the past.  We tend to 
feel this in our everyday lives, for example if we think our parents‘ union inevitably 
produced ourselves, ignoring the countless other individuals that could have been born in 
our stead.  Up until very recently, these myths and histories have been routinely particular 
and ethnocentric: creation is the story of how our tribe came to be; history is the story of 
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our nation struggling to be born.  In either case, there is a tendency to see the coming into 
being of the present world only in terms of one particular people.  The singularity of this 
kind of inhabitant goes along with the assumption that the present is the natural product 
of the past, whether the means of production is the magical will of a narrating god or the 
mechanical outcome of a history.  The novelists in the following chapters see the past, 
and the act of imagining the past, in non-teleological and hence postethnic terms.  These 
writers present the foregone process of becoming-present as the workings of contingency 
and coincidence in world that always has been and always will be occupied by many 
kinds of mutually othered peoples. 
Although Mannheim would name our image of the past an ideology, the utopian 
imagination also encompasses the past, usually with nostalgia, albeit under the names of 
the arcadian and the pastoral.  Leveraging a kind of homesickness, utopian past-writing 
lifts up supposedly traditional or foundational social orders against the dilapidations of 
the present, and so they are broadly conservative rather than progressive.  Romanticizing 
a prelapsarian otherness by opposing the rural to the urban and the agrarian to the 
technological, pastorals ostensibly ameliorate present suffering by remembering or 
reclaiming a more authentic or less corrupt, less complicated and fragmented life that 
once was.  What appears on the surface as a lost or distant otherness functions as a call 
for cohesion to an ideal unity, the way people ought to be.  Traditionally, this ideal lost 
state of being is imagined from an ethnically precise point of view but projected broadly 
onto all humanity.  Nostalgic utopianism is then the least utopian utopianism, insofar as it 
implies an ideology resistant to differential change in favor of recapitulating unitary 
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traditional achievements and values.
2
  Nevertheless, we can still include this form in the 
broadly change-obsessed discourse because conservatisms advocate a break from or 
rupture of the status quo, albeit in the form of a return to the old rather than the 
innovation of the new. 
In part one, I find evidence for a different kind of past-writing in selected novels 
by Morrison, Roth, and Silko.  In doing so I have unintentionally recreated the same 
lineup of authors who Naomi Rand discusses in her article ―Surviving What Haunts You‖ 
(1995).  Yet Rand‘s reading of these imaginative pasts as survival narratives is very 
different from my own reading of them as reconfigurations of the past along the lines of 
postethnic or inoperative community.  Rand is helpful in spelling out the connection 
between claiming a group history and establishing an individual identity: ―With an 
acknowledgment of a particular cultural heritage comes a delineation, an enforcement of 
individuation which is finally at odds with the desire for homogeneity and acceptance 
that might be called on of the basic American myths‖ (21).  With reference to Sollors‘s 
categories of descent and consent, Rand claims that ―these writers must struggle with 
their pasts as with their demons‖ partly because they are haunted by ―the vision of a truly 
‗New World‘ where past and present are unable to coexist amiably‖ (22).  There can be 
no doubt that the past troubles American identity and the identities of Americans, when, 
to take one example, some are the descendents of slaves and some the descendents of 
slave owners. (Moreover, let us not forget, more and more are descendents of both).  I 
agree with Rand that Morrison, Silko, and Roth insist, in these novels, that America‘s 
past is the schizophrenic past of both victimizer and victim.  Because of this persistent, 
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haunting past, these novelists make use of ghosts and memories to indicate the ―still 
ongoing battle between possible and impossible versions of the world‖ (30).  Ghosts in 
particular, for these authors, ―serve as a link between the visible and invisible, between 
guilt and freedom from guilt,‖ which ultimately disallow any forgetting of the past.  Rand 
underlines this point when she observes that 
As Americans, we are taught that we can free ourselves, can cut the ties that bind 
us to the past, but the line between the visible and the invisible is not as tenuous 
as we would like to believe.  For Morrison, Roth, and Silko, the act of separation 
must entail a resuscitation, and even a resurrection, perhaps because those who do 
not study history are condemned to repeat it. (31)   
This final platitude, I think, indicates the horizon of Rand‘s argument.  There is here a 
general rejection of the existential freedom from the past that many have seen, rightly, as 
a tool of domination, severing oppressed people from their ―roots‖ in a differential 
identity that can be an important source of strength.  But what is going on in these novels, 
I claim, is more complicated than a mere imperative to ―never forget.‖  There is a 
particular kind of active memory—what in Morrison we name rememory—that makes 
the relationship to the past and the present more flexible than Rand would indicate.  This 
flexibility comes from a rethinking of the past as not the history of either the dominating 
or the dominated group, but rather as the shared history of both.  Morrison, Roth and 
Silko not only speak to what haunts African Americans, Jewish Americans, and Native 
Americans separately, but also what haunts these groups along with Anglo Americans, 
collectively or communally.  In the following chapters, we will see that a rethinking of 
the past does not only mean a rethinking of, say, the African American past for the 
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African American community, but also a rethinking of the interethnic past for the 
postethnic community. 
One of my premises here is that invoking the past to regulate present behavior 
affects not only ―ethnic‖ writers, but also ostensibly nonethnic, i.e. white, American 
writers as well.  The call to remember the American dead—usually with no 
acknowledgment of the ethnic diversity among the dead, and hence a de-ethicizing or 
whitening of them—continues to be the principal lever of patriotic quietism.  That is, 
criticisms of the American social order can and have often been silenced by the 
accusation of being disloyal because they disrespect what so many have died for.   This 
invocation of the fallen soldier—the dead, who is most rhetorically persuasive when he is 
―unknown‖ and thus a perfect cipher for the national message—consolidates national 
identity through a process that Anderson calls the ―reassurance of fratricide‖ (1991,199).  
Anderson attributes this phenomenon to the operations of first-generation nationalism, 
but it clearly goes on even in older nations in subsequent generations.  If anything, its 
rhetorical advantage, like the number of the dead themselves, continues to increase.  
Anderson explains, convincingly, that when nationalists tell the history of a singular 
national consciousness ―awakening‖ from sleep (thus having a past, even though newly 
active), they need a way to speak from the pre-conscious past.  To answer this need, 
Michelet and others innovated a trope of ―speaking for the dead,‖ by which they could, 
―with poignant authority, say what [the dead] ‗really‘ meant and ‗really‘ wanted‖ (198).  
What the venriloquized dead wanted, it comes as no surprise, was to succeed at supreme 
personal sacrifice in founding the ―awakened‖ nation, whichever one it may be.  Thus 
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uncritical love and blind duty are a debt owed to the dead, to the nation as part of a 
historical narrative, the nation that appears to the newly awakened as already decided 
and, indeed, inevitable. What is at stake, then, are the ways in which historical narratives 
create the impression of a monoethnic teleological sequence that demands our loyalty to 
the status quo.  When we answer the question, ―how did we get here?‖ with any given 
narrative, we imply that the end of the story (the present-day ―we‖) is the intended or 
natural conclusion of that narrative.  The political uses of such teleology are clear: when 
certain conditions are assumed to be inevitable, any resistance to those conditions seems 
impossible or unwise.   
However, the narrative of the dead need not always be a national or ethnically 
expunged narrative, a story of the death of faceless individuals in service to the birth of a 
nation (to use a loaded phrase).  Writers of the dead or the unreal—in other words, 
writers of fictions—can articulate alternative visions, revisions in fact, to the secular 
myths of the nation.  The motivation to do, I propose, would have to entail likewise 
revisions to ethnic identity and community.  That is, if the secular history of nationalism 
means to provide a national identity, then whatever alternative or revisionary past one 
offers up would also have to answer the same need.  My assumption here is that 
alternatives are generally a different solution to roughly the same problem, even when the 
solution involves radically revising our notions of what the problem is or is not.  The 
novelists in part one, I argue, resist this ventriloquism of the nation‘s dead by imagining a 
past in which the dead did not in fact give their lives for the sake of the present status 
quo.  The dead cannot have done so because they could not have agreed among 
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themselves, in their diversity, on what their future (our present) should be, if they thought 
of us at all.  That is, we cannot be cajoled by our debt to their sacrifice if they did not 
make that sacrifice for the sake of particular agenda.  In these novels, the nation is not an 
operative community in which we must continue the work of our ancestors.  By 
complicating the past, making our image of it postethnic, these writers free up new 
options in the present.  
Chapter 1: Toni Morrison: Piecing Together a Past 
In the often repeated words of the New York Review of Books, Morrison ―is the 
closest thing the country has to a national writer.‖  This begs the question of how we 
should categorize Morrison‘s work, as an ethnic writer, a woman writer, or an American 
writer.  The intersection of all these categories is what gives her work much of its power 
and calls it to my attention here.  In a recent lecture, Morrison demonstrated the 
broadening scope of her literary vision, which exceeds conventional markers of identity 
authorship.  She did not lecture on a text by a black writer, a woman writer, or an 
American nationalist writer: instead, she retold the story of Beowulf and compared the 
original Anglo Saxon monster to the modern reinterpretation by John Gardner in his 
novel 1971 novel Grendel.  The point of her lecture was, to put it briefly, that the way in 
which we imagine both otherness and evil can be broadly separated into medieval and the 
modern sensibilities.  The medieval is simple and stark while the modern is fraught with 
the challenge of the ―intellectual imagination‖ to configure a world occupied by many 
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others.  This is much the same thing I mean when I say that we can no longer imagine the 
world in terms belonging to only one group, that the contemporary political imagination 
must be postethnic.  Gardner‘s novel is a revision of literary history, and fantastic episode 
in that history as well.
3
  Morrison‘s novels have themselves sometimes been fantastic 
(e.g. the ghost story Beloved), and always re-visionary within the terms of ―rememory,‖ 
an imaginative method of understanding the personal and collective past.  Morrison has 
written and has been read as a re-memberer of the African American, women‘s, and 
American experience, and there is consensus that Morrison‘s extended creative work of 
rememory succeeds in its goals of healing those in need of being healed.  Her recent 
novel, A Mercy, extends this project to its broadest terms, exceeding the boundaries of 
ethnicity, gender, and nationally by remembering a time when those boundaries were 
actively being drawn. (Needless to say, they still are.)  I begin here with rememory 
because it is this model of imagining the past that draws my interest to her as a writer and 
that informs my understanding of the past-writing of postethnic utopia.  First, though, we 
must answer the question, to what extent are Morrison‘s rememory novels, which do not 
invent fanciful contradictions to historical fact, utopias at all?  The answer is that they are 
not utopias proper, but that rememory does participate in utopian discourse.  
This is because Morrison‘s fictions are not only stories often set in the past, but 
also narrative depictions of individuals performing recollection.  Very often, characters 
recreate these personal pasts in dialog with pastoral or arcadian tropes.  Jewell Parker 
Rhodes points to the ―Sweet Home‖ plantation in Beloved as one such utopia (1995).  I 
could submit, also, the ex-slave‘s farmstead ―Lincoln‘s Heaven‖ in Song of Solomon.  
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Both are sites of not only nostalgia and longing but also pain that must be confronted and 
reconfigured by the novels‘ protagonists.  The personal past looms large in these fictions, 
which in some ways offer their narratives of individual rememory work as metonyms for 
the work that needs to be done by the African American community as a whole (at least, 
this is the usual reading).
4
  Certainly, as I touched on in the introduction, the individual 
search for the collective ―good life‖ is a ubiquitous theme in American literature.  African 
American literature, such as A Raison in the Sun, often problematizes ―the good life‖ with 
the differences created between generational experiences of different forms of 
oppression.  This intergenerational evolution of worthy desire creates a story of progress, 
one that is often painfully complicated by the sense that progress can be defined, in the 
colonized mind, as becoming-white.  But even when progress is articulated in other, non-
whitening terms, the task of achieving the good life for the historically and systematically 
oppressed cannot not be imagined as the struggle within and against a historical 
backdrop.  It follows, then, that success would be usually and reasonably imagined as the 
fulfillment of a historical progress.   
By staying closer to this ―real‖ history, A Mercy is hardly an alternative history in 
the style of Henry Turtledove, Dick, or the novel by Roth that I will focus on in the next 
chapter.  Moreover, A Mercy is not, strictly speaking, an invented re-take on a historical 
events, as is Charles Johnson‘s Dreamer or Don DeLillo‘s Mao II.  Nor is it a historical 
fantasy like Octavia Butler‘s Kindred.   These novels are related, of course, if by no other 
kinship than the fact that Morrison, Johnson, and Butler all confront the problem of 
history as it pertains to contemporary African American identity.  Yet, A Mercy stands 
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apart because it suggests a particular kind of answer to this problem, the healing 
processes of rememory taken beyond the limits of any one ethnicity.  This method, I 
believe, speaks to larger concerns with the past and identity in a particularly important 
way.  Briefly, Morrison‘s work shows that making an enthno-identity out of the past is 
not a conservative act of not forgetting history, but rather a progressive process of 
reinterpreting memories, both individual and cultural.  If we can, in fact, reinterpret or 
rewrite our personal histories as needed, then likewise our present identity positions, our 
ethnicities, become negotiable or rewritable.  Thus, rememory offers a way of thinking 
about the past that does not generate a sense of inevitability or destiny.  A Mercy, in 
particular, resists an exhaustive version of American history that has come to dominate 
public discourse.  In this way, although rememory does not ignore historical reality, it can 
contradict a particular historiography.    
It may be sufficient to define rememory as reinterpreting memory, but the term 
has been so productively theorized by Morrison‘s readers that I must draw on a 
supplemental description.  Rhodes defines the process of rememory as ―a way of finding 
your bearings in a historical context‖ (1990, 77).  Her comparison of memory and 
rememory is a particularly helpful starting point:  
Memory is a disorienting, disjointed function which Morrison captures through 
the complex layering and interweaving of her narrative structure. The process of 
memory itself becomes an event as states of mind provide for the incremental 
catharsis of the self.  Rememory, on the other hand, is a revisionary process of 
memory, of seeing things for what they were, not for what you thought them to be 
at the time, of seeing things again in the light of present circumstances, and of 
weighing the value of past events in order to build a foundation for living in the 
present and the past simultaneously. (77) 
91 
Written to comment on Beloved, this description does not fully account for the shift from 
the individual to the communal that Morrison‘s work repeatedly performs.  I agree with 
Rhodes‘s overall claim that Beloved can be read (partly) as the story of how Sethe comes 
to rememorize the Sweet Home plantation as a bitter place, a plantation dystopia rather 
than a pastoral utopia.  This unveiling is what is meant by ―seeing things for what they 
were.‖  I submit that this appeal to the actual, real, or matter-of-fact truth of the past does 
not function very far beyond the limits of any individual living memory.  Rhodes‘s 
commentary is limited, then, to the ―incremental‖ and ―foundational‖ memory-rememory 
processes of a particular self.  Moreover, it is a self that must be cleansed (undergo 
catharsis) in order to become clear-seeing (in the light of the present).  While, again, this 
works well as far as it goes, it does not address concerns with what cannot be the sole 
domain of any individual memory or what has not been retained in personal memory at 
all. There remains the issue of the past that is ―lost,‖ unrecorded in personal memory or 
the historical record, and it is this past that most urgently needs to be imaginatively 
reconstructed.  In other words, there is no room here for Judith Butler‘s unaccountable 
self, which I have proposed as an apt description of the subjectivity of postethnic 
utopianism.  The acts of community that one limited being, might extend to others, 
generously, is precisely what I think Morrison points us toward in A Mercy, even in the 
title itself. 
Set circa 1690, the novel reimagines colonial America as an inoperative 
community through dramatis personae that represents American identity as a matrix of 
different affiliations.  This is not the same thing as a consent community, as Sollors might 
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have it, since the point is precisely that the novel‘s community is assembled through 
neither consent nor descent.  Thus in its timing (mythic colonial past) and spacing (the 
diversity of characters), the novel makes a claim to an American rememory on a grander 
scale than Morrison‘s previous novels but in a way already anticipated in her critical 
writing.   In Playing in the Dark, Morrison contests the colonial formation of American 
identity as ―a new white man‖ (1993).  In A Mercy, she contrasts that white man, in the 
character of Jacob, not only with an Africanist presence in the characters of Florens, her 
mother, and the blacksmith but also the presences of women, American Indians, 
homosexuals, the mentally disturbed, the poor and the indentured.  This broadening of 
rememory to what I can only name the human community is anticipated in novels such as 
Paradise, which contrasts an intentional community of women with an intentional 
community of African Americans, thus offering gender as a category of domination and 
oppression parallel but incommensurate to race.  In Paradise the best of all possible 
worlds cannot be imagined only in terms of being black or being a woman, and in A 
Mercy it cannot be imagined in the terms of any single identity drawn according to any 
one of several positions or ethnicities.   
A Mercy‘s inclusive arcadia is a farmstead belonging to Jacob, a merchant and 
―American Adam‖ who is central and peripheral to the novel: central as the owner, and 
peripheral because he is dead most of the time.  This reinterpretation of the colonial scene 
undoes the call of the patriotic dead because neither Jacob nor any of the farm‘s other 
inhabitants see themselves as the founders of a new nation in the tabula rasa of a new 
world.  Jacob is dissatisfied and ornery about the colonial landscape, especially the 
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differences of religious affiliations between various fiefdoms.  Jacob‘s wife Rebecca 
made the Atlantic crossing out the economic necessity of an arranged marriage.  Lina is 
an American Indian whose village was decimated by small pox; she is christened 
―Messilina‖ by ―kindly Presbyterians,‖ who teach her that her traditional behaviors are 
wicked before they give up on her conversion and sell her to Jacob.  The mentally 
disturbed Sorrow is shipwrecked as a young girl and adopted by a local sawyer; when she 
is abused and impregnated by the sawyer‘s sons, Jacob is asked to take her in.  Jacob 
accepts the slave Florens in trade for debts from a Maryland squire, motivated partly out 
of compassion based on his own past as an orphan and partly by a sudden ambition to 
become a prosperous plantation owner.  It is this transfer of Florens, from her mother to 
Jacob, that forms the framing ―problem‖ of the story: throughout her narration, Florens 
wrestles with the pain of having been given away by her mother.  The most striking 
detail, for me, is Jacob‘s motivation to accept the mother‘s plea based on his own self-
identification as an orphan.  This too quick roster of the farm‘s inhabitants shows that the 
members of this community arrive at the farm through choices not their own.  Even the 
two politically free characters, Jacob and the Blacksmith, have personal histories of 
transatlantic displacement.  There are no bonds of substance, i.e. blood or inheritance, 
and it would be cruel at best to call the bonds of law that united most of these characters 
in patriarchal marriage, slavery, or servitude to Jacob a kind of ―consent.‖  Most 
importantly, I think, none of them, not even Jacob exactly, are the ideal ―new white 
man,‖ creating a brave new ―land of the free.‖  The origin myth, here, is being made 
postethnic even before ―ethnicity‖ was invented. 
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On the first page of the novel, as Florens begins her telling, we read ―I see a 
minha mãe standing hand in hand with her little boy‖ (3).  The minha mãe, Portuguese 
for ―my mother,‖ is the ghost, more exactly a kind of after-image or echo, of Florens‘s 
mother.  Florens is haunted by her mother‘s choice, by the choices of another person that 
have shaped her life.  The giving of Florens qualifies in Ashraf Rushdy‘s account of 
rememory as a ―primal scene‖ that the narrator is compelled to remember at crucial 
moments in the present in order to solve or resolve a present crisis (1990).  On another 
scale, the novel itself as a staging of a national or communal primal scene in which 
Americans may contemplate the choices made by the national ancestors.  On the 
intrapersonal level, each character remembers a scene that formed their own ―past‖ as a 
context for the present: Jacob recalls his experience at Jubilo that inspires him to accrue 
property he had not previously dreamed of owning (including slaves, to which he is 
disturbingly ambivalent); Rebecca recalls her crossing of the Atlantic in the company of 
other female transportees; Lina recounts her indoctrination at the hands of the 
Presbyterians; Sorrow retells the loss of her firstborn child.  On an interpersonal or 
community level, however, the novel as a whole represents a kind of primal scene by 
prompting its American audience to undergo the work of rememory vis-à-vis the colonial 
period.
5
   
In going back to this point in time, Morrison articulates an alternative mytho-
history, one that is not only about the invention of a new white man in the context of a 
signing Africanist presence.  Rather, the colonial scene as reimagined here is about many 
different individuals, in a complex network of power relations, negotiating a life together.  
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This narrative is not the teleological story of a nation intent on the single, unifying 
purpose of escape from and rebellion against European political and religious tyranny.  
Nor does it make the creation of that nation, a hundred years after the events of the novel, 
into a historical inevitability.  If anything, A Mercy remembers America as a place, a 
spatial proximity or neighborhood, where a great many different people came together, in 
a great many different ways, for many different purposes and to many different ends.  
While this does not contradict historical fact, it does contract a particular historiography 
that has pervaded American public discourse.  In doing so, it creates a counter-arcadia, an 
alternative imaginative history. 
This alternative history of the community has consequences for the individuals as 
well: all the novel‘s characters must create their own selves out of the crosshatching of 
their memories and their surroundings.  Lina‘s story serves as the best example because 
she makes the strongest claim that unbroken continuity with the past is not a necessary 
condition for present ability.  Through the destruction of her village and her reeducation 
by missionaries, Lina‘s ―authentic‖ native culture is lost to her beyond her ability to 
recall.  Nevertheless, after the Presbyterians sell Lina as a servant to Jacob, she develops 
a means to resist the ideologies that had been forced on her, even without having the 
―real‖ counter-ideology at hand: 
…she decided to fortify herself by piecing together scraps of what her mother had 
taught her before dying in agony. Relying on memory and her own resources, she 
cobbled together neglected rites, merged Europe medicine with native, scripture 
with lore, and recalled or invented the hidden meaning of things. Found, in other 
words, a way to be in the world...Solitude would have crushed her had she not 
fallen into hermit skills and become one more thing that moved in the natural 
world. (48-9) 
96 
Lina performs this cobbling together a culture-of-one in temporal terms as piecing 
together the bits of the past.  Morrison juxtaposes Lina‘s resolution with the image of a 
chicken that nests in the corner of the kitchen: this blurring of the lines between the 
animal and human home speaks to Lina‘s revised identity as ―one more thing that moved 
in the natural world.‖  Thus this is a rememory project performed simultaneously on the 
levels of personal history, culture, and even biology.  The solution offered to the solitude 
of being cut off from other people is to redefine her place in the world so that she not cut 
off from other living things.  Rather than pining for materials that are lost in the past or 
uninvented in the present, Lina finds a way to move, a way to act, that saves her from 
being ―crushed‖ by embracing the materials at hand.  She assembles an identity that is 
postethnic in the broadest sense of no longer relying on an ascribed position in the world, 
but rather avowing one‘s place from which to speak, even if only on the limited basis of 
one‘s own small life.  It is after this realization that Lina becomes the reliable 
housekeeper of the farm, nursing the other women though sickness and childbirth. 
However, Lina‘s self-creation is not the entire story, and the role of ―mercy,‖ of 
interdependence, is perhaps more important still.  Although she begins the novel, Florens 
does not have the last word, and the end of her writing is not the end of the book.  
Morrison presents a second, more painful, and more vital mercy in addition to the one 
Florens thinks she knows.  It is the mercy that the ghost-image of Florens‘s mother has 
been trying to explain to her.  Throughout the novel, Florens sees her mother‘s ghost (or 
at least, an image of her mother), moving as if speaking, but making no sound that 
Florens can hear.  The final section of the novel presents the mother‘s story and explains 
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what Florens desperately wants to know, why her mother asked Jacob to take Florens 
away from her at Jubilo.  Florens‘s mother recounts how she came to be taken into 
slavery, and how she came to be ethnicized as ―black‖ rather than human.  Upon arriving 
at Jubilo, Ortega has Florens‘s mother raped, and later, it is suggested, rapes her himself.  
It is to avoid this fate for Florens that her mother begs Jacob to take her away, because ―I 
saw the tall man see you as a human child, not pieces of eight.‖  This seeing as human, 
which we know from Jacob‘s version of the same event is based on his own ―ethnic‖ 
position as an orphan, is precisely an undoing of the ethnicizing work that had been done 
to Florens‘s mother, making her ―pieces of eight.‖  Jacob accepts this bargain—which we 
cannot forget makes him a slave owner in a more sinister way than he has been up to this 
point—and Florens‘s mother declares that ―It was not a miracle. Bestowed by God. It was 
a mercy. Offered by a human‖ (166-67).  How can we possibly think, along with the 
novel, that this is mercy!  And yet it seems that such is the mercy we can expect in a 
world where no one stands outside the systems of political and social power.  If anyone 
did stand in this impossible outside position, it would be the philosopher king, on whose 
mercy we should rightly fear to depend.  Along these lines, Florens‘s mother closes the 
novel with an axiom: ―[T]o be given dominion over another is a hard thing; to wrest 
dominion over another is a wrong thing; to give dominion of yourself to another is a 
wicked thing‖ (167).  This suggests that while larger systems themselves are not quickly 
reformable, and revolutions may fail, something that cuts across or ‗instead of‖ the 
systems might resist the suffering they inflict.  Lina pieces together a hybrid counter-
culture; Florens‘s mother chooses a less inhuman future for her daughter.  These choices 
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are by no means ideal or utopian, but they do break with the status quo, the situation at 
hand which has not been freely chosen. 
A Mercy is, indeed, a novel of many unremarked lives, lives that were not marked 
down in the ―pages of history‖ in the way that the biographies of the founding fathers 
were marked and remarked into a kind of hagiography.  This unremarkable cast 
distinguishes it from a novel like Johnson‘s Dreamer, or DeLillo‘s Mao II, which 
attaches to a named ―historical‖ personage.  More importantly, Morrison‘s unremarked 
characters are revealed as making their own kinds of marks – Florens writes her story on 
the closet walls.  The novel remembers, in contradiction to historiographic memory, an 
inoperative and hence postethnic community of colonial America. These characters live 
in proximity with each other and in excess of the conventional account of the colonial 
experience.
6
  Thus, Morrison‘s colonial America was always a place with a past, never a 
blank slate.  Although some who came there were visionaries and schemers, there was 
never a grand utopian design uniting everyone together as ―colonists‖ let along ―founding 
fathers.‖  Early America as she remembers it is not even America in the national sense – 
only a collection of settlements and land-grant fiefdoms.   There was not a unified, 
inevitable progression toward the Declaration of Independence, or any such ―historical‖ 
event.  There were, this novel imagines, only many different people interacting in many 
different ways.  The systems in place meant that most people suffered one way or 
another.  Many similar systems are still in place today.  But also and most importantly, 
there were acts of human mercy.  We can extend this to say that it is an ethos of mercy, 
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rather than faith in American goodness per se (its principles, its laws, its historical 
meaning), that the novel offers as a context for living in the present. 
The novel speaks to the concerns of the early twenty-first century by imagining 
the past postethnically in contraction to the ways it is conventionally imagined non-
ethnically.  By disrupting one of the prevailing stories by which ―operative‖ America 
knows itself, it dislocates the position from which many people may think of themselves 
as Americans of one kind or another.  This origin in loss and fragmentation is represented 
in a story that Lina tells Florens.  One day, an eagle‘s nest is disturbed by ―a traveler‖ 
who arrives on the mountain top and, surveying the beautiful landscape, declares ―‗this is 
perfect, this is mine.‘‖  His proclamation causes a thunderous disturbance, and he attacks 
the eagle when she tries to protect her nest.  The eagle, Lina says, is ―still 
falling…forever‖ and the eggs ―hatch alone.‖  When Florens asks if the chicks live, Lina 
answers that ―we have‖ (62-3).  Rather than being the inheritors of a utopian legacy, the 
novel suggests that Americans the orphaned children of a past that is ―still falling‖ 
through the contingencies of cause and effect, and still haunted by the colonial edict.  
Eschewing historical destiny, the novel offers individual mercy as a way to ameliorate 
human suffering.  In other words, the world will not become a better place because of the 
advent of a particular form of democracy.  If it becomes a better place at all (and it may 
not), it will be it some extent through smaller, unremarkable, sometimes illegible actions.    
This renewal of a sense of contingency, then, resists a prevailing sense of 
inevitability.  It is not inevitable, in this novel, that America will be a shining beacon on a 
hill.  If the past comprised many different ethnicities of people interacting in many of 
100 
different ways, then the future may emerge in many of different directions.  
Fragmentation is the norm, not the aberration here.  We tend to feel like the past is 
―fixed‖ because we know how it ―really‖ turned out, and likewise we tend to think that 
the way things happened are the only way they could have happened.  Remembering the 
past postethnically, as Morrison‘s novel shows, raises the possibility that things could 
have happened differently.  If we imagine that the past could have gone otherwise, what 
are the consequences for our current place in history?  What kind of ethical self can we 
form if we believe ourselves and our communities to be other than part of a grand, 
hopefully benevolent design?  This is precisely the imaginative experiment in Roth‘s The 
Plot Against America, which imagines an alternative history in direct contradiction to 
what really happened.  Morrison‘s work helps articulate a community that is not a 
national identity but rather a cooperative neighborliness based on mercy rather than 
divine or historical providence.  This helps us to say, in Nancy‘s terms, that our 
communities are comprised not of people we are in communion with, but rather people 
with whom we communicate.  Morrison‘s novel also hints at what the substance of the 
communication ought to be, and with that ought comes a complex set of utopian 
connotations. All the various mercies in the novel, even the painful mercy of Jacob 
accepting Florens as his slave, are framed in terms of a compassionate humble generosity 
based on mutual incompleteness, which recalls Butler‘s proposal for an ethics based on 
one‘s own inability to fully account for oneself.  There remains more work to be done, 
however, in detailing what this humble generosity would look like.  What kind of actions 
would proceed from a belief that the world depends upon an uncountable number of 
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interpersonal mercies among mutually fragmented or limited individuals?  I explore some 
possible answers to this question in the next chapter. 
Chapter 2: Philip Roth: Contradicting History 
The Plot Against America re-imagines the clash between liberal democratic and 
fascist ideologies in the context of individual lives in early twentieth-century America.
7
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propose that the key to the novel is its setting in the 1940s, the period in American history 
when the newly industrialized nation solidified its identity contra fascism and 
communism through engagement and victory in World War II.  In the decade preceding 
the war, the Great Depression had thrown capitalism into doubt, and fascism and 
communism were both seen viable alternative ideologies in ways that they would not be 
after the war.  Roth‘s novel imagines a contradictory history in which the U.S. takes a 
fascist turn during the years 1940-42 under the presidency of Charles Lindberg.  The 
possibility of a fascist American is certainly not outside the conventional reach of 
imaginative writing—London‘s The Iron Heel and Lewis‘s It Can’t Happen Here both 
project contemporary dystopias along this premise.  But Roth‘s work is different in that it 
is a utopia of the past, a dystopic arcadia.  It is not the only one of its kind—Dick‘s The 
Man in the High Tower imagined the Germans winning the war—but it is a rare instance 
of a past-projection that is not merely nostalgic.  
The Plot is Roth‘s first post-9/11 novel, and David Brauner draws extensive 
comparisons between it and the Jonathan Foer‘s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, 
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which came out the following year.  Both novels were marketed as responses to the event 
and situation after 9/11.  The point of comparison for Brauner is how the novels explore 
the trauma of a historical catastrophe as absorbed by the life of a child protagonist.   In 
this reading, The Plot‘s treatment of anti-Semitism only ―provides a pretext for Roth‘s 
primary subject: the subjecthood, and subjectivity, of Philip‖ (2007, 201).  The 
imaginative flights of the child Philip within the counterfactually imagined 1940-42, 
accordingly, serve as Roth‘s comment on the therapeutic uses of fantastic detachment 
from the real (including the desire for an unreal place that marks the utopian 
imagination): 
Whether being overtaken by hostile historical forces in his homeland (as in the 
scenario of Hitler invading America), or inhabiting an ahistorical, geographically 
amorphous realm (‗lost in some far-off region‘), Philip‘s visions all involve a 
radical self-detachment, a situation in which he defines himself as ‗lost‘, literally 
and figuratively. (202) 
According to Brauner, the novel is about ―this retreat from everything – family, friends, 
community, culture, history, the ability to speak and to hear—that ordinarily constitutes, 
and protects, a child‘s sense of identity‖ and its cause, the ―trauma‖ done to the Roth 
family by the historical forces at work in their world (203).  But I am not convinced that 
the novel is only about trauma, nor do I think that Philip‘s imagination is only about 
coping through escapism.  I agree that anti-Semitism is not the focus of the novel, 
although this is the widespread assumption of its reviewers.  It seems to me that the key 
to the novel is not that horror occurs, but when and how it is brought about by individual 
failures; likewise, it not only matters that the protagonist survives the horror, but also and 
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more importantly how he learns to respond to other people in the same situation.  In this 
attention to the individual, the novel deconstructs the us versus them narrative of America 
and the Nazis.  This challenge to American identity and American moral authority makes 
the novel postethnic in general, but it is particularly so in the way it rethinks Philip‘s 
Jewish American identity and where his loyalties ought to lie. 
Readers may ask, with Alan Cooper, why ―through all this‖ trauma and 
controversy of the Bush administration, Roth seems intent on ―hanging out back in 1940‖ 
(2005, 241).  The Plot does not seem, to me, a desertion of the novelist‘s responsibilities 
to tackle difficult social issues (a responsibility Roth has claimed), but rather a way to 
come at those issues indirectly.  This is not to say that the novel is some type of allegory: 
Roth is not using 1940-42 as a stand in for 2004.  Rather, he is addressing the issues of 
2004 through the past, attending to the ways in which the past is used to legitimize (or 
delegitimize) elements in the present.  This is not the first novel in which Roth has upset 
conventional nostalgia: his ―anti-pastoral‖ positions are laid out in the American Trilogy, 
the novels featuring Nathan Zuckerman after the four works comprised in Zuckerman 
Bound.
8
  Taking Roth at his word that the novel is about this time per se and not an 
allegorical comment on the first decade of the twenty-first century, we can consider how 
this alternative history compares to A Mercy, which performs its imaginative work on the 
decades around 1690, as well as to Gardens in the Dunes, which works in the decades 
after the end of the Indian Wars.  These novels are about rethinking the time when they 
are set: not the times themselves, but rather what those times have symbolized in 
American communities. 
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This focus on the ―when‖ of the novel rather than the ―who‖—the temporal rather 
than the autobiographical element or the issue of anti-Semitism—addresses one of the 
more persistent problems critics have raised.  Several commentators have questioned the 
ethics of Roth‘s counterfactual imagination: they ask, what good is a story about pretend 
oppression in place of a story of real oppression?  Walter Ben Michaels points to how this 
issue is at the heart of the book‘s aesthetic appeal: 
So, part of the book‘s power derives from its realism, the fact that it feels like the 
truth… while another part derives from the fact that, of course, it‘s not true—
when the police come to remove the Jews from the hotel, it‘s scary but, like a 
horror movie, pleasurably scary because its history is counterfactual—it didn‘t 
happen here. And both these facts—the fact that it could have happened here and 
the fact that it didn‘t—are given additional power by a third fact, the fact that, of 
course, it did happen here, only not to the Jews. (2006, 287) 
Michaels goes on to critique the functions of anti-racism in ―the utopian imagination of 
neoliberalism‖ (299), a point which is clearly pertinent to a utopian-studies approach in 
the minority or ethnic writing.  The focus, for the moment, is on the immediate question 
of the good of imagining a counterfactual Jewish ―holocaust‖ in America, when a real 
―holocaust‖ actually happened to African Americans.  Michaels‘ counterpoints focus on 
the persecution of Jim Crow and segregation, but obviously a parallel refutation could be 
made citing the genocide of Native peoples as well.
9
  Ultimately, I insist, it is not the 
―who suffered‖ that Roth is re-imagining, but rather the years 1940-42.  The importance 
of these two years in how Americans understand their national identity in the twentieth 
century cannot be underestimated.  By imaginatively overturning American behavior in 
this period, Roth challenges the core of certain kinds of American ideology, a certain 
105 
image of what America is and how individual Americans fit into its workings.  The 
ideology at stake here has its inscription in the American story of the Holocaust, or more 
specifically, the story of America and the Holocaust. 
Why do we—Roth but also his readers—need to entertain a ―made up‖ horror, 
when the twentieth-century offers too many ―real‖ horrors for us to grapple with?  This 
question and its implicit rejection of such imaginative work gestures in several directions, 
not only towards real American horrors, but also toward the real ―Jewish‖ horror of the 
actual Holocaust in Europe.  Craig Brown makes this point when he contrasts Roth‘s 
―made up tears‖ with ―tears that were all too real‖ (2004).  Michaels echoes it when he 
asks ―In what sense—except Roth[‘s]… counterfactual one—is the Holocaust part of 
American history?‖ (289). One possible response to this may be simply that the 
Holocaust is undeniably a part of the history of many Americans, both of recent 
European emigration and veterans of the war itself.  Following from the community 
history we read in A Mercy, we may insist that postethnic American history is more 
properly thought of as the history of all kinds of Americans and not only the history of 
what happened within the geographical boundaries of America.  Any response to 
Michaels‘s challenge depends on how we understand the distinction between the history 
of a nation and the histories of many singular beings who come into proximity with one 
another. 
Whereas A Mercy and Gardens go back to the periods that emblematize slavery 
and genocide, Roth goes back to the emblematic moment of ―the good war‖ or ―the 
greatest generation.‖  American actions in Europe in the 1940s are a nearly sacred text of 
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any faith in the moral authority of America as an actor on the world stage, whether it be 
as the ―one superpower‖ or as the world‘s ―policeman.‖  The only elements of the story 
of WWII that are acceptably held up for questioning are the domestic internment of 
Americans of Japanese Ancestry and the nuclear bombings in Japan.  Notably, both take 
place in the context of the war‘s ―other‖ theater, the one without the Nazis.  Americans‘ 
image of their nation as the actor that stopped Hitler and ended the Holocaust remains the 
holy icon of American nationalism. This moment is not only the material advent of 
American military-industrial power on a global scale, but also comes to be used as the 
ethical warrant for any American foreign policy in the late twentieth century.  When Roth 
revisits this moment and shows American‘s behaving badly –even, perhaps, like Nazis 
and/or a complicit German citizenry—he challenges the mythology of the war and its use 
in underwriting a blithe confidence in the rightness of America in the global age, fighting 
fascism and soviet-style communism.  American self-righteousness, not anti-Semitism, is 
the target of this postethnic dystopian satire. 
My reading of the novel is illuminated by Elaine Safer‘s in her book, Mocking the 
Age, which focuses on Roth‘s humor.  Importantly for my broader argument, she sees his 
humor as a form of imagining-the-world: ―Roth makes us aware that we live in a bizarre 
cartoon world where the ludicrous and the calamitous merge, a world in which black 
humor keeps reappearing and we do not know whether to laugh or cry‖ (1).  While the 
satiric uses of speculative utopias—nowheres of the present and future—is not 
necessarily postethnic, Safer‘s reading suggests that The Plot may be satirical and 
postethnic: ―The satiric edge of The Plot develops by contrasting the fearfully grotesque 
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actions of Lindbergh‘s followers with the romantic notion of the American Dream and its 
idealistic message that the United States is a melting pot where people of different races 
and religions live in peace and good will‖ (151, emphasis mine). The book ―draws 
attention to the disparity between romantic ideals of equality and justice for all as 
opposed to fear and submissiveness of the people who fail to speak out because they are 
afraid of the consequences‖ (152). Throughout the novel, the Roth family or their 
neighbors insist on holding faith with the governing documents of American democracy 
and the institutions that protect its open society.  As their hopes are defeated, again and 
again, these documents and institutions are not the object of mockery as much as the 
individual‘s lazy reliance on such artifacts to keep them free.  Thus, the novel is an 
indictment of the kind of utopianism that assumes that a revolution can be accomplished 
once and for all, and then we rest. 
The series of events in the novel systematically undoes the Roth family‘s sense of 
themselves as Americans, ―as one‖ in communal identity with all Americans as part of an 
already accomplished American project or dream, the work of the founding fathers.  That 
the novel makes its intervention ―in‖ the years 1940-42, the years crucial to the formation 
of an American image of international righteousness, I would claim, gives it teeth as a 
critique of the actions and reactions of America in the years following September 11—
which we should remember, at this point, was initially and widely compared to Perl 
Harbor.  As the novel reimagines U.S. as a Nazi outpost, it becomes less and less tenable 
to believe in the Roths as Americans, and yet there remains a lack or need for some kind 
of community.  The obvious candidate, needless to say, is the community of being 
108 
Jewish, the community that Lindbergh wishes to ascribe to them exclusively.  The novel 
can be read as the transformation of the Roths from being Americans who are Jewish to 
being Jews in America.
 10
  But this move only replaces one kind of operative community 
with another, exchanging the American and Jewish essentiality, without providing a 
postethnic (and postnational) alternative to having an essence at all. 
The Plot very clearly, I propose, does not make this move to being Jewish but 
instead goes for a non-essentialism such as the one that Safer finds in Counterlife and 
other novels in which Roth refutes of the existence of any core self by having characters 
transform their identities this way and that.  The Plot, however, transforms a society 
rather than individuals (147), suggesting that there is no core social identity like a 
―national character,‖ and thus marking the postnational within the postethnic.  This is 
tantamount to saying, as Nancy does, that there is no metaphysical essence of a 
community, only the being-in-common of singular beings.  In the American Trilogy, 
Safer explains, exterior forces cause ―alternative personalities,‖ rather than alternative 
histories, but whereas the historical forces in the trilogy are basically factual, in The Plot, 
the historical events are counter-factual (148).  This raises, I think, the issue of a 
community‘s image of its operative self, its temporally construed purpose or goal.  
According to Safer, Roth challenges the notion of a unified individual self through the 
imagining of counter-lives that give rise to or arise from alternative personalities. 
Additionally, the counter-factual imagination of the Plot makes a similar move on the 
interpersonal level of community as well as the intrapersonal level of the individual. 
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The historical forces of the Lindberg Administration reconfigure young Philip as 
not American but Jewish, and Philip himself no longer wants to be either.  He cannot be 
the assimilated American, as his brother Sandy can, nor can he be the fighting-and-
wounded Jew his cousin Alvin is, nor the displaced-and-persecuted Jew his neighbor 
Seldon becomes.  Rather, Philip wants to be ―an orphan,‖ a being with no past that 
determines his community identity, American or Jewish.  He wants to be ―cut off‖ from 
the body politic or any other kind of corps, and this figure of amputation becomes 
important to his coming of age.  By isolating himself in this way, he becomes a singular 
being rather than a being identified with metaphysical essences such as being Jewish or 
being American (or even being a Roth).  Ultimately, the novel suggests, this kind of 
existential isolation is not disabling, but rather lets Philip offer himself to others in a way 
preferable to yielding to the demands of others whose claims originate in a shared 
identity.  
The novel opens up a possibility for a postethnic responsibility to others through 
the conventional socialization motif of the buildungsroman, but here the socialization 
does not absorb the individuals into the adult world but rather substantiates an adult 
individual‘s emergence into a peer position with other adults.
11
  The hallmark of Philip‘s 
entry into this adulthood is his growing capacity not only for empathy but also for 
responsibility.  Responsibility, in this case, must be understood as the-ability-to-respond, 
and not in the sense of a ―guilt‖ that must be borne.  The issue is not how one is 
responsible for what happened, but rather how one is responsible to what is happening.  
Instead of responding to the demands of others because, like a child, he cannot refuse a 
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fellow Jew or American (or family member, for that matter), Philip becomes able to 
respond because his isolation from those around him gives him the option not to do so.  
He does not respond under the sway of the rhetorical power of the past—whether that 
past is Jewish tursis, the work of the founding Americans, or even biological and cultural 
progenitors, his parents.  He does not have to respond because he is ―Jewish,‖ 
―American,‖ or even because he is a ―Roth.‖  Rather, by the end of the novel, Philip is 
able to respond because he can see others as separate and limited individuals, like 
himself, and he can imagine both their circumstances and a response that might mitigate 
their suffering. 
Philip must come to terms with the pain of those around him and his own relation 
to that pain as one-among-them rather than being at-one-with-them.  Although he initially 
reacts to his cousin Alvin‘s lost limb with disgust, Philip gains the courage to respond to 
Alvin‘s suffering directly after they share a room for the summer.  When Philip tries on 
Alvin‘s prosthesis, one of his cousin‘s scabs sticks to Philip‘s knee (138).  The fear that 
Alvin‘s injury could in fact be his own manifests and dissipates in this moment, and it is 
after this encounter with the sharable otherness of Alvin‘s stump that Philip begins to 
care actively for his cousin.  Out of this relationship, Philip devises a solution to one of 
the difficulties of Alvin‘s life, getting dressed: 
I found myself think about Alvin and how I could get him to forget about his 
prosthesis—and so I said to my mother, ―If Alvin had a zipper on the side of his 
pant leg, it would be easier for him, wouldn‘t it, to get in and out of his pants 
when he‘s got his leg on?‖…That night when Alvin pulled on the trousers after 
having undone the zipper, the pant leg passed easily up over the prosthesis 
without his having to curse everyone on earth just because he was getting dressed. 
(145) 
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Philip comes to this solution by paying close attention to Alvin‘s life, through which 
Philip is able to perceive a way that Alvin‘s world could be (a little) better.  This 
imaginative modification of the world based on an understanding of human suffering is 
what Scary proposes in the later part of The Body in Pain, and we could say, in her terms, 
that Philip has crafted his understanding (sentience) of his cousin‘s needs into the artifact 
of a zippered pant leg.   The modified clothing, then, contains Philip‘s counterfactual 
wish, his wish that Alvin did not have to struggle to get dressed.  This imaginative 
reconstruction of a very small part of the world is an example of utopianism on a small 
scale, or what Popper would call ―piecemeal engineering.‖  It is, for my argument, what 
utopianism looks like in a postethnic community without an ethnocentric call for grand 
utopian visions.  In the final chapter of my introduction, I proposed that the ethos of 
beings in such a community is characterized by generosity and humility. The care of a 
counterfactual imagination that arises out of thoughtful attention answers what it gives in 
its generosity.  The question remains, though, in what sense is it an ethos of humility. 
Coming from the limit and the exposure that Nancy and Butler so richly theorize, 
the humility here is in a very real sense a recognition of mortality.  Ultimately, the 
emergence of Philip‘s sense of himself as a responsible being involves, in some sense, the 
―death‖ of his parents as his parents, as those beings with whom his responsibility is 
asymmetrical.   It is only when he sees his parents stressed by the ―Bad Days‖ of the 
novel‘s counterhistory that Philip can see ―my mother was a fellow creature. I was 
shocked by the revelation, and too young to comprehend that there was the strongest 
attachment of all‖ (340).  This loss of asymmetry is also a flattening of a positional and 
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hence a kind of ethnic hierarchy.  Ultimately, the ethos that requires paying attention and 
being responsible is more sustainably liberating than the father-worship of democratic 
ideals that rely on the signers of the Constitution.  It is ultimately a ―better‖ basis for 
practicing the virtues desired by liberal democracies because it lacks a kind of childish 
hubris that ―we‖ are the center of history or our ancestors‘ benevolent plans.  This is not 
the moral hubris of knowing good from evil, but rather the ethnic hubris of thinking the 
world works only for the good or ill of people like us.  It is the postethnic humility of 
knowing that the world needs many small improvements—even as small as a zippered 
pant leg—and that we will need everyone‘s contributions. 
The novel‘s final image underlines this conclusion, and returns us to the 
intersection of Nancy‘s and Butler‘s ethics.  When Philip‘s cousin Sheldon‘s mother is 
killed in a pogrom, Philip likens his grief-stricken cousin to a stump for which Philip 
himself will be the prosthesis.  Sheldon replaces Alvin 
…as the person in the twin bed next to mine shattered by the malicious indignities 
of Lindbergh‘s America.  There was no stump for me to care for this time.  The 
Boy himself was the stump, and until he was taken to live with his mother‘s 
married sister in Brooklyn ten months later, I was the prosthesis. (362). 
Taking up Nancy‘s terms, this kind of inter-being (as opposed to a common-being) 
requires a revaluation of the space which separates and brings together, which spaces 
individuals at various distances.  This proximity functions at several moments in the 
novel, with the forced relocations of the OAA and Homestead 42 projects marking most 
apparent the interplay of space and identity.  Philip must be responsible for those close to 
him not through any ethnic affiliation, but rather, postethnically, through spatial 
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proximity and a concurrent compassion.  The source of that compassion, ultimately, is 
Philip‘s own sense of himself as a fellow being, singular and traumatized, among other 
singular beings.  The recognition of mutual singularity and mutual incompleteness or 
interior opacity—what Butler describes as an inability to account for oneself—motivates 
this care for those nearby.
12
  The spatial terms here begin to raise the question of what 
counts as the proximate environment, and we will take up the question of the natural 
world as community in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3: Leslie Marmon Silko: Cultivating History 
―And those who would make the boundary lines and try to separate them, 
those are the manipulators, those are the Gunadeeyah, the destroyers, the 
exploiters‖  
—Silko  (Arnold, 9) 
If Roth‘s novel presents us with the revelation of an inoperative community in the 
wake of a loss of national and ethnic communion, then Silko‘s Gardens in the Dunes 
gives us a perennial version of this revelation.  Like Morrison‘s colonial farmstead, the 
―old gardens‖ in Silko‘s novel represent a kind of agrarian ideal, but one that is situated 
on the other side of the boarder, with the Native Americans rather than the colonial 
pioneers.  Her small, Edenic enclave, isolated by the desert, echoes the utopian trope of a 
lost world isolated, like Shangri-La, in some geographical stasis.  However, rather than 
an intentional closed society of utopian engineers, the desert gardens in Silko‘s novel are 
the final refuge of the invented Sand Lizard tribe.  With the story of these people set in 
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the wake of the Indian Wars, the novel revisits another key moment in the story of 
American identity.  Just as Morrison reimagines the initial folding together of many 
identities in the new world, and Roth revisits the formation of the triumphal American 
identity in the twentieth century, Silko rewrites the civilizing mission of Manifest Destiny 
and the atrocity of the Indian Education programs.  The cultural genocide of the Indian 
schools is itself emblematic of the close relationship between identity and utopianism, 
our ideas about selves and societies.  In order for Manifest Destiny to proceed, it was 
deemed necessary not only to take Native lands but also to erase ―Indian‖ cultural 
identities.  However, Gardens in the Dunes approaches this familiar story from an 
unexpected direction, seeing cultural violence as not simply a historical atrocity but also a 
complex occasion demanding both persistence and an openness to change.  Through the 
rhetoric of the garden, especially the perennial holistic garden, Silko reworks the usual 
story of an invasive European species along a postethnic line.   
Silko‘s best known novel, Ceremony represents specifically and compellingly the 
intergenerational cultural trauma suffered by tribal people, which it achieves through, 
most notably, a blending of traditional songs and storytelling with conventional novelistic 
narration.  The songs and stories of the novel Ceremony and the healing ceremony in the 
novel offer yet another way of understanding the power of language in shaping the world.  
In the introduction, I have already reviewed in some detail broadly Cartesian theories of 
how language might shape the world in terms of ideology and the artifact, yet these are 
not the only ideas that humans have about how language and material reality interact.  It 
would be a mistake to appropriate native beliefs about the powers of storytelling and song 
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to constitute real change into the heuristics of Marxism, interactionism, or existentialism.  
Nevertheless, the belief that words have real ―magical‖ power in the world is not isolated 
to any particular tribal belief systems nor is it incommensurable with non-tribal 
paradigms.  One example, outside the Native American context, is the Anglo Saxon word 
for bard or poet, scop, which means ―shaper‖ and indicates the poet‘s role in shaping both 
the story and the world as it is understood by the listener.  Further, in Classical rhetoric, 
epideictic or ―ceremonial‖ speech is precisely the use of words to ―magically‖ transform 
reality, as for example when a official pronounces a couple to be man and wife.   The 
magical or ceremonial uses of mythic language are an important element, Laurence 
Coupe argues, in the critical line that extends through Burke and Frye to Bloch and 
Jameson (2009).  The very possibility of discursive transformation being consummate 
with a transformation in lived experiences requires a certain faith that ―words are a kind 
of action,‖ an Emersonian aphorism.  In Ceremony, traditional songs and stories are able 
to heal Tayo because they establish a sustaining bond to his community.  Rand 
emphasizes this bond to the community‘s traditional past and thereby argues that it is a 
stronger connection with his essential Indian-ness than rehabilitates Tayo (1995).  But, I 
would insist, the temporality of that ceremony, like the temporality of Gardens in the 
Dunes, is not so simple.    
In Morrison and Roth, I have claimed, postethnic inoperative communities replace 
teleological ―operative‖ communities, but even so these ―new‖ communities remain 
temporally linear.  Although there is no overarching ―cause‖ or purpose larger than 
individual intention, there are still rational sequences of cause and effect.  Silko‘s 
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temporality, drawing on Native traditions, is instead cyclical and accompanies an 
intergenerational model of justice.  David Moore points out that ―the wide-ranging 
narrative of Almanac [of the Dead] describes teachings of the elders who valorize 
patience over violence because of the cyclic power of time‖ (1999, 154-55).  This stance, 
what Moore calls ―radical patience,‖ is also a key attitudes in Gardens, where the cyclical 
power of time is seen in the perennial return of the self-seeding vegitation.  This 
perennialism and a related inclusivity are, I argue, an important contribution to the 
contradiction of teleological narratives of inevitability because they resist calamitous 
narratives that fear change as irrevocable loss.  Postethnic utopias, confronted with the 
already severe ongoing damages of globalization, will need to be more resilient than a 
debilitating nostalgia would allow.  For example, a principle theme of Gardens is that 
new flowers will bloom tomorrow, which are both tomorrow‘s flowers and the product of 
yesterday‘s seeding.  In its cyclical nonlinearity, this perennialism links the past and the 
future as consubstantial with the present.  In this model, decisions are made and 
consequences are felt intergenerationally, but Gardens does not use this continuity to 
construct a transcendently stable identity, such as like a pure ethnic heritage, that must be 
preserved.  In fact, the Sand Lizard attitude towards strange seeds is both practical and 
joyous.     
The novel‘s cyclical journey-and-return narrative reproduces and reverses several 
well known utopian or pastoral motifs.  Indigo starts out in the old gardens with Sister 
Salt and Grandmother Fleet, is displaced into her position with Hattie and Edward, and 
then returns again to the old gardens where she renews her life with Sister Salt.  Much of 
117 
course has changed along the way, and one important mark of difference in the return 
section is the message Indigo receives from Hattie, who has settled in Europe: her letter 
writing marks a communicative connection across the geographical and cultural distance.  
This voyage and return reprises the utopian narrative of a shipwrecked sojourner who 
discovers utopia: Indigo is violently displaced from the world she knows, discovers a 
dystopic civilization, and returns home with new plants, specifically gladiolas.   On one 
hand, this reverses the city-county-city arc of most pastoral stories in which the city 
dweller is enriched, revitalized, or renewed by his contact with nature, as for example in 
Upton Sinclair‘s Oil!  On another hand, it also recalls the structure of Samuel Johnson‘s 
Rasselas, in which a utopian prince goes adventuring in real world.  But Silko‘s pattern is 
not as romantic as Sinclair‘s or satiric as Johnson‘s: the old gardens are not a paradise, 
and the European people Indigo encounters are not all the objects of derision. 
The difference here lays in the attitude towards the interactions between the world 
―inside‖ the old gardens and the ―outside‖ world that Indigo experiences.  The 
relationship between the two is represented through different attitudes toward gardening.  
The dichotomy of agriculture and horticulture divides different kinds of use, the edible 
and the decorative, which division Silko undoes with the edible decoration of the gladiola 
plant. First, it is the very lack of a demand that all uses be declared ahead of time that 
distinguishes Sand Lizard practices from either farming or gardening as it is known to the 
white characters.  Indigo makes it a point that the Sand Lizard people are unique in their 
relationship to nature, which is neither that of strictly defined agriculture nor horticulture:  
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The more strange and unknown the plant, the more interested Grandma Fleet was; 
she loved to collect and trade seeds. Others did not grow a plant unless it was 
food or medicine, but Sand Lizards planted seeds to see what would come; Sand 
Lizards ate nearly everything anyway, and Grandma said they never found a plant 
they couldn‘t use for some purpose. (83-84) 
Sure enough, in the final section of the novel, we are told that not only are the gladiolas 
flowers admired and appreciated as a unique donation to the local church (475), but it 
also turns out that the spud tuber can be eaten: ―Those gladiolas weren‘t only beautiful; 
they were tasty‖ (476).  Silko does not simply oppose natural and pragmatic Native 
agriculture with artificial and indulgent European horticulture: the imaginary Sand Lizard 
attitude embodies both the nutritional/medicinal and aesthetic functions of plants.  It does 
so precisely by placing plants, and animals, in postethnic community with human 
inhabitants of the old gardens.  I write postethnic here, but its precise inflection in this 
text is the post-anthropocentric.   
Moreover, the native ability to incorporate the European gladiolas flowers and 
spuds into their aesthetic and dietary practices represents the sustaining potential of 
intercultural cross-pollination.  The problem of such an all-encompassing ―desire,‖ as 
Brewster E. Fitz helpfully explicates, ―can be seen not only as welcoming diversity but as 
also as potentially producing confusion‖ (2004, 194).  Fitz goes onto explain how this 
confusion might be either babble or glossolalia, a pan-cultural language represented in 
Gardens by the pan-tribal community of the Ghost Dance (198-99).  With out a doubt, it 
is fitting that we should read this fictional, intercultural linguistic phenomenon in such 
religious terminology, especially since Gardens does much of its work at the comparative 
linkages between early Christian and tribal belief systems.  But a non-mystical 
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explanation will do just as well: the possibilities for communication in Gardens are not 
limited to language or the requirement that a language or culture be shared by those who 
communicate.  It is sufficient, I think, to say postethnic utopianism sees communication 
as a broader category than interlocution, which can go as far as to the interactionist stance 
that language does not exist as an organized system but rather as a set of contingent 
interactions.  (This is a point I elaborate in the afterword.)  Thus an opportunity for cross-
cultural pollination opens up through the Sand Lizard‘s receptive, patient, and inquisitive 
attitude towards non-indigenous seeds.   The use made of the seemingly useless foreign 
material, genetic and cultural, hints at the power of Native traditions to incorporate, 
adapt, and amend the world as it occurs. 
In its historical setting, Gardens invites a comparison to another ―historical‖ 
novel, James Welch‘s Fools Crow.  In both novels, a fairly insular tribal community—the 
Sand Lizard people or the Lone Eaters—live close to the land and are threatened by the 
encroachments of pioneering white men.  There are, however, some key differences here 
that allow me to highlight what makes Gardens postethnic.  In Fool’s Crow, the tribal 
community is whole and sharply defined prior to the worst violence of the Indian Wars; 
in Gardens, the native community is scattered (the only Sand Lizards remaining are 
Grandma Fleet, Sister Salt, and Indigo) and the new neighborhood comprises people 
several backgrounds, including white Mormons.  In Fools Crow, the title shaman sees the 
future and rallies his people to fight; in Gardens, Indigo is flung on her journey with no 
sense of futurity but a persistent patience to return home with new seeds.  These 
differences—clearly gendered—can be attributed to the different work each novel does 
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and the generic distinction between a historical novel and utopian past-writing.  Fools 
Crow is a valuable novel of reconstruction: it gives us the history of the Blackfeet in the 
Indian Wars, making this history come alive from the perspective of those who ultimately 
would not be the victors.  It is a vital antidote to the foregone white histories that write 
the settlement of the west as a civilizing mission (civilizing both the wild Indians and the 
wilderness itself).  Gardens, on the other hand, does not offer us a fictional 
historiography but rather imagines a utopian location—the old gardens—for the 
rhetorical leverage that such a trope offers.  Silko‘s novel is set in the wake of genocidal 
trauma: its topic is not the memorializing of that trauma as much as the performative 
demonstration of regenerative survival.  (In the part two, we will revisit this idea with 
Vizenor‘s neologism survivance.) 
Taking a step back, we can observe that the title tropes of Silko‘s major novels 
each speaks to the power of discursive practices to generate and regenerate an 
intercultural world that is post-traumatic and hence in need of healing (or what we might 
call therapy in a different context).  Ceremony indicates the power of story and song to 
heal and shape our experiences and ourselves; Almanac ―emphasizes,‖ according to Ami 
Regier, ―the expansive, compendious nature of the almanac form rather than emphasizing 
the purity of a past set of formal practices‖ (1999, 185), and Gardens taps into both 
intercultural common ground and differences, both welcoming in the whole world and 
making careful distinctions and commitments within in.   
In this way Silko reworks, or works again through a painful period in Native 
American history, after the most violent episodes of the Indian Wars, during the forced 
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reeducation of Native children in an effort to remove their ethnocultural identity.  Yet she 
interrupts the conventional story in several details: the child does not come from a 
recognizable tribe and she is not taken away from a purely tribal setting.  The family that 
adopts her is neither conventionally domineering nor conventionally libratory: they try 
neither to erase nor to affirm her ―Indian-ness.‖  And, finally, the novel does not end with 
a successful or failed escape attempt but rather a return.  The controlling metaphor for the 
novel, the garden and specifically the old gardens of the Sand Lizards, represents this 
complexity and perenniality.   
Because the tribe that Indigo originates from is a product of Silko‘s imagination, 
one might echo the concerns about Roth‘s novel above by asking why we need an Indian 
education story about a made-up tribe when we have so many real stories of tribes whose 
children really were forced into Indian Schools?  Is this invention a pan-tribal and thus 
homogenizing trope?  Silko does in fact make differences among tribal identities explicit 
in relevant parts of the book: Indigo recognizes different native people by their specific 
tribal names, only using the term Indian when referring to how the government views 
things.  But the Sand Lizard tribe is a made-up identity, and Indigo‘s is a made-up story, 
which allows Silko to contradict the conventional history of cultural eradication.  Such a 
contradiction can seem like a kind of denial of the real horrors, just as Roth‘s imaginary 
Nazi-like regime might seem like a denial of the actual apartheid-like conditions that 
existed for African Americans.  But Silko is not, I think, stealing attention from the real 
Indian children and families who suffered; rather, she is calling our attention to how 
122 
complex cultural identity and reproduction can be, and how this postethnic complexity 
can at least offer some reassurance if not enliven our prospects for cultural survival. 
The first complexity that Silko imaginatively introduces is the blended religion of 
the Messiah at Needles.  In the initial section of the novel, Indigo and her family attend 
Ghost Dances that are a mix of Native belief and Christianity.  When the Ghost Dance 
community is raided, it is apparently because the government fears that the Messiah cult 
could stir a revolutionary movement.  Importantly, it is not only the Indians who are 
heretics and targets of suppression, as Grandmother Fleet explains, ―the other Mormons 
got tired of resisting the U.S. government.  The government said only one wife, and how 
the new church said one wife, so the old Mormons moved to remote locations‖ (38).  Out 
of this complex community of Native beliefs and Christian heresies, Indigo eventually 
arrives in the care of Hattie, herself a kind of heretic.  Raised by a progressive father, 
Hattie‘s thesis proposal on the feminine principle in the early Church is rejected by her 
committee, who compare her with May Baker Eddy and Margaret Fuller, to Hattie‘s 
dismay (101).  In the terms of the novel, then, we do not have a Euro-Christian civilizing 
mission perpetrating cultural genocide on a pristine and venerable Native society; but 
rather, we have one family of heretics adopting a child displaced from another family of 
heretics.   
The question of interethnic reconciliation here, across unequal lines of power and 
in the wake of ongoing crimes perpetrated by one group against another, can be 
disquieting.  My thinking about the novel follows Suzanne Ferguson‘s observation that in 
Gardens, ―Silko can be seen to perform acts of (implicit) reconciliation between Native 
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America and Europe, resolving some of the tensions that characterize [her] earlier works 
and finding [herself]—through [her] characters—more ―at home‖ in a conflicted world‖ 
(2006, 35).  By no means does this automatically let the oppressors off the hook:  I also 
agree with Terre Ryan that the novel speaks about the ways in which "white European 
and American men have sought to dominate all other human beings and all of the earth‘s 
landscapes‖ and that ―Silko‘s gardens demonstrate that imperialism begins in our own 
backyards" (2007, 115). But by making a postethnic representation of the processes of 
domination in the proximate interrelationships of complex, multi-dimensional characters, 
the novel affirms the memory of such crimes in a nonsimple, multi-dimensional way that 
cannot be reduced to imperialists versus subalterns, or, as Ryan names them, gardeners 
versus subsistence farmers (116).  The intersection of heresies and competing forms of 
domination creates an intricate network that crisscrosses the Atlantic, through the 
narrative voyages of Hattie, Edward, and Indigo.  Ultimately, the convolutions of transit 
and postethnic cultural reproduction, especially as these are tied to space, are made 
manifest in the various kinds of gardens throughout the novel.   
The garden as a place of cultivation and reproduction is a fertile site for the 
contemplation of both utopian and postcolonial ideas about revolution.   In the 
introduction, I suggest that if ideology is cultural DNA, then utopianism is the 
evolutionary mutation that accumulates changes over time.  As potential sites for various 
levels and methods of controlling or not controlling natural propagation, gardens work 
nicely as metaphors for the cultural work ideology and utopia.  Aside from the Garden of 
Eden, in the utopian tradition we have Voltaire‘s satiric exhortation in Candide to tend 
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one‘s own garden and ignore the ineffable suffering in what is ostensibly the best of all 
possible worlds.  A less ironic philosophy of local cultivation also crops up in Jamacia 
Kincaid‘s My Garden Book, in which she meditates on the ways in which others may be 
influenced by force or example: 
There must be many ways to have someone be the way you would like them to 
be; I only know of two with any certainty: You can hold a gun to their head or 
you can clearly set out before them the thing you would like them to be, and 
eventually they admire it so much, without even knowing they do so, that they 
adopt your ways, almost to the point of sickness; they come to believe that your 
way is their way and would die before giving it up. (1999, 141) 
At first glance, the second way seems so much better than the first because it is 
nonviolent.  But, reading through to the ―sickness‖ and the your way/their way 
dichotomy, it becomes clear (as it is in the longer passage, about colonial transplantation 
of garden plants) that Kincaid is really describing two modes of colonization and in some 
ways the second one is worse than the first.  Yet we still would like to believe in leading 
revolutions by examples rather than forcing them by guns: Gandhi‘s maxim ―Be the 
change you want to see in the world‖ bespeaks a patience and toil that is both passive (i.e. 
pacifist) and revolutionary.   It is not revolutionary because it violently overthrows the 
system; rather it is revolutionary because it resists the system on its own terms rather than 
the terms the system imposes.  It is noncolonial because it turns the revolutionary demand 
inward, into the individual who desires it for herself.  This complements the inward 
turning self-critique of Nancy‘s singular being and Butler‘s unaccountable self.  
Ultimately, the postethnic utopia, as an inoperative community, operates according to this 
paradigm of a limited, fragmented being who is not already finalized even thought it does 
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seem (to itself) to have always existed.  So, it a double or triple twist of irony, one really 
must tend one‘s own garden.  The colonial project of reforming others here is exchanged 
for the need to reinvent oneself.  Of course, even this helpful paradigm could be twisted 
to blame the victim, but I know of no paradigm that is foolproof against such abuses.  
What interests me here, as with young Philip in the previous chapter, is responsibility not 
as guilt but as a capacity for compassion.  Accordingly, in the disruptions of the 
postethnic utopian imagination, violence is replaced with meditation and reflection, 
activity with passivity, and zealotry with patience.  
We can see this replacement in the novel as Silko‘s imagination of the garden 
varies throughout: the principle contrast is between Edward‘s violently active orchid 
hothouses, which force transplantation and propagation of specimens, and the Sand 
Lizard people‘s patient, e.g. passive, old gardens, which are located on desert terraces 
that reseed themselves: 
Sister Salt bent down to pick up the beans but Grandmother Fleet shook her head 
firmly. ―let them be,‖ she said. That way, the old gardens would reseed 
themselves and continue as they always had, regardless of what my happen…. 
―Anything could happen to us, dear,‖ Grandma Fleet said as she hugged Indigo 
close to her side. ―Don‘t worry. Some hungry animal will eat what‘s left of you 
and off you‘ll go again, alive as ever, now part of the creature who ate you.‖ (51) 
The defamilarizing effects of this statement might not fully count as what Sulvin calls 
―cognitive estrangement,‖ in the context of utopian or science fiction narrative, but it is 
clear that Grandmother Fleet is teaching Indigo about a world that is radically different 
than the teleological and anthropocentric world of conventional utopian narratives.  
While the novel‘s setting puts it in the category of the arcadian, Silko‘s nonlinear 
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temporality leads us into the present and future at the very moment that we step into the 
past.  Today‘s fallen beans are tomorrow‘s beanstalks, just as the individual we today call 
Indigo may be tomorrow be part of a different creature entirely.  A cyclical connection 
through time becomes also a connection through space, and it is the proximity of 
tomorrow to today that makes the concern for survival something different than a mere 
hanging on or maintenance of the status quo.  Moreover, the loss of sovereignty over the 
garden and the loss of individual separateness from the natural order (e.g. the food chain) 
are consubstantial and encouraging.  The Sand Lizard people are not the kind of utopian 
gardeners who plan and execute a perfect horticultural scheme; neither are they the kind 
of utopian individualist that seek out Romanic self-actualization apart from a complex 
web of relationships to their spatial and temporal neighbors.  Theirs is an ecological 
community of proximity and contingency, e.g. an inoperative one, and this gives them a 
resilience that survives even the disruption of Indigo‘s long time away from home. 
 Such resilience and comfortableness in the world is a kind of neighborliness 
strikingly different from the narratives of teleology or neocolonialism that seek to make 
―peace‖ with the world on all sides though mastery of it.  The past, in the mastering 
mindset, is there to be surpassed, the future to be plotted, and the immediate world is the 
object of ―dominion.‖  Silko‘s cyclical, perennial community does not seek anything, 
does not have any ambitious work to perform, except for their curiosity and enthusiasm 
for life that welcomes new seeds and new relationships, such as the gladiola spuds and 
Indigo‘s friendship with Hattie.  The difference between welcoming the future and 
seeking it out is precisely the difference that Derrida draws our attention to when he says 
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that we should speak of a future to-come.  The eagerness and warmth—in short, the 
love—of this generous, open stance we will see again in subsequent chapters.   
A love of variety and an inclusivity towards the past and future is not a trite 
multiculturalism: at the end of the novel, remnants of the Sand Lizards are again isolated 
in their old gardens and Hattie is relocated in Europe.  These characters are not resettled 
in some cosmopolitan wonderland, although the letters exchanged across the Atlantic 
keep the web of affiliation intact.  Neither isolation nor Indigo‘s period of contact with 
Hattie is romanticized as utopian or dystopian per se.  Instead, interconnected global 
networks of economic and biological circulation underwrite an intercultural exchange: 
Indigo and Hattie can no more be separated than Indigo and the old gardens can be 
separated, since both kinds of relationship are substantiated through living proximity and 
awareness that the other exists.  In other words, both the Sand Lizard people and the 
white settlers are part of the same, postethnic world.   
I have been writing about this shared-world-in-the-past as one that is postethnic, 
hence a kind of postethnic utopia or a world that cannot be imagined on behalf of only 
one group.  There are, along the lines of my analysis, two general comments to make 
about the novels in part one.  First, the novels by Morrison and Silko both use gender as 
an alternative category to cut across cultural or ethnic divisions.  In A Mercy, the 
inoperative community of the farm is principally composed of women (Rebecca, Lina, 
Florens, Sorrow), and in Gardens, women‘s relationships comprise both the small Sand 
Lizard clan (Grandmother Fleet, Sister Salt, and Indigo) as well as the intercultural 
connection (Indigo and Hattie).  Such a gender solidarity does not show up in Roth‘s 
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Plot, and we could easily enough attribute this to the different genders of the writers 
themselves.  One can imagine, for a moment, making much the same argument as the one 
I am advancing using different terms, a postgender utopia.  It is an interesting possibility, 
and one that I want to keep open by remembering that when I write postethnic, I really 
mean the post-identitarian location at which an inoperative community takes shape.  If 
the ―new‖ of utopia is the inverse of the ―status quo‖ of ideology, then several kinds of 
post-status-quos must be inscribed within it.  Post-structuralism, post-modernity, post-
colonialism, post-humanism and so on.  But there also must be a post-identity and also a 
post-community, an identity and a community that are not bound to the self or the world-
as-it-is by the chains of the past. 
The second general point we need to make is the rhetorical situation of these 
novels.  In the introduction, I insisted that one source of the bifurcation of utopia is the 
different rhetorical situations of Plato‘s Socrates and More‘s Hythloday.  In the former, 
utopia is the master plan of an authority, and in the latter it is the jest of someone 
speaking truth to power.  I do not, of course, mean to initiate a reader-response argument 
here.  Rather, I want to acknowledge that Morrison, Roth, and Silko are each speaking 
truth to power using utopian tropes, or at least novels that enter into utopian discourse 
from various direction to different degrees.  Published in 1999, Gardens is the earliest 
novel here, although Roth‘s counter-identity novels and Morrison‘s rememory novels 
have been with us long since.  All three novelist are, generally speaking, of the same 
generation and that generation is, increasingly, marked by a post-Cold War conservative 
sweep of American politics in the Reagan revolution, the Republicans‘ ―Contract with 
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America‖ in 1992 (an operative paradigm par excellence), and the administration George 
W. Bush.  With momentum from the preceding twenty years, the politically ascendant 
ideals in America in the decades around the turn of the twenty-first century have been the 
―New World Order‖ ideals of a ―neo-conservatism.‖ 
The point I want to make here, which is relevant if not surprising, is that the neo-
conservative version of the past underwrites a teleological agenda similar to the Manifest 
Destiny that marked westward expansion in the previous century.  One of the projects of 
neo-conservatism is the exportation of American liberal democratic utopia to the rest of 
the world.  We can see in Francis Fukuyama‘s The End of History that this argument is 
grounded in the belief that American political norms are the inevitable and final product 
of history and human social evolution.  It is this belief in the purposeful and inevitable 
unfolding of American history that the novels in part one contradict.  One part of this 
history holds that America‘s past is an unblemished unfolding of the ideals of human 
liberation.  Neo-conservatism relies, in part, on maintaining the vision of early America 
as an egalitarian shining city on a hill, created by a noble cadre of ―founding fathers.‖  
Another key part of this history holds that America is an inherently benevolent actor on 
the world stage.  This belief invokes the story of America‘s opposition to fascism and 
Nazism in the twentieth century.  And yet a third part of this history hold that the 
progress of America is the progress of civilization per se.  These national myths are 
contradicted in A Mercy by imagining the colonial past as a matrix of many different 
individuals and projects, in The Plot Against America by seeing America‘s anti-Nazism a 
temporal contingency rather than an expression of national character, and in Gardens in 
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the Dunes by imagining the perennial resilience of non-Western ways of life.  The 
importance of individuals and ―national character‖ to these projects participates in a 
general conflation of individual development and national development.  This requires 
some consideration of what it means to come into being, as a person or as a nation.  As 
we have seen, the ways in which personal and national history are ―lost‖ and therefore in 
need of imaginative (re)construction have important implications for our identities and 
our ethics. 
The story of how things were and how they will be is the lynchpin of any 
teleological paradigm, and all modern Western ideologies are such in one way or another.  
While one might desire a non-teleological expression to counter the demands for 
temporal coherence and inevitability, the only way to dismantle the utopian ideologies of 
modernity is to grasp that lynchpin and give a firm, contradictory pull.  A Mercy does this 
by revising the colonial mythos prior to the great work of 1776; The Plot challenges 
blithe faith in the work of 1776 as a stable, complete ―done deal‖; Gardens persists in 
maintaining that an alternative lives even after the work of ―history‖ as been done.  These 
novels offer a post-American identity that is not the New World Adam, and they 
reminded us that being good to each other does not have to depend on shared ethnicity 
(on national, familial, or cultural identity).  Both A Mercy and The Plot try to make the 
past flexible, to ―restore uncertainty,‖ and to remember that when the past was present, 
the future was uncertain.  In compliment, despite that uncertainty, Gardens in the Dunes 
finds comfort in a faith that flowers will grow next year.  These writers make our present 
look like the uncertain product of the past, rather than the culmination of a teleological 
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oeuvre.  This disrupts any narrative of progress and resists the illusion of telos that comes 
from knowing how the story turned out.   
Remembering that the past exceeds history creates flexibility – the question is, if 
we are uncertain and things are flexible, how do we cope?  Morrison‘s Lina shows us that 
we can cope by cobbling together a way of moving in the world; Roth‘s Philip finds that 
that we can cope by attending to the world at hand.  Silko‘s Indigo tells us to look sharp, 
be ready to run, and gather new seeds for planting.  All these methods are decidedly 
present-minded, and the next question to be asked is how one pays attention and how one 
navigates the present day.
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PART 2 / NEGOTIABLE GEOGRAPHIES 
Cartographies Natural and Utopian 
We have seen that the act of imagining a national (Morrison), personal (Roth), or 
ethno-cultural (Silko) past replaces an ideology of historical inevitability with a sense of 
temporal contingency that welcomes the utopian ―new.‖  In part two, I turn to the 
imagination of ―the present,‖ the world that surrounds us in the now.
1
  As we shall see, 
paying attention to the world-as-it-is-not matters a great deal to how we live in the world-
as-it-is.  Although contemporary readers have grown accustomed to utopias constructed 
at a temporal distance, in the past and future, the present-tense utopias in part three are 
categorically not distanced in this way.  They must be, then, distanced spatially, either in 
terms of geography or culture.   The spacing of subjective culture and objective 
landscapes gives us an opening into the postethnic imagination of alternative present 
conditions, through, for example, the importance of space and proximity that we outlined 
in the introduction in the philosophies of Nancy and Chakrabarty.  In part two I will bend 
the term ethnicity, especially in the chapter of Richard Powers, beyond strict definition in 
line with American racial minorities.  As we look at the intersection of poststructural 
language and postlogocentric epistemology within postethnic identity, we must keep in 
mind Stuart Hall‘s claim that ethnicity offers itself as a broad term for identity because it 
names the sociocultural position from which one may enunciate.  Thus in the same way 
that part one required a subargument about identity and memory, this section on the 
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postethinic utopia written in the present requires a subargument on language and location.  
The acts of the imagination in postethnic present-writing are not feats of inventive 
memory, but rather inventive cartography. 
Despite the general tendency to conflate utopia and science fiction, the spatially 
distanced, geoisolated utopia is actually the traditional form.  The utopian romances and 
satires of the Renaissance and Enlightenment were more often set in a remote 
geographical location than in a remote temporal one.  Utopian adventure stories of the 
early modern period (and even today) participate in a conflation of space and time 
characteristic of the modern-imperial imagination.  In such discursive fantasies, 
contemporaneously existing peoples are described as somehow anachronistically 
―primitive‖ or ―advanced.‖  Anne McClintock describes this trope as ―panoptical 
time…the image of global history consumed – at a glance – in a single spectacle from a 
point of privileged invisibility‖ married to ―anachronistic space‖ (1995, 37-40).  While 
McClintock‘s argument has to do with race, gender, and class in the British Empire, the 
point of view she describes plays its role in American history as well, having 
underwritten both the evangelical defense of slavery and the genocidal ―modernization‖ 
of native peoples.  This goes to show, in broad terms, that cultural fantasies dictating 
nonsensical temporal relationships to geographically distanced others in pseudo-
evolutionary terms have had very real and tragic consequences. 
I am using the term cartography, the discursively produced and productive 
mapping of geographical regions or landscapes, to name the relationship between 
geography and culture.  It is too simple to say that people in different places have 
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different worldviews, or that the cultural construction of space means that a cemetery 
reads differently than an airport terminal.
2
  In ecological terms, we might most usefully 
link geography and culture in terms of migration and evolution.  Comparative linguistics 
and philology tells us that languages evolve and change as populations are separated 
through migration over geographical boundaries: over time, people in different valleys 
begin to speak and do things differently.  Such is also true bodily norms, both 
performative practices (styles of clothing, beautification, modification) as well as what 
biology might call phenotypes (physiological ethnic markers, such as skin tone or hair 
texture).  In this way, geography and time form pathways by which groups of people are 
divided and grow apart.  In some sense, we only have ethno-cultural difference because 
of geographical boundaries and the succession of generations.  At the same time, over the 
course of modernity, those boundary lines have become less geographic and more 
ideologic, less material and more imaginary.  The ideological regulation of such frontiers 
is precisely the theme of the novels in part two, and my argument here is that a postethnic 
utopian disruption in this context allows these writers to resist the demands to remain 
loyal to one cartography instead of others. When we understand our received 
cartographies as imaginary, we have the opportunity to imagine alternative maps of our 
world. 
We could say, indeed, that we live in the world according to how we imagine it to 
be.  In part one, I argued that Morrison, Roth, and Silko contradict certain kinds of 
historiography which each finds inimical to healthy community.  By refuting ideologies 
of historical inevitability with stories of temporal contingency, these writers also refute 
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one set of imaginary relationships in favor of another.  Part two again takes up this 
question, now addresses the interactions of individuals with others in the world around 
them rather than with others in the personal and communal past.  Whereas the act of 
representing different histories contradicts inevitability with contingency, we will find 
that the act of creating different cartographies contracts ideological fixity with 
imaginative negotiation.  
The novels that I discuss below mark, more clearly than the novels in part one, an 
intersection between utopian tropes and literary postmodernism, especially the self-
reflexive and intertextual operations we call metatextuality.  American literature has 
produced a great number of naïve utopias that do not include an ironic distance from their 
own projects
3
.  Granted, it is not surprising that American utopias in the time of literary 
modernism are not postmodernly self-reflective.  As a point of comparision, we can not 
that of the major works from this period that are set in the narrative present—Herland 
and Walden II top the list, although London‘s ―near future‖ Iron Heal might also 
qualify—are ethnocentrically focused on framing and solving problems from one point of 
view.   However, not all American utopias written in the time of literary postmodernism 
are necessarily postethnic: for instance, Callenbach‘s Ecotopia (1975) is clearly dialogic, 
and hence more textually complex than early novels, but it does not put the totalism of its 
utopian visions into question.  This is also the case with the arts-and-crafts utopianism of 
Kunstler‘s more recent World Made by Hand (2008), a post-apocalyptic novel that shares 
several ecological themes with Callenbach.  What is missing here is the ironic or self-
reflexive distance that characterizes literary postmodernism, which is an important part of 
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what Moylan means by the term critical utopia, utopian novels that bring the total 
utopian imagination into question.  The specific object of critical reflection in the novels 
below is how the product utopianism of a particular community demands that people live 
in its world with non-negotiable boundary lines of allegiance.  As we shall see, whereas 
the demands for particular identifications in part one were made in terms of inevitability, 
the demands confronted in part two are made in terms of the objective fixity of the 
subjective cultural world. 
Because the problem of postethnic utopia is the problem of who decides ―the 
good‖ and for whom it is decided, it requires a heuristic distinction between how we 
imagine others and how we imagine the good.  In the present tense, there are at least two 
kinds of counterfactual wishes potentially at work.  The wish of naturalism is the desire 
that certain parts of the world or human experience not-be-hidden.  Martha Nussbaum 
describes this specifically as the aspiration for people to see with empathy lives that are 
hidden from their own through difference or distance.  Additionally, we can observe, 
pace Nussbaum, there is another kind of inclination that wants people to see the world as-
it-is-not.  This can be called a utopia if it represents how the world ostensibly should-be 
and a dystopia if it illustrates how the world ought-not-to-be.  (And of course, these basic 
categories can each be made to function in naïve and ironic, romantic and satiric forms.)  
But, for certain, the utopian imagination is an articulation of a nonexistent world in a 
different sense than fictional worlds in general can be said not to exist.  Ultimately, in this 
chapter, we will find that these two kinds of counterfactual wishes are entangled one with 
the other and our heuristic distinction breaks down in a useful way.  In one sense, this 
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entanglement and collapse is already hinted at by the ambiguity and paradox of the words 
―could‖ and ―possibility.‖  For is not the rhetorical power of both naturalism and 
utopianism their invitation to be believed?  Nevertheless, distinguishing these forms of 
the imagination for the time being helps focus the question at hand, the operations of 
literary cartography as invention rather than measurement. 
Are the virtues of imaginary map-making different from the virtues of naturalism, 
which maps the world with geographical fidelity?  How do these virtues complement one 
another in the encompassing framework of the literary imagination?  The novels in part 
two each take up this question by asking, first and foremost, what the utopian imagination 
can do in the present tense, when the concerns of past and future seem to recede from 
notice.  We can better theorize what the postethnic utopian imagination does if we ask by 
and for whom this kind of imagination is employed.  For whom do we write and read 
fictions, of this kind or any other?  What does the practice of postethnic imagination 
accomplish in the world?  How are its accomplishments distinct from the 
accomplishments of naturalism?  The writers in the next several chapters each wrestle 
with different parts of these questions.  Chabon‘s work, in its imaginative diversity, 
suggests that we draw our own maps of the world.  Powers‘s encyclopedic imagination 
represents a world can be navigated by many various, intersecting routes.  Finally, 
Vizenor‘s trickster heroes illustrate the importance of play and irreverence to finding 
pathways for survival in a hostile world.  
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Chapter 1: Michael Chabon: Imaginary Homelands 
The usual apology for the utopian imagination is that this kind of sociocultural 
projection allows participants to immerse themselves in an unreal world as a means of 
escape from the real one.  This is an especially neat answer to the question of distinction 
from naturalism, because it allows one to theorize naturalism as an imaginatively 
empathetic turning towards the world and utopian fiction as a turning away from it.  This 
would accord with Mannheim‘s description of utopia as a kind of incongruence with the 
present: naturalism, utopianisms complement, would be simply defined as congruency.  
The Jewish district of Sitka in Michael Chabon‘s The Yiddish Policeman’s Union 
presents itself at first glance as one such wish-fulfillment land, and according to at least 
one detractor, its escapism indulges a deeply problematic denial of the urgent reality of 
the Jewish situation.  The critique of Chabon‘s different landscape is similar to the 
critique of Roth‘s different history: some things, in these cases the persecution of the 
Jews, ought not be made the object of the imagination.  However, I believe a careful 
reading of Chabon‘s novel reveals a cleverly disguised denial of certain kinds of 
destructive fantasies in favor of a very ordinary set of ethical commitments.  In other 
words, the novel is about the problem of mapping out a homeland more so than it is about 
the problem of Jewish persecution. 
Chabon‘s collected body of writing exemplifies creative restlessness, the playful 
vitality of the postethnic imagination.  His career has transitioned from early works of 
self-described ―literary naturalism‖ to more fantastic genres as seen in the young adult 
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high-fantasy Summerland, the meditation on American comic book writing in The 
Amazing Adventures of Cavalier and Clay, and the historical adventure story Gentlemen 
of the Road.  Superhero stories in Adventures are recommended both as an escape from 
reality and as a supplement to reality.
4
  They allow the articulation of a demand contra 
Hitler, contra disappearing fathers, and so on.  The fantasy world of Sitka in The Yiddish 
Policeman’s Union also expresses a counterfactual wish for an impossible supplement.  
The novel responds both to the ―disappearance‖ of Yiddish in the twentieth century and 
also to the wish for the ―phrases would I need to know in order to speak to these millions 
of unborn phantoms to whom I belong‖ (2007, 23).  In its ethnic focus, as a Jewish 
utopia, and its apparent affirmation that language mastery is a prerequisite for belonging, 
Union engages with the question of utopian ethnicity and the operative or inoperative 
forms of community.  On the surface, it seems to advocate an operative community of 
Yiddish speakers; I will argue that this first impression is only one side of a deep 
ambivalence that ultimately avows communities of proximity and choice rather than 
ascribed ethno-religious imperatives. 
Much of the commotion about the novel, which Chabon responds to in detail in 
his essay ―Imaginary Homelands‖ (2008, 157-80), takes offense at the notion that 
important and real things can also be imaginary or in-our-heads.  In part one, I have 
already discussed the basic assumption that ideas are real, albeit a different kind of real 
than the material things that convey them.  The interplay of real ideas and real places, 
especially through the funhouse mirror of neologisms and utopias (utopia itself being a 
kind of portmanteau), relate to the broader difficulty of home as it is constituted by 
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language and location: Chabon‘s novel is a literary experiment in mapping an imaginary 
homeland.  The writer has described his experimentalism in terms of a trickster tradition, 
albeit a Judeo-European rather than Native American one, ―the spirit of doing things af 
teselokhis, out of spite, a kind of magical, Trickster spite….  If I could outrage a few 
people with one little essay—how many could I piss off with an entire novel?‖ (179).  
The importance of the trickster figure to the present-writing of postethnic utopia surfaces 
again in a later chapter on Vizenor.  For now, we need only see that tricksters are by 
nature outrageous.  Here, the outrage results from Chabon‘s essay on a 1958 Yiddish 
phrasebook, which he called ―heartbreakingly implausible‖ because after the new state of 
Israel adopted Hebrew instead of Yiddish as its national language, there is no place on 
earth where this phrasebook could possibly be useful.  ―Say it in Yiddish seems an 
entirely futile effort on the part of its authors,‖ he says, ―a gesture of embittered hope, of 
valedictory daydreaming, of a utopian impulse turned cruel and ironic‖ (2007, 19).  The 
phrasebook eventually led Chabon to imagine the kind of homeland it implied, ―I kept 
thinking about those Jews up there in Alaska, making their Yiddishland….  And little by 
little at first, and then all at once, the idea began to assemble itself: I would build myself a 
home in my imagination as my wife and I were making a home in the world‖ (2008, 
178).  In this way, the boundaries that divide and unite a community and family—homes 
and homelands—become the overarching theme of the novel‘s inventive cartography.  As 
a postethnic utopian novel, it offers a way to understand how contingency, community, 
and location entangle to map out a homeland. 
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The relationship between language and culture, and the need to invent one in 
order to create the other, is well known to writers and readers of such fictions.  I have 
already hinted at the importance of trickster language here, and in Vizenor‘s work 
especially we can see the magnitude of neologisms in trickster discourse.  A more 
traditional account of linguistic invention is located in J.R.R. Tolkien‘s work, in which 
the language of the elves in fact preceded the composition of the best known stories.  
(Tolkien, a gifted philologist, invented languages for the mythical creatures of European 
folklore from an early age, as a hobby.)  Additionally, we have the examples of Orwell‘s 
Newspeak and Anthony Burgess‘s Russian-infused patois that colors A Clockwork 
Orange.  Although Yiddish is certainly not an invented language on the order of Tolkien, 
the dialect of Sitka does resembles the constructed slang of Burgess‘s dystopia.
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  Chabon 
constructs a neo-Yiddish with such uses as ―shammes‖ for detective and the complex pun 
―sholem‖ for gun.  Because the creation of a fantasy milieu requires the convincing, 
astute impersonation of place and person, ecological as well as interpersonal empathy, it 
shows us, in literature at least, the capacity of language to map out a sensorium in the 
reader‘s mind.  In an interview with Liz Perle, Chabon describes this task,  
Sustaining that act of seeing and inhabiting another place or person—whether it's 
the life of an English professor in Pittsburgh one weekend, or a Czech kid 
escaping Prague in a box with the golem, or two adventurers in Khazaria in the 
year 1000—that's the hardest part about writing… I still have to put myself into a 
state where I'm feeling, hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting and touching everything 
the characters are experiencing. Then I still have to find a way to get all that 
sensation into language and make it magically appear inside the mind of the 
reader. (2007, 31) 
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Again, as existentialist critics would insist, the work of literature is the work of sharing 
our perceptions of the world.  Although we may rush to conclude that this philological-
existential model returns an operative language as the foundation of community, the very 
ability to invent new worlds in excess of a language indicates that language mastery itself 
is subsequential to experience, perception, and communication.  Davidson makes his 
infamous about language (that no such thing exists) in the context of malapropisms,
6
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the argument works as well for neologisms or nonsense words. The potency of language 
is not its fixity to the world but its looseness from it.  Trickster writers can lie (―tell 
stories‖) about the world they perceive, thus sharing a ―false‖ world, one that does not 
exist at all.  The writer is able, with important limitations, to create, through creative 
language, an artificial world ―magically... inside the mind of the reader.‖  While the 
execution of such a feat holds some fascination as a skill and an art, the question remains 
what is it good for?  Why bother constructing fantasy worlds out of words? 
Although Chabon has been widely acclaimed, his alternate map of Jewish 
geography opens him to the same charges of impiety and lack of authenticity that have 
confronted Roth‘s alternative history of Jewish persecution.  D.G. Myers goes further, 
however, into the ad hominem by describing Chabon as ―an imaginary Jew‖ and asking 
―whether Chabon has actually assimilated himself to this tradition or merely decked out 
his writing with bright Jewish feathers‖ (2008, 572).  This claim is mostly based on the 
Say It in Yiddish episode, and Myers insists that Chabon gets his problem wrong from the 
start: ―Chabon might have learned the real reasons that Israel adopted Hebrew as its 
official language.  Instead, he set out to imagine an ‗alternative history‘ in which the 
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country that rejected Yiddish has ceased to exist‖ (585).  In other words, according to 
Myers, Chabon has tried to punish Israel by writing it out of existence, an affront that no 
―real Jew‖ could contemplate, only an ―imaginary‖ one.  As it turns out, Myers‘s reading 
of the novel and my own are not actually very different: we both think Chabon is 
rejecting ethno-religious imperatives (messianic destiny) as a necessary condition for 
hope as a singular being.  However, Myers finds this bankrupt on two counts.  First, 
Chabon gets both his Yiddish and his Judaism wrong (e.g. the plural of yid should be 
yidn; the tzaddik ha-dor is not synonymous with the messiah; Chabon ―arranges a 
Oasidic wedding on the Sabbath‖).  Second, although Myers allows ―some of this might 
be chalked up to mere sloppiness,‖ he insists ―the slips and errors are significant because 
they betray the novel’s true point of view‖ (586, emphasis mine).  The critic assumes that 
what Chabon has to say is so inimical to what an authentic Jewish novelist would say, he 
would never come right out an admit it.  Thus what has been discovered must be an 
unwitting betrayal rather than a purposeful revealing.  This scandalous ―true point of 
view,‖ according to Myers, is ―a particular ideological perspective. In this view Zionism 
represents a betrayal of Jewish history and exile is the proper Jewish condition‖ (587).
7
  
Thus, the novel is only a ―polemical contraption‖ intended to rail from ―an imaginary 
Judaism, which they [imaginary Jews like Chabon] have created out of nothing‖ (588).  
Myers‘s criterion of ethno-historical piety is also a demand for a certain kind of 
representational fidelity, the fixed cartography of naturalism.  This demand is so 
important, in light of actual suffering, that the process of invention itself is untenable.  
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More exactly, any temptation to take our eyes off the ―real,‖ even for a moment, is too 
dangerous to indulge, and the processes of the imagination are ipso facto suspect. 
However, as I said before, Myers and I do not disagree that Chabon is clearly 
rejecting one part of one version of Jewish identity, Zionism.  What Myers might call the 
moment when Chabon betrays his true point of view, I would call the moment of 
Landsman‘s anagnorisis:  
I don‘t care what is written… I don‘t care what supposedly got promised to some 
sandal-wearing idiot whose claim to fame is that he was ready to cut his own 
son‘s throat for the sake of a hare-brained idea. I don‘t care about red heifers and 
patriarchs and locusts. A bunch of old bones in the sand. My homeland is in my 
hat. It‘s in my ex-wife‘s tote bag. (368) 
We should remember that, in addition to being the story of clashing imaginary 
homelands, Chabon‘s novel is also a detective story.  While one arc of the story has 
Landsman investigating the death of the messianic utopia—the murder of the Tzaddik 
Ha-Dor —the narrative has him solve the problems of the familial, interpersonal, 
postethnic utopia instead.  Detective work, in this context, extends to any process of 
putting together the pieces of the world that are presented to us.  It is a kind of 
cartography – looking for clues like landmarks and trying to piece them together in a 
geography that can be safely (or at least knowledgably) traveled.  This is, of course, a 
process that has often been thought about in the context of language and rationality.  On 
these themes, Chabon‘s novels is related to other postmodern detective stories such as 
Paul Auster‘s New York Trilogy.  As the settlement of Sitka faces planned dissolution, 
the novel choruses ―it is a strange time to be a Jew.‖  Such existential strangeness, 
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familiar to readers of Auster, is bound up with the utopianism of Sitka itself: ―By now 
they were all staunch Alaskan Jews, which meant they were utopians, which meant they 
saw imperfection everywhere‖ (31).   
Jewishness, of course, comes with own set of utopian figures clustered around the 
topic of Zion and the messiah.  Predicated on, among other things, a hope for a kind of 
perfection, both Messianism and Zionism entail a view of history that is at leaste 
teleological and in this case specifically eschatological.  Landsman faces the reversion of 
Sitka to American control with a particular fatalism, musing that he is ―Seven months 
into the unknown world to come. Another diminutive prisoner of history and fate, another 
potential Messiah‖ (41).  The recurring promise of messianic potential becomes, here, 
part of a fated history that at this point in the novel holds Landsman prisoner.  When the 
world is imagined as a perfectible place, the detective is called upon to ―solve‖ the 
imperfections of the world.  In Auster‘s novels, this means investigating the gaps 
between perception, language, and identity.  In Chabon‘s, the detective must investigate 
who killed the potential messiah, the Tzaddik Ha-Dor, and what this has to do with the 
Zionist ambitions of religious and political powers that be.  Without trying to offer a 
complete reading of the novel, we can draw some conclusions from the thematic 
constructions of two ―helper‖ characters: Landsman‘s ex-wife Bina and the boundary 
maven Zimbalist. 
Both these supporting characters put the world into a certain kind of order, 
temporal or spatial.  While Landsman is ―paid to notice what ordinary people do not,‖ 
Bina‘s detective work is compared to storytelling: 
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Her gaze is not as comprehensive as his—she misses details sometimes—but the 
thing that she does see, she can link up quickly in her mind to the things that she 
knows about women and men, victims and murderers. She can shape them with 
confidence into narratives that hold together and make sense. She does not solve 
cases so much as tell the stories of them. (158) 
Thus Bina keeps order in the world, maps it, by tying elements together in a 
comprehendible narrative.  The goal of the narrative is to determine right and wrong, or 
more exactly to identify and punish criminals.  The boundary maven‘s order-making is 
likewise concerned with right and wrong, but operates on in terms of spatial 
cartographies rather than narrative language.  Zimbalist is responsible for maintaining a 
strict grid-work of sanctified thresholds, which are constructed partly from variety of 
ropes and cables strung up around the settlement to create ―imaginary‖ doorways that 
allow whole neighborhoods to be considered a single household.
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maven‘s work is not only divisive (creating boundaries) but also cohesive (binding 
together).  He orders the world in space, keeping complex charts and maps of the various 
doorways strung up around Sitka.  His made-up spaces complement Bina‘s made-up 
stories.  Space and time, maps and stories, are represented as the principle means of 
inventing the dimension and meaning of the world around us. 
Both of these kinds of ordering contribute to the conclusion of the novel, the 
solution of the murder mystery and the restoration of Landsman‘s broken marriage. 
Again, Landsman is the quintessential detective, the person who pays close attention.  He 
notices details, but it is the ability to bind and articulate details together (with string, with 
words) that makes the world we live in.  This tying-together can be deeply problematic 
when it insists on commensurability with an ordained fate – the novel‘s Zionists are 
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willing to kill the potential messiah himself to bring about the perfect world he should 
usher in.  Landsman himself seems reluctant, as the story unfolds, to take strong action.  
As in the abandoned chess games that pepper the narrative, his position is such that ―He 
has no good moves… they call that Zugzwang… ‗forced to move.‘‖(400).  He decides at 
first that he ―would be better off if he could just pass,‖ and keep quiet about the terrorist 
destruction of the Jerusalem mosque.  The novel is, in many ways, about the detective 
arriving at a capability to act, which depends on his accepting narrative threads and 
geographical demarcations without being inexorably bound to them.  This reconciliation 
between paying attention to detail and creating order occasions both Landsman‘s reunion 
with Bina and his decision to out the criminal plot. 
In the final pages, Landsman reconciles with his wife, from whom he had 
separated following the mistaken abortion of their only child, having blamed himself for 
favoring the abortion of what turned out to be a healthy baby (a birth defect had been 
feared).  In his mind the promised land of Zion and the promise of a child stand as 
equally powerful signs of a wondrously benevolent future: 
Any kind of wonder seems likely. That the Jews will pick up and set sail for the 
promised land…That the temple will be rebuilt…War will cease, ease and plenty 
and righteousness will be universal…Every man will be a rabbi, every woman a 
holy book, and every suit will come with two pairs of pants. Meyer‘s seed, even 
now, may be wandering through darkness toward redemption, striking at the 
membrane that separates the legacy of the yids who made him from that the yids 
whose errors, griefs, hopes, and calamities went into the production of Bina 
Gelbfish. (407) 
Prior to this conclusion, belief in the perfectibility of the world made his mistakes 
unbearable.  Landsman cannot forgive the unwarranted abortion so long as he holds to a 
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criterion worldly perfectibility.  His aborted child and Mendel, the murdered Messiah, are 
both unbearable guilts because he believed all future happiness depended absolutely and 
finally upon them.  Bina, however, takes a very different view of the abortion, and she 
does so in the terms of maps and boundaries, the vocabulary of geographical and 
interpersonal ties that makes a community: 
We did what seemed right at the time, Meyer. We had a few facts. We knew our 
limitations. And we called that a choice. But we didn‘t have any choice. All we 
had was, I don‘t know, three lousy facts and a boundary map of our own 
limitations… (410) 
Ultimately, then, the couple are reunited in the context of their shared limitations and 
their shared past.  As Nancy and Butler help us see, their mutual apprehension of 
exposure to the unknown—each other, death, the future—is the very call to love each 
other.  Their past does not have to be a historical tragedy, although there is pain in it.  
Bina redraws the landscape, retells the story of what happened, so that Landsman comes 
to believe that he  
…has no home, no future, no fate but Bina. The land that he and she were 
promised was bounded only by the fringes of their wedding canopy, by the dob-
eared corners of their cards of membership in an international fraternity whose 
members carry their patrimony in a tote bag, their world on the tip of the tongue. 
(411) 
The final lines refer to the Yiddish Policeman‘s Union, and Landsman‘s intimate union 
with his wife either is an extension of or extends to the professional union to which they 
belong.  Both are limited, invented ties that nonetheless give actual, expansive meaning 
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to the world.  As the marriage union promises future children, the professional union 
promises future society by punishing criminals and keeping the community safe. 
Both unions, Chabon suggests, work best when they are understood as flexible, 
limited, and contingent as language itself, able to ―carry… their world on the tip of the 
tongue.‖  With this view of the work at hand, which I would describe as postethnic, two 
dilemmas are solved at once: Landsman will tell what he knows of the terrorist plot and 
also will be able to rejoin his wife.  Both the ability to sustain an intimate relationship and 
the ability to act ethically in the world are predicated on a rejection of a certain 
relationship to the world in favor of its alternative.  Landsman becomes free to act only 
by rejecting the belief that a past mistake is a historic tragedy and likewise rejecting 
certain inflexible cartographies of home, future, and fate.  This postethnic transformation 
drops the burden of acting correctly in circumstances where mistakes are gross 
transgression against the historicist and naturalist demands for total loyalty.  It takes up 
the responsibility of acting the best that one can, within certain boundaries and also 
bound together with other people. 
Chabon‘s novel, then, is about imaginary communities, to recall Anderson‘s title, 
but whereas Anderson refers specifically to nations, Chabon suggests that all 
communities are products of the imagination.  There are more such communities in the 
book than one would first suspect.  There is of course Chabon‘s creation of the District of 
Sitka, but there is also the conspiracy group of the Zionists and the ―nation of two‖ that 
Bina and Landsman form.  Then, there is the Verbover sect itself and the imaginary 
household that the boundary maven creates and maintains.  The novel is a community of 
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communities.  Boundary lines separate and join together – to be ―bound together‖ is to be 
both in a community and separated from other communities.  In this sense, taking a 
phrase from Mary Louise Pratt, we could say that the novel is about borderlands and 
contact zones (1991).  It may be that all the works of the utopian imagination are, in 
Pratt‘s words, ―linguistic utopias‖ (1988).  Language creates social worlds; this much is 
agreed upon even when we differ as to whether those worlds are sustained in 
superpersonal, interpersonal, or intrapersonal ways.  Whether we explain the social realm 
as ―language,‖ the ―third space,‖ or ―ideology,‖ there is a general consensus that 
communication is about living together in the world.  At the end of the twentieth century, 
after the Cold War stalemate that divided one world into three, when not only one ethnic 
group faces globalized existential threats, we can no longer think that we live together 
only with those like ourselves.  Creating a postethnic image of the world and people is a 
work for literature—what Nancy calls literary communism—and in that sense our 
imaginary communities are becoming, for practical if not philosophical reasons, 
postethnic. 
Chapter 2: Richard Powers: The Connectionist Imagination 
The inclusion of Powers in a study organized around ethnicity is not obvious, but 
I argue that his encyclopedic novels and his ―connectionist imagination‖ constitute an 
important kind of postethnic outlook on the world.  What is more of a challenge, here, is 
the implicit indication that postidentitarian utopia means not only that groups labeled 
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―ethnic‖ become postethnic, although many do claim postindian, postMexican, and 
postblack identities by name, but also that white people become postwhite.  This is not an 
easy argument to advance, partly because whiteness itself has been constructed as a non-
ethnic identity: returning whiteness to the postidentitarian world requires first that we 
push it out of its central position, which generates ideologies such as ―assumed 
whiteness,‖ and then revisit it anew.  I cannot even begin to fully explore the number of 
white writers who ethnicize white identity at various locations, including non-Anglo 
European cultures, pagan European or Gnostic belief systems, and non-bourgeois ―poor 
white‖ culture.  Silko certainly opens the door for connections between native North 
American and European spirituality in Gardens in the Dunes.  Likewise, solidarity 
between the black community and ―poor whites‖ is widely expressed in African 
American writing, for example in Langston Hughes‘s ―Let America be America Again,‖ 
and more broadly in the ―fusion‖ movement in Southern politics at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  Postwhite identity also appears, in various guises, in writings that 
locate identity in a natural region or experience, as in the desert stories of Mary Austin,  
the poems of Gary Snyder, or the ecological-class configuration of Janisse Ray‘s Ecology 
of a Cracker Childhood. 
Powers‘s novels, however, do not do any of this conventional work and remain, 
stubbornly, silent in terms of race, class, or gender.  This does not mean that identity is 
erased from the scene—Plowing the Dark features an Iranian-American protagonist—but 
it does mean that Powers is not read as a writer of ethnicity.  Nonetheless, insofar as 
critics have read his fictions as concerning identity, I propose, even this silence on the 
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conventional categories of resistance is being reconfigured in new ways.  My central 
claim remains that these novels show we can no longer believe that the world can be 
imagined in the terms of one kind of people.  Powers‘s fictions, broadly speaking, engage 
with the epistemological problems of representation that are familiar to readers of 
postmodern literature, and which are, I would add, existentialist in their assumptions 
about experience, perception, and identity.  This kind of displacement of identity is 
included by Stuart Hall along with those inspired by Marx, Freud, and Saussure, but 
rather than simply attributing it to Nietzsche, Hall characterizes it as the end of a 
particular, Western location of truth caused by ―the discovery of other worlds, other 
peoples, other cultures, and other languages‖ (1989, 11-12).  That is, the disruption of 
modern epistemology that we know as ―the postmodern condition‖ is a consequence of 
no longer being able to conflate one way of seeing the world with the world itself.  Our 
notions of truth have gone post-solipsistic, more specifically postethnic.  Furthermore, 
this ―discovery‖ of/with others is part of seeing the world as a very capacious, diverse, 
complicated, place.  That sense of awe, the humility of any one human being‘s perceptive 
capabilities, is what infuses Powers‘s novels, making them postethnic even when they say 
very little about ethnicity on the surface. 
Now it may be that Anglo-Caucasian experiences of ―the dark night of the soul‖ 
or ―existential angst‖ are not as compelling as the bodily suffering of minority ethnic 
groups.  And it would be a ridiculous to claim that resisting ennui is as politically urgent 
as resisting, say, the structures of environmental racism or getting serious about various 
ceasefires, peace talks, or other life-and-death negotiations.  But bourgeois ennui exists in 
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the same world as the toil of the peasants and the struggle of the proletariat, and it is 
becoming less and less tenable not to include every kind of human experience and 
imagination in our representations of that world.  Specifically, Powers revises the 
nonidentity of whiteness through the reconfiguration of the sovereign knower—an 
imperial idea with expressions in Descartes‘ cogito and Bentham‘s panopticon.
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Although Powers maintains the existential freedom of individual perception to interpret 
experience, he locates this freedom within a system of limitations that include other 
people and the physical world.  In doing so, his novels collectively argue for the 
interconnectedness of all things, including the person perceiving the connections.  
Power‘s privileged viewer is, then, embedded as a member of the natural order rather 
than a sovereign over it. 
This connectionist cartography outlines the world in different ways, towards 
different ends, than the traditional linear narrative landscape of naturalism.  In the same 
way that Chabon‘s diversity of imaginary worlds exemplifies the creative potential of 
map-making, Powers‘s imaginative mapping of the world‘s diversity through his 
encyclopedic technique exemplifies the powers of an inexhaustible fascination with the 
world that is mapped.  Powers‘s is one of several encyclopedic postmodern (and white) 
novelists who work to illuminate the vast contingency of the world as a whole.  They 
produce, for the most part, large novels.  Thomas Pynchon does it in Gravity’s Rainbow, 
letting the narrative veer and shift through many contingent encounters among scores of 
characters.  Don DeLillo does it in Underworld when he follows a baseball forward and 
backward in time (a different kind of cross-section).  Neal Stephenson does it in his dense 
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historical-scientific novels such as those in The Baroque Cycle, packing in a terrific 
amount in arcana and lore culled from scientific and philosophical history.  Yet we may 
ask, what is the virtue of imagining the world as big and complex?  How does this kind of 
as-if world differ from a reductionist one? When literary fiction strikes its readers with 
wonder and amazement at the strangeness and constructedness of the ―here and now,‖ the 
effect is much the same as when a science fiction or fantasy writers dazzle them with 
fairyland and distant planets.   The sense of the world as a place rich with possibilities, 
both dense and malleable, is at the core of a postethnic rethinking of fragmentation.  That 
sense is also, I claim, at the core of Powers‘s fiction.  Although most of his novels fit the 
bill, Galatea 2.2 and Plowing the Dark, in particular, offer ways of thinking about the 
interactions of writers and readers in the representation of such a world. 
In a 2008 interview, Powers spoke to Stephen J. Burn about the metafictional and 
encyclopedic nature of his ―connectionist‖ novels.  For Powers, everything in the world is 
connected to every other thing, and the human processes of mapping and navigating the 
world remain eternal and recursive acts of self-creation.  Three quotes illustrate Powers‘s 
view of the relationship between fiction, the world, and the people living in both:  
[N]ot only [can] literature be a form of genuine knowledge, but it [can] represent 
and enact kinds of interdependent knowing that other disciplines acknowledged 
but [are] unable to reach…From the very beginning…my vision for fiction was 
predicated on the notion of interconnectivity and a view of ―long time‖ (2008, 
169).  
Later, 
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My only difficulty with the word ―intersection‖ is that it presupposes boundaries 
in the first place… There truly are no independent disciplines that operate 
exclusively of any other—just people, acting out of very human hopes, fears, and 
desires.  And fiction is uniquely privileged to place its camera at those imaginary 
boundaries between disciplines… (171) 
At last, 
The novel of information is uniquely suited to speculate on how individual 
existence impinges on collective reality, and how, with regard to saying what it 
means to be alive, everything connects with everything else. (174) 
These comments relate fictional worlds to the real world itself, and literature as a mode of 
inquiry to other modes of inquiry.  More to the point, we can relate the structure of 
Powers‘s novels and their themes to a particular way of being in the world, one that is 
characterized by a process of linking together fragments not to arrive at the revelation of 
a whole but rather in the sense of articulation that Nancy attributes to the inoperative 
community.  It is an active, recursive, negotiable process of being. 
We are familiar with the ways of being that naturalism can encourage— literary 
humanism‘s principle virtue, empathy.  Reading Chabon and Powers, we can see that the 
postethnic utopian imagination encourages, in contrast, play as its principle virtue.  
Playfulness, I propose, is the postethnic utopian complement to naturalism‘s empathy.  If 
naturalist fiction emphasizes the need for a certain kind of connection among human 
lives, then connectivist fictions emphasize the need to be at play in a fragmented world 
where everything is or can be connected in multiple ways by the innovative cartographer.  
The argument has been made, exhaustively, that naturalism‘s sense of empathy is 
necessary for liberal democracy.  We will have to wait until later in this chapter to 
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consider why a postethnic sense of play is also a vital necessity to these concerns.  But 
first, we need to better understand how the connectivist imagination works, what it 
implies, and how it relates to other facets of postethnic utopianism I have been 
describing. 
Burn glosses his interview with Powers helpfully, and several points in particular 
stand out.  First, he attributes to the novelist an ―ecological vision,‖ a sense of a world in 
which ―environment and individual reciprocally shape and direct each other‖ (164).  
Second, he tells us, the rhetorical ―shock‖ effect of mixing of conventional and 
metafictional frameworks ―is meant to direct the reader outside the book, driving her 
back‖ to the world (165).  And finally, in regards to the density of information in a 
Powers novel, ―Data…is not antithetical to empathetic characters as much as it is the very 
reason why we should empathize with other individuals, similarly lost in the ocean of 
information‖ (166, emphasis mine).  The sense of being lost is very like the experience of 
being limited, exposed, or fragmented, and we should understand that Powers‘s main 
thesis about the information rich universe is that we are all lost in it together.  No one of 
us—or one kind of us—has a vantage point from which to find, save, or repair the rest.  
In this sense, the interdependence of survival in a vast information-rich, mutually 
reinforcing and self-organizing interconnected cosmos, the connectivist epistemological 
model is a postethnic utopian one. 
The two novels I focus on here, Powers describes as dealing with ―the symbolic 
nature of knowledge formation‖ and a ―descent into extreme ‗locked room‘ subjectivity‖ 
(175).
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  Following Burn‘s observations above, we can see how Powers maps the 
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common ground shared by the coldly intellectual and the warmly heartfelt, postethnically 
contradicting a particular set of assumptions about the separation of ideas and emotions, 
mind and body.  These novels read in places like atlases because the world is a vast place; 
but they are also miniaturist in their attention to the human beings who interact in and 
with that world. 
Plowing the Dark explores these themes through an interlaced double narrative.  
In one thread, artist Adie Karpol is hired by a software company to help refine their 
virtual reality software.  ―The Realization Lab,‖ a division of ―TeraSys‖ has developed ―a 
second-generation, experimental, total-immersion environment modeler‖ (24) that is 
called, with a nod to Plato, ―The Cavern.‖  This device is ―an unlimited fantasy sandbox, 
perfect for a girl to get lost in‖(25).  It can immerse individuals in a crayon world, a 
painting by Degas, or a projection of world oil consumption mapped on a virtual globe.  
Thus, in the Cavern, every level of representation, from crayon scribble to photorealism, 
exists on a continuum with a sliding control.  The novel concludes, as we shall see, that in 
a nonfriviolous sense we live in a crayon world of perceptual ideas as much as a 
photorealistic world of material experience.  At the beginning, though, Adie is hired to 
help stage great works of art, down to the individual brushstrokes, so that users can walk 
around inside their favorite paintings.  As she warms to the challenge she finds herself ―a 
tourist in her own Eden‖ (58), able to invent not only maps but also completely three-
dimensional spaces out of the human imagination.  The software can also be used to 
create complex virtual models of the world.  For example, a representation of petroleum 
use is able, apparently, to forecast a peak oil collapse in the near future.  Thus, the virtual 
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reality machine becomes an emblem of all manner of representational powers, from the 
fine arts to scientific projections.  Virtual reality, here, stands in for the image of the 
world that we each carry around in out head.  It is real, but not in the same sense that the 
world itself is real.  The question, though, is how much the virtually real can matter. 
In a second narrative thread, told in the second person, ―you‖ are an Iranian-
American teacher taken captive in an unspecified middle eastern country and held 
hostage for several months.  This story is the more literal exploration of ―locked room 
subjectivity‖ that Powers refers to above.  While captive, the teacher finds recourse in the 
stories that he creates in his mind.  The use of second-person narration is important here 
because early in the novel, in Chapter 10, Powers uses second-person narration to 
describe walking through the Cavern‘s ―Jungle Room‖ program, blurring the line 
between the prisoner‘s imagination and the representational capacities of virtual reality.  
The Jungle Room is based on Degas‘ The Dream, which one character interprets as a 
picture of a jungle that has grown in through a woman‘s living room windows.  The 
parallel crossing of the threshold distinction between The Cavern and the prisoner‘s 
cell—both emblems of the human skull with its sensory windows— is the symbolic 
action of the novel.  The narrative works towards the staging of an ineffable moment 
when Adie in her virtual reality machine and the captive teacher in his own mind 
miraculously interact each other.  The event is never fully explained, and this lacuna 
suggests that the connection made through the exchange of virtual realities (e.g. through 
reading and writing) is something mysterious, wonderful, and sustaining.   
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With these twin storylines, Powers addresses the value of art in an age of digital 
simulation, one the one hand, and in the face of human suffering, on the other.  We might 
even call these the poststructural and the postcolonial faces of postmodernity.  While 
Adie becomes more and more disillusioned that the genius of individual painters can be 
indistinguishably reproduced by the right kind of software coding, the prisoner becomes 
increasingly reliant on his own imagination to mitigate the pain of his condition.  
Ultimately, then, the novel asks if art in the digital age can respond to human suffering in 
the ways that ―hand-made‖ art has done in the past.  
This question, and its answer, can be approached in the context of Powers‘s 
earlier novel Galatea 2.2, which marks a self-reflective turning point in his work and 
features the kind of fictionalized self we see in Roth and Auster.  In the novel, a writer, 
apparently named Richard Powers (although the name does not occur often in the text), 
who has written four novels identical in description to the four novels Powers had written 
prior to this one, assumes a fellowship post at a research institute in his old college town.  
He becomes involved in a Pygmalion-style bet: he will help create a computer that is able 
to pass a Turing test using a graduate English exam covering works ―from Beowulf to 
Virginia Wolf.‖  His challenge is to create a computer intelligence that can read as well 
as a human being – the criterion for success is that the machine‘s answers should be 
indistinguishable from the answers given by a human test taker.  The philosophical 
problem is not unlike the one that Nussbaum raises when she claims that the narrative 
imagination helps us not to doubt that the people around us are people and not convincing 
robots.  The challenge to make a machine read like a human is analogous to Plowing the 
160 
Dark‘s question on what it means if a computer can create an ersatz brushstroke 
indistinguishable from a genuine one made by Degas.  These novels, taken together, ask 
what constitutes human identity when machines are able to flawlessly imitate the 
activities that have been considered key identifiers of human-ness, the ability to create 
and interpret art.  The answer, which gives us both the connectionist and postethnic 
reading of these books, is the experience of living in an embodied, limited, and exposed 
position.    
Throughout Galatea 2.2, Powers problematizes writing fiction by commenting on 
his previous novels, and the narrating persona seems to be on the point of abandoning 
literary discourse.  He has a full blown case of existential-postmodern ennui, which as I 
have already hinted needs to be more often recognized as representationally located 
primarily in white experience as reflected, for example, in novels by DeLillo, Pynchon, 
or John Updike.  By the end of the narrative, however, his writer‘s block lifts, apparently 
in light of the answer the computer intelligence Helen gives to her test prompt.  The task 
is simply to explain two lines from The Tempest, spoken by Caliban: ―Be not afeard: the 
isle is full of noises,/ Sounds and sweet airs, that give delight, and hurt not.‖  Helen‘s 
response insists that these lines can only be meant for an embodied (human) being:  
You are the ones who can hear airs. Who can be frightened or encouraged. You 
can hold things and break and fix them. I never felt at home here. This is an awful 
place to be dropped down halfway… Take care, Richard. See everything for me. 
(326) 
With this, ―H. undid herself. Shut herself down.‖  Whereas the human graduate student, 
the control subject in the Turing test, has responded with ―a more or less brilliant New 
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Historicist reading… a take on colonial wars, constructed Otherness, the violent 
reduction society works on itself,‖ the machine ―reads‖ the literature as something 
continuous with living in the world as one embodied person among others, witnessing, 
apprehending, and making things.  The response of the narrator to this message unfolds 
over the final two pages: 
She had come back only…to tell me one small thing. Life meant convincing 
another that you know what it meant to be alive. (327)… I turned from the office, 
struck by a thought that would scatter if I so much as blinked.  I‘d come into any 
number of public inventions. That we could fit time into a continuous story. That 
we could teach a machine to speak. That we might care what it would say. That 
the world‘s endless thingness had a name… Each metaphor already modeled the 
modeler that pasted it together. It seemed I might have another fiction in me after 
all. (328) 
This passage touches on a number on interrelated elements, and it is their complicity that 
is precisely the point, that is, the constructed nature of most utopian projects considered 
simply as ―public inventions‖ of what ―we could‖ do.  Powers, here, takes up the by now 
familiar position that orders of time and space are equally the products of human 
invention.  Both function through symbolic interaction—the place names on maps, for 
instance—and social communication is also the invention of the world in human terms.  
Inventive or better yet re-inventive memory and cartography are alike in that both break 
from a criterion of correspondence or accurate, authentic signification. The thingness of 
the world, Powers tells us, does not have one true name that can be inscribed on a map, 
no more so than the contingent sequence of events in time has one true historical 
trajectory.  Rather, in Helen‘s ―reading‖ of Shakespeare, art makes sense only when it is 
addressed to other people rather than to its own object, history, or world.  Literature is for 
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others rather than about others.  Life here entails a postethnic requirement insisting that 
because we do not simply exist in communal identity with others, we must take up the 
task of communicating to other people, convincingly, that we are alive. 
To put it in terms of the retold Galatea myth, there is no good in getting a machine 
to read Shakespeare, even though it can, because Shakespeare‘s writing does not do any 
good for a machine reader.  It is useful for a human reader, one that lives in the world 
with other people.  It follows, then, that art and the imagination in Plowing the Dark are 
not considered good in terms of any measure such as original genius or aesthetic unity.  
That is, they are not good in terms of the writer‘s identity as a genius or even the identity 
of the work as an original—the Cavern‘s computers mitigate the demand to revere the 
artist or the work by creating art out of computer code.  Rather, art artifacts are good, in 
this postethnic paradigm, only insofar as each particular one is useful for the person who 
receives it. 
In the final scene of the novel, Powers gives us a moving image of such a 
counterfactual wish come true. The prisoner is on his way home, still dazed by what he 
takes to be his ―hallucination‖ of Adie in a virtual/imaginary Hagia Sophia.  It is the 
connection with her, at the moment he had given up hope, that has allowed him to hang 
on: ―It left you no choice but to live long enough to learn what it needs from you‖ (414).  
But having survived, about to disembark to be reunited with his wife and child, he 
hesitates, thinking ―And how you will survive another‘s company again becomes the only 
real problem... there will be talk, there will be touching. There is no earthly way you can 
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bear it‖ (415).  He is thinking here of his wife; what surprises him is the ―smaller other‖ 
who turns out to be his daughter whom he has not seen before.  He observes, 
Your love rushes toward you but stops short, sobbing at the thought of real 
contact, of what happens next.  Her small shadow steps forward from her.  You 
look down and see your girl, this Scheherazade, whose name plays everywhere 
across her face, clutching a picture she has drawn for her foreign father.  She 
clings to you as if she‘s known you all her short life.  Grasps at long last the fable 
she‘s grown up on. 
―Look,‖ she says, shoving her drawing into your shaking hands. A crayon man, 
returning to a crayon house. ―Look! I made this for you.‖ (415) 
In this moment, through the symbolic action of the novel, the real and the artificial have 
become blurred in the notion of the ―virtual.‖  Certainly, the freed prisoner is not a crayon 
man, nor is he returning to a crayon house, but he is in some virtual sense ―the fable she‘s 
grown up on.‖  Like the narrating persona at the end of Galatea 2.2, the prisoner is both 
the maker and the thing made, a being created postethnically through and in the midst of 
the connectedness of all things.  According to this idea, human beings have a particular 
set of experiences that connect us to each other as sentient language users, while at the 
same time, as singular beings, that human sentience is only one node in a cosmic 
network.  The humility of this position, which does not deny the impressive powers of 
cognition but rather incorporates them into an embodied experiential paradigm, allows 
the characters in a Powers novel to find their way forward toward each other and toward 
the world at large.  In this way, the power of art is not only the making of a beautiful 
world (the virtual paintings) or an ―as if‖ world that allow a better kind of problem 
solving (the program that charts the peak oil collapse).  It is those things, but also it is 
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something made for another person (look! I made this for you).  And according to Scarry, 
like all artifacts made for people, it contains a compassion and a counterfactual wish. 
As I said at the beginning of part two, the question of utopia in the immediate 
present is the question of the demand for geographical fidelity or the license for inventive 
cartography.  What is at stake then, is the freedom to map the world as we wish it to be.  
This freedom is, most broadly, part of a postethnic ethics of representation because it 
calls for an acknowledgement of self-determination.  Not only should we be free to make 
our own maps, but so should others.  However, this is not the most radical or the deepest 
implication of connectivism for postethnicity.  The connectivist idea of 
interconnectedness means that our maps are also interconnected, that they inform and 
shape each other.  Again, according to our own tastes we can invoke ―différence,‖ 
―dependant arising,‖ ―ubuntu,‖ or other understandings of this kind of relationality.  In 
the world as Powers describes it, we need as many maps as we can get because the 
universe is a complicated place and no one standpoint—no one ethnicity—can survey the 
whole thing.  But even more than what we need pragmatically, in a connectivist 
imaginary, of necessity we cannot not interactively share our maps because we cannot not 
live in each other‘s worlds. 
Chapter 3: Gerald Vizenor: The Trick of Survival 
―Most of the stories about the tribal trickster are not sacred, wicked, wise; 
rather the trickster is eternal motion and transformation in the stories. The 
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trickster is boasted on cue and comes to naught; no critical closures, 
representations, or essential cultural conditions could hold the stories‖ 
—Vizenor, Introduction to summer in the spring (13) 
Several keywords reoccur in Vizenor‘s novels and discursive writing, forming an 
almost mantra or chant-like effect: survivance, trickery, tease, natural reason, manners, 
and terminal creed to name a few. In one of the rare recent articles on Vizenor, Kathryn 
Hume proposes that understanding his lexicon, in which ―words have been altered or 
wretched from their usual connotations to serve his purposes‖ (2007, 580), is key to ―a 
sense of how his literary projection of consciousness challenges received reality‖ (582).  
It is precisely this altered reality, a ―trickster consciousness‖ that relates Vizenor‘s work 
to Chabon and Powers: all three novelists remap the world postethnically, each operating 
in broadly existential-pragmatic paradigms of linguistic world-making, albeit each is 
grounded in different traditions.  We may extend our catalog of postethnic methods for 
engaging this world-shaping power of language to include the shamanic in Vizenor‘s 
novels, in much the same way we extended the theories of healing power of memory to 
include the ceremonial in Silko‘s. Vizenor‘s ―idolect‖(597) creates a what Hume calls his 
―cosmos,‖ in which all things, human and nonhuman, are potentially alive and 
interconnected (584-91). While this relates to Powers‘s connectivism, in which a 
privileged viewer creates connections through enlightened perception, in Vizenor‘s world 
it is the existential or natural connection of all things that allows a marginalized trickster 
figure to elide and elude capture.  Powers‘s viewer can see anything because he is not 
pinned down; Vizenor‘s trickster cannot be pinned down because he can say anything.  
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The power of musical verbal repetition is perhaps the most undertheorized marker 
of Vizenor‘s Anishinaabe cultural background.  Also called the Chippewa and the 
Ojibwe, ―[t]he Anishinaabe were‖ according to Alan Velie, ―traditionally the most 
musical of the Indian tribes. Musicologist Frances Densmore wrote in Chippewa Music 
(1910) that when an Anishinaabe visited another reservation, ‗one of the first questions 
asked on his return was, 'What new songs did you learn?‘‖(2000).  This apparently real 
practice of collecting songs from other tribal groups resembles the invented Sand Lizard 
practice of seed collection in Silko‘s Gardens.  While not all native songs are ceremonial, 
the ones that are signal an important difference from the conventional notion of a literary 
poem: they are Burkean equipment for living in the sense that ceremonial poems ―[serve] 
ritual purposes: healing, political consolidation, or propitiation of deities‖ (―American 
Indian Poetry‖, 1993, 42).  While clearly different from popular notions of ―magic 
spells,‖ songs and stories in native traditions are accorded a spiritual power to affect life 
and experience.
11
  In the discussion of Silko in part one, we noted that ceremonial or 
magic speech can be an instructive paradigm for the functions of language as a real part 
of the world rather than an unreal reflection on, description of, or gesture toward it.  
Silko‘s premier novel, Ceremony, exemplifies magical language infused from a native 
tradition into a nonnative one, a blending of ceremonial healing and a literary work, the 
novel.  Vizenor, like Silko, was named as one of the ―four masters‖ of the Native 
American renaissance by Alan Velie (1982).  A revision of his 1978 novel Darkness in 
Saint Louis Bearheart, Vizenor‘s 1990 Bearheart: The Heirship Chronicles pits the 
power of a trickster‘s natural reason and survivance against the terminal creeds and word 
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wars of white culture.  In doing so, Vizenor fuses native trickster traditions with 
postmodern jouissance, while at the same time escaping the ―prison house of language‖ 
and discursive stagnation through what he calls natural reason, which is, for me, another 
sign of the ecological ground for the postethnic imaginary.  Before turning to Bearheart 
in detail, we should explore the role songs and natural imagery in Vizenor‘s early poetry 
and academic training, which have informed his concept of postindian identity. 
The first stage of Vizenor‘s literary career consisted mostly of haiku poetry, a 
form which he finds comparable to Anishinaabe songs in their brevity and natural 
imagery (Lee, 1994). Despite what we might expect, Vizenor was familiar with haiku 
writing from his military service in Japan before he was ―introduced‖ to Native American 
poetry at New York University (Velie, 2000).  Later, and most significantly in his award-
winning novel Griever, Vizenor would retrace these early cross-cultural connections in 
the relative trickster traditions of Chinese and Native American cultures.  The trickster‘s 
reversals and surprises are ultimately what is most important, in this chapter, to my 
overall argument about postethnic utopia, and Vizenor‘s biography is illustrative here 
because it thwarts conventional assumptions about where, how, and to whom ethnicity is 
reproduced or handed down.  What makes such trickery both utopic and postethnic?   
On that question, let me digress briefly to confront the problems of using any 
cultural characteristic as a warrant for comparative study as well as the way trickster 
discourse cuts across these problems.  The use of any cultural form by those outside the 
culture raises concerns about exploitation, and ―use‖ can include any engagement with 
the material from assessment to appropriation to appreciation.  The question, here, in 
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terms ethnicity, is whether certain cultural artifacts belong exclusively to a descent group.  
This problem is especially keen in Native American studies.  To whom does native 
culture belong? Who gets to tell native stories or stories in the native tradition?  Who gets 
to listen to them? As cultural artifacts cross the parochial boundaries of reservation 
nations that are defined and managed by the Bureau of Indian affairs—Hollinger would 
remind us here that the five principle racial identities in the US are perpetuated by the 
options on the official census—their circulation is another indicator that people migrate 
postethnically through formerly separated imaginative landscapes in much the same way 
we migrate around the physical geography of a postmodern world.  
Thus, postethnicity requires a theory of cultural exchange and mixture reasonably 
safe from appropriation and colonization.  Ceremony, along with House Made of Dawn 
and other landmark texts of the native American renaissance, gave nontribal audiences a 
new look at tribal beliefs, and it is not surprising that ―outsider‖ interest in these novels 
would remind many people of ―outsider‖ fascination with and exploitation of native 
culture.  Paula Gunn Allen, in particular, accused Silko of a kind of cultural betrayal for 
telling to outsiders what ought to remain the property of those inside the pueblo tradition 
(1990).  That Silko herself should be accused of playing into the hands of those who 
would appropriate and abuse native traditions has a particular resonance, because she 
herself, in "An Old-Fashioned Indian Attack in Two Parts" (1978), leveled related 
charges against Snyder for his work Turtle Island.  For Silko, it was wrong for the white 
poet to use pueblo cultural material.
12
  The question of the benefits to Snyder, in critical 
reputation if not monetary profit, makes this an issue not only of representation but also 
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appropriation.  In the Allen/Silko dispute, members of the community should not profit 
from sharing insider information, and in the Silko/Snyder dispute, outsiders should not 
use materials that originate from inside Native American cultural traditions.  The whole 
inside/outside paradigm, along with the notion of culture as property belonging to a 
people rather than persons, or persons themselves belonging or not belonging to a culture, 
is heartily mocked by Vizenor‘s ―crossblood,‖ irreverent, mobile tricksters. 
Approached from an ecological rather than a cultural framework, Snyder‘s poetry 
and activism underlines the salient point that cultural material is fungible in a way that 
cultural identity ostensibly isn‘t.  Of course, one of the assumptions for the argument that 
I am making about postethnic utopianism is that contemporary life makes it increasingly 
untenable to imagine a world only for the good of a selfsame ethnic identity, and the 
presence of others in one‘s ideal world inevitably raises the probability of exchange and 
transmission of everything from poetic schemas to DNA sequences.  So it makes weird 
and wonderful sense that Vizenor, the mixed-blood Anishinaabe, and Snyder, a Euro-
American with some Irish/Scotts heritage, have Japan in common.  That is, both writers 
have incorporated Japanese haiku, and/or haiku like imagery, into their work.  Of course, 
haiku is, arguably, the principle influence on Ezra Pound that sparks the Imagist 
revolution and inaugurates modern poetry in the West, so Snyder‘s beat poetry already 
owed something to Basho.  Nevertheless, Synder and Vizenor draw more directly and 
deliberately than that on the haiku tradition not only for their poetry but also for the belief 
system haiku attention solicits: an attention to living moments and the natural world that 
Vizenor comes to call, if I grasp this phrase correctly, ―natural reason.‖  Snyder, of 
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course, also incorporates Buddhism in a way that Vizenor does not, and as an 
―ecological‖ poet, his use of Native imagery can be critiqued as participating in the 
common, racist trope of Native Americans as ―noble savage‖ environmentalists.  
Vizenor‘s work, as we shall see, generates a different kind of spirituality and has its own 
non-environmentalist ecology.  In fact, being ―at one with nature‖ is a principal 
characteristic of invented Indian identity (invented by whites) that Vizenor critiques in 
Bearheart and, more broadly, with the idea of postindian survivance. 
The trickster figure, central to Vizenor‘s ubiquitous invocation of the Anishinaabe 
trickster hero Nanabozho, is helpful for comparative study because the quintessential 
trickster behavior is the crossing of boundaries and the violations of cultural normativity.  
Chabon, who often refers to the Norse trickster Loki, associates the trickster‘s linguistic 
feats with aesthetic pleasure in general.  ―Yet entertainment,‖ he writes, ―remains the 
only sure means we have of bridging, or at least of feeling we have bridged, the gulf of 
consciousness that separates each of us from everybody else‖ (2008, 5).  So the trickster‘s 
hijinks, stories and poems, art and pleasure are about transgressing both the normative 
cultural boundaries that tie a community together and the boarders that separate 
communities from one another.  We do not get only the benign half the trickster here: the 
excessiveness of art means that the life-force that brings us together can also upset our 
values, as Vizenor‘s novels often do.  On the transgressive laughter, John Lowe‘s article 
on ―postmodern ethnic humor‖ is instructive, linking the trickster novels of Vizenor 
(Griever, 1987), Maxine Hong Kingston (Tripmaster Monkey, 1989) and Ishmael Reed 
(Reckless Eyeballing, 1986).  These novels form a cultural network that spans the globe 
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(Africa, North America, and Asia), but the connection also depends upon a local 
proximity, the writers shared time at Berkley (1996, 103-104).  Thus, trickster tales 
become a means of connecting up the world, but in a way that is importantly different 
from the panoptical dislocation of Power‘s ―connectionist‖ seeing and the detective work 
of Chabon‘s imaginative remapping.  Powers and Chabon both see and draw new 
landscapes from the flux of experience around them, but the trickster in Vizenor‘s novels 
refuses to see or draw any such new product.  Instead, trickery is a risky, dangerous 
process of unseeing and boundary-crossing. 
Elizabeth Blair‘s explication of the crosscurrents of trickerism and ―postmodern 
language games‖ is helpful here.  ―Vizenor‘s writing‖ she observes, ―has remained 
problematic for those who attempt to fit it into a paradigm of Native American literature‖ 
(1995,75).  We might conclude that one reason for this difficulty is the trickster‘s own 
reluctance to be fixed into any paradigm at all except for his own humor and 
capriciousness. Vizenor is certainly upsetting, as we shall see, to any sanctimonious 
veneration including the condescending ―respect‖ accorded to tribal people.  That respect, 
his writing clearly argues, is only another form of cultural distancing that serves agendas 
of marginalization and oppression.  This does not mean that Vizenor forsakes the 
particular political causes of Native Americans. (In fact, he has extensively advocated 
having museum ―specimens‖ of Native skeletons returned to tribal communities for 
burial.)  Blair sums up the politics of his postmodernism nicely when she observes that 
―[a]ccording to Vizenor, deconstructionist theories release tribal narratives from the 
translations of social science… [his] theories about postmodernism are inseparable from 
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his theories about the Native American trickster.‖ (76-77).  As a case in point, she turns 
to his first novel, Darkness in Saint Louise Bearheart (1978) and its revision as 
Bearheart: The Heirship Cronicles (1990).  Blair‘s excellent close comparison of each of 
version of the novel concludes that ―the violent, scatological, polymorphously perverse 
world of dream returns to the tradition as written text‖ (88-89), which is to say that 
Bearheart is a messy, strange novel.  But these characteristics, I propose, are only 
performative expressions of the novel‘s postethnic thesis that trickery is an irreverent 
means of survivance in an oftentimes chaotic and cruel world. 
Compared to Chabon and Powers, Vizenor focuses more on the negotiability of 
beliefs rather than the powers of redescription.  Chabon might use language to invent a 
homeland in which to settle down, and Powers might leverage the privilege of an 
ostensibly unlocated identity to see in all directions at once, but Vizenor questions the 
finality of any such activities.  What matters in his novels is not how the world is 
described so much as the beliefs that are motivated from and towards those descriptions.  
What he calls terminal creeds are not only those beliefs that make us sick to death, 
terminally ill, but also those beliefs that rely too much on terminology to heal us.  
Moreover, they are those beliefs in the terminus, in the end of change that Plato‘s 
philosopher king promises.  For Vizenor‘s tricksters, words are instrumental and not an 
end unto themselves, which is not the same thing as insisting that every speech act must 
have a practical, decorous application.  Sometimes, the uselessness of dirty jokes is itself 
a form of resistance, especially against the clean and sober righteousness of a protestant 
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American work ethic.  Thus the ―word wars‖ are cultural battles fought over and with 
words but not for the sake of words.   
The postindian irreverence of trickster survivance is illustrated, mortally, in the 
―Terminal Creeds at Orion‖ chapter in Bearheart.  The pilgrims arrive at Orion, an 
walled community founded on a doctrine of ironism or of questioning all ideas.  The gate 
keeper greets them by asking ―what use are your hands if they never question your view 
on the sides and shapes of time and experience?‖ (192).  Yet Belladonna, one of the tribal 
pilgrims, still makes an impassioned, tone-deaf speech for romanticized Indian identity: 
―We are raised with values that shape our world in a different light… We are tribal and 
that means that we are children of dreams and visions… Our bodies are connected to 
mother earth and our minds are part of the clouds… Our voices are the living breath of 
the wilderness.‖ (192).  Her audience quickly raises the question, ―Are you telling me 
what you are saying is exclusive to your mixedblood race?‖  Bella affirms this, ―Yes! I 
am different than a whiteman because my values and my blood is different.‖  Prompted 
by the audience, she elaborates, ―Indians have more magic in their lives than 
whitepeople…  Indians have their religion in common… Indian blood is not white 
blood… tribal people are closer to earth…are not competitive people like the whites…‖ 
(196).  The audience insists that ―Indian‖ is an colonizing creed and that Belladonna‘s 
invocation of a pan-tribal identity is nonsense because ―the rule has too many 
exceptions.‖  They decide that she ―speak[s] from terminal creeds… Not a person of real 
experience and critical substance.‖  As Belladonna continues to expound how ―My tribal 
blood is like your great red wall…. My blood moves in the circles of mother earth and 
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through dreams without time…. My tribal blood is timeless and it gives me strength to 
live and deal with evil…,‖ her hosts fetch plate of poisoned cookies, her ―just deserts.‖  
She is condemned for being ―a terminal believer and a victim of her own narcissism.‖   
The idea hunters at Orion declare that ―the histories of tribal cultures have been terminal 
creeds and narcissistic revisionism‖ (198).  Belladonna‘s final act is to write an ironic 
line in a ledger of such terminal creeds: ―Our hearts soar with the eagles of our people‖ 
(199).   In the logic of the narrative she cannot survive this episode because what Vizenor 
calls survivance requires continuous living—including the personal growth and change 
that comes from critique—which means that it is more than merely staying alive by not 
dying.  To continue to live, according to this analysis, native peoples cannot rely on the 
ostensible strength of the culture named ―Indian,‖ partly because such a culture cannot be 
actually located among the diversity of tribal communities, and more importantly because 
the pan-tribal concept of ―Indian‖ is itself an invention of toxic colonial discourse.  Thus 
survivance—which, I want to highlight, has an evolutionary rather than a conservative 
thrust—must be post-Indian.  
The novel relates cultural survivance to human ecological survival, and the 
resistance to cultural extermination is also the resistance to extinction.  Both 
extermination and extinction are, in this paradigm, terminal creeds of white culture.  The 
jack copy for Beartheart glosses the story in this way: ―the tribal pilgrims reverse the 
sentiments of Manifest Destiny and travel south through the ruins of a white world that 
ran out of gas.‖  While such a robust and simple refutation of a painful history might help 
to sell books or galvanize critical interest in the novel, Vizenor‘s spatial negotiations are 
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trickier than a simple reversal.  Throughout Bearheart, the benevolent trickster Proude 
Cedarfair not only moves forward with the band of tribal pilgrims, encountering a series 
of satiric challenges that allow Vizenor to mock this or that ―terminal creed,‖ but he also 
returns imaginatively, in a dream meditation, to the cedar circus where his father and 
grandfather‘s bones are located.  Despite this rememberence of the past, Proude is always 
moving away from his ancestral home.  The novel ends with his departure for the ―fourth 
word,‖ taking almost none of the pilgrims with him, saving not even his wife, who is 
raped by the wicked trickster ―clown‖ Double Saint.  Although Proude often has the last 
or definitive word in each satiric episode (it is importantly he who defeats the ―evil 
gambler‖), as an expression of the trickster cultural hero he cannot be a leader or a 
prophet.  His movements in time and space are more subtle than a simple march toward 
or against a dominant (white) narrative.  
Bearheart stands apart from Vizenor‘s other novels, which are connected together 
through characters of the Browne family of the White Earth Reservation.   This 
postethnic kinship network, a cross-blooded, cross-cultural family of tricksters, ―remaps‖ 
time and space without reliance on identitarian solidarity nor a non-identitarian 
omniscience.  Even though ―impure,‖ these relationships or lines of descent are not 
discounted: Vizenor‘s novels are unified through the articulation of the Browne family‘s 
extended genealogy as something objectively substantive.  In a way, the extended family 
is like Roth‘s several interconnected sets, and the imaginative location of the White Earth 
Reservation functions in much the same way as Faulkner‘s Yoknapatawpha county.  
However, in Vizenor the vitality of belonging operates on a consent model: culture and 
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identity are not final (e.g. terminal creeds) but rather the humorous invention of a lively 
trickery.  For example, as Griever did with the Chinese story of the monkey king, 
Hiroshima Bugi
13
 traces the connections between Native American culture of the 
Anishinaabe of the White Earth reservation and several Japanese cultural traditions, 
especially kabuki theater and bushido, samurai martial philosophy.  Hiroshima Bugi 
features a very far flung member of the Browne family, Ronin Browne, the child of an 
Anishinaabe named Nightbreaker and a Japanese dancer.  One of Ronin‘s most important 
feats in the book is a re-measurement of time according to an ―Atomu‖ calendar that 
places year zero with the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima. 
This Atomu calendar date is marked on Ronin‘s chest in an ―invisible tattoo‖ that 
appears only when his skin is flushed, in a sauna or in sexual arousal.  The mark that is 
both permanent and unseen stands for the trauma of the bomb itself or, more exactly, the 
museums that commemorate the disaster by rendering its victims ―invisible.‖  There are 
several kinds of invisibility at stake here, one of which is the invisibility of 
misrepresentation.  The victims of the bomb are distorted in the museum‘s miniature 
model: Ronin objects that the survivors are depicted in soiled clothing while the trees 
around them have been denuded of leaves.  In the actual blast, individuals suffered 
horrible lacerations and burns, which are not shown in the scale models with the excuses 
of modesty and taste.  Likewise, the museum camouflages the aggression of the war in a 
bronze pillar replicating letters of peace and good will.  As a final point, Shinto shrines 
are built around war criminals, making them into object of memory-worship, while 
countless children who died in the blast are forgotten.  Ronin chooses an invisible line of 
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affiliation with the victims, whose ghosts he sees, and likewise forms several socially 
indiscreet or impossible relationships with a waitress, a crippled veteran, a leper, and a 
deceased writer, claiming them as his familial community.  This method of affliation, I 
propose, is a type of postethnicity.  If so, then we should not be surprised to find that just 
as Ronin forms his kabuki troop from misfits and outcasts, his story itself is a fragmented 
text assembled for us from his scribbled notes by Anishinaabe war veterans living in the 
Hotel Manidoo.  They accept Ronin as Nightbreaker‘s son, recognizing his ―kabuki 
poses‖ and bushido shouting as a cultural tie to native tricksterism.  Ronin‘s animal 
stories and natural images are proof, for the Anishinaabe veterans, of his ―natural 
reason,‖ and his yelling and dancing are signs of his humor.  Through these interactions, 
time and space are rearranged and the relationship network of the White Earth 
Reservation extends postethnically all the way to Japan.   
Ronin‘s tricks and stunts throughout the novel try to expose hidden injustice, just 
as his invisible Atomu date tattoo appears as if by magic.  He renames the atomic bomb 
museum ―Hiroshima Mon Amour,‖ after the French film that displaces the destruction of 
the bomb with a love story.  He melts the bronze peace letters with acid.  But his ultimate 
trick is played on the stage of national piety.  While the perpetrators of Japanese war 
crimes are venerated as ancestor spirits (kami), the victims of the bomb remain 
unvenerated: ―The Yasukuni Jinja is haunted forever by the atomu ghosts of Hiroshima. 
The shrine honors the warriors, the kamikaze, even six war criminals, but the shrine 
priests never mention the thousands of children who were incinerated in the service to 
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their emperor‖ (148).  Ronin stages an invasion of the shrine in the name of the ghost 
children who should be the rightful objects of remembrance:  
I clapped my hands and shouted at the elusive kami spirits of the war criminals. 
Some out of that shrine you cowards, some out under the torii and face the 
thousands of children you sacrificed at Hiroshima. The atomu children deserve to 
be honored more than you or any emperor. Tojo, come out and face my sacred 
sword or forever hide behind the hakama of the shrine priests and the black shirts 
of the nationalists. (150-51) 
The capacity to make such a challenge, to take a committed stand is, paradoxically, 
enabled by a postethnically shiftable positionality.  Hiroshima Bugi moves back and forth 
between the hotel Manidoo, where Anishinaabe veterans reassemble the stories of 
Nightbreaker‘s son Ronin, and the sites in Hiroshima in which Ronin wanders and teases.  
The Japan chapters are organized partly by character–as in Bearheart, at the center of this 
novel we have a band of misfits centered around a trickster hero–and partly by location.  
The Rashomon Gate, the Imperial Moat, Sagami Bay, the Peace Park, the Inu Shrine, the 
Yasukuni Jina, the Ginza are all locations important to the cultural production of ―false 
peace‖ and victimry, and each becomes the stage for one of Ronin‘s samurai-kabuki 
poses or tricks that reverse the pompous sanctity of the location in favor of active 
survivance.    
The trickster performance is one aspect of a broader tradition underlies postethnic 
utopianism and, to some extent, any art that both entertains and teaches.  These terms 
from Horace echo in Miller‘s observation that literature‘s power comes from its 
powerlessness: a license to do very real ideological work is given on the grounds of 
literature unreality, its flexibility.  While the separation of art and politics has rightly been 
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contested, it is precisely by pretending to be apolitical that literature, art, and other 
trickeries can do political work.  The importance of aesthetic effect, such as surprise and 
humor, was well known to sophists and cynics in the Classical period, who were the 
playful and tricky opposition of Platonists and, later, the stoics. This kind of clowning 
shows up again the medieval court jester, which is arguably precisely the role that More‘s 
Hythloday would perform at the king‘s dinner table as he recounts his fantastic voyages.  
Fooling around creates an opportunity for parhesia, inappropriate speaking against 
decorum or what we might call political correctness.   
The closest analog in contemporary culture to the sophist, jester, or trickster is the 
modern performance artist or stand-up comedian.  While much jesting and trickery is a 
―waste‖ of scatological nonsense—and Vizenor‘s Bearheart is certainly full of bizarre 
and upsetting scenes that remain nonsensical— it can just as often be exquisitely precise 
in its satire.  The best example of the kind of performance art I have in mind here is the 
―post-Mexican‖ art of Guillermo Gómez-Peña.  His description of a performance called 
―Declaration of poetic disobedience from the New Boarder‖ illustrates the power of 
ceremonial rhetoric and the relationship between words, places, bodies, and ethnic 
identities: 
In my techno-shaman-in-drag persona, I walk around the tableau, and throughout 
the space, erasing the boundaries between audience and performers. // At one 
point I begin to slowly reveal Emiko‘s body… until her body is exposed, but her 
eyes are still blindfolded by the US flag. The acupuncturist methodically follows 
my path, inserting… forty needle/flags [―representing…nations belonging to the 
alleged ‗coalition forces‘‖] one by one into her exposed body, leaving the 
audience with the after-image of a ‗colonized‘ female body/world to ponder. // 
…At the end of the declaration, I invite the audience members to ‗de-colonize 
Emiko‘s body‘ by carefully removing the flags with the assistance of the 
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acupuncturist[,] ...displaying the power that each individual has to make a change. 
(2006, 76) 
The power of such rhetorical performance is located exactly at the disjunction of 
language from the world, which is also the seamless unity of language with the world.  
Somehow, the rather meaningless act of removing a pin can signal a seismic shift in ideas 
because the pin and the audiences‘ beliefs have been linked together in a powerful way 
by the speaker. 
In the beginning of part two, I suggested that we could, at least temporarily, 
distinguish naturalism and the postethnic utopian imagination by their relationship to the 
world.  Naturalism is mimetic, seeking to hold the mirror up to nature.  The utopian 
imagination is nonmimetic: although it is addressed to real people and deals with real 
issues, it does so in a slanted or indirect manner.  However, when we try to delineate this 
distinction, it quickly breaks down.  It is strange to say that naturalism presents the world 
as it truly is, since fiction is ―made up‖ and even mimetic writers must simplify reality.  
A world-reducing ―as-if‖ is at work whether the guiding principle is realism, reducing the 
world to some elements that might well exist, or fantasy, creating a chimerical construct 
out of a limited set of elements that are more wildly inventive.  In one sense, naturalism 
is about the world as it exists, the ordinary and the every day, the probable.  But we 
cannot then say that utopianism is about the completely impossible.  If readers did not 
think the ideas in a romantic utopia were achievable, they would not be persuaded by 
them.  In the same way, a dystopia loses its power if the evils it warns against are not felt 
to be a likely threat.  Postethnic utopias, too, have to be thought possible or somehow 
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―true‖ in order to do their cultural work.  Coming at this paradox another way, we can see 
that although it is utopianism that is supposedly fleeing the real, what makes naturalism 
work is precisely a distance from the real world.  Claims for the value of literary 
empathy, such those made by Nussbaum, have to do with the impossibility that literature 
abets: it lets us feel like we can see inside other people‘s lives, even their minds.  
Likewise, what makes fantasy and utopia compelling is its relation to the ―real‖ concerns 
of ―real‖ people.  Ultimately, I think, this is because all writing, regardless of genre or 
mode, is for another person.  Moreover, because it is always to be read at a time after it is 
written, no matter how present-minded or contemporary the issues are, all writing is in 
some sense directed towards the future. 
We already know that future-direct utopian writing is strongly associated with 
revolutionary zeal, with radicalism and rupture.  This association persists despite the 
conservative, rather than revolutionary, ideologies of much of this kind of writing.  It is 
also regardless of the situated rhetoric of specific texts such as More‘s Utopia.  This 
association with futurism and progressivism in the American context is partly due to the 
―New World‖ pastoralists who thrived on the discovery and exploitative settlement of 
America.  It is partly due to the ―shining city on a hill‖ ideology, which still stains much 
public discourse in America.  But there are other causes for the association in the wider 
world, notably the revolutions of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as the 
future-minded utopianism best represented by Trotsky‘s vision of human domination 
over nature that closes Literature and Revolution (2005, 202-205).  Additionally, it is a 
future-minded forewarning of draconian or hedonistic revolutions that we find in Huxley 
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and Orwell.  As I anticipate here the utopias of the future that will be the focus in part 
three, I should clarify that my interest is not in how certain utopias view the future, or 
whether they are set in the future.  This distinction is analogous to my focus in part two 
on inventive cartography as a process rather than the produced maps of any one inventor.  
Leaving behind the spatial paradigm and returning to the temporal one, I remain focused 
on a postethnic utopian resistance to ethnocentric historicity.  That interest has been 
enlarged, in this section, by novels that illustrate how the utopian imagination resists the 
demands of geographic fidelity or any other demand to be blindly loyal to a fixed order of 
things. 
What happens when we see the historical narratives of hope and despair as 
imaginative inventions rather than revealed historical destiny or right-perception of the 
way things should be?  Past-writing novels return us to a sense of perennial possibility, of 
the past as a time when the future (our present) was not yet determined.  In part one, I 
claimed that any notion of historical progress and decline must give way before this 
notion of continuously renewed contingency.  Now, I have suggested that the postethnic 
imaginary offers us ways of mapping the vibrant and chaotic world, finding a home in it, 
engaging it in a mutual act of creation, and seeking out freedom even in dire 
circumstances.  But while such claims have everything to do with hope and optimism, 
this cannot be the hope of naïve progressivism because progressivism is itself, in most 
forms, a kind of teleology.  Strong belief in the improvement of the world, its 
perfectibility, is precisely the kind of imaginary homeland Chabon rejects, and it leads to 
precisely the kinds of terminal creeds that Vizenor taunts and eludes.  What does a future 
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look like when ideologies of decline and progress alike have been rejected?  When we 
draw our maps in pencil, leaving them open to revision, then we have left ourselves open 
to a future ―we‖ that is ―empty‖ of any prediction or expectation.  It is to that future that 
the third and final part of this project is addressed.
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PART 3 / EMPTY FUTURES 
Future-Writing and the Prophetic Voice 
Continuing along the temporal axis we have been following, we come now to the 
writing of the imaginary future.  Both the modern sense of historical narrative and the old 
medieval Christian notion of the millennial kingdom of god have contributed, each in its 
own way, to the assumption the future might be written in eschatological ―utopian‖ 
terms.  Even though grand-scale revolutionary thinking/doing may be what first comes to 
mind when we suppose the utopian imagination of the future, I argue now, as in previous 
chapters, that our utopias have become, of postethnic necessity, fragmented and 
piecemeal.  In postethnic utopias the projection of an imaginary world is an enunciation 
from a limited (ethnic) position; in situations of asymmetrical political power, these 
speech acts are ―tricks,‖ methods for talking about social change to the king whose power 
rests in the status quo.  Any cursory survey of the literary-cultural history of utopian 
writing shows that as monarchy became less relevant, in modern parliamentary politics, 
progressive utopianism shifted from the remote island to the remote time.  Under the 
influence of modern science, social transformation, and the revolutions of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, future-writing became more like the work of a draftsman 
measuring out a blueprint.  Utopian jesters like More were replaced, to a large extent, by 
those whom Popper calls ―utopian engineers.‖  The implementations of such schematic 
agendas have been so often bloody and disastrous that we are rightly skeptical if not 
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hostile to this kind of utopianism.  There is little left to be said to defend or denounce the 
ways of thinking that have lead to the guillotine, the gas chamber, the gulag, or the 
cultural revolution.  In this chapter, rather, we confront the most dangerous kind of 
utopianism, the future-writing that tries to enlist our endorsement for a particular, total 
vision of how the world ought to be.  But, thankfully, the postethnic turn manifests a 
different kind of future-writing, which is not a clean-slate projection of tomorrow in the 
modes of speculation, prediction, or planning.  On the contrary, this writing grapples with 
the implications of living in a world with a future in the wake of a postethnic loss of a 
monolithic guiding vision. 
At no time, in part three, am I particularly attentive to whether a given imaginary 
future is an astute speculation, just as in chapter one I was not interested in historical 
accuracy when writers imagine the past.  In other words, my concern here is not futurism, 
although futurism is certainly a kind of discourse closely relate to my topic.  Certainly, 
looking-ahead is vital to society, and futurists who do so serve an important intellectual 
and cultural role.
 1
  They do not, however, necessarily give us the literary equipment for 
living today in a world with a tomorrow, a world in which we know only that an 
unknown future will be arriving. 
It has surprised me, as I organize and revise my readings of these novels, that I 
have moved backward in time as my topic has shifted toward the future.  The first novel 
in part one, A Mercy (2008), is the most recent one in this project.  The oldest novels that 
I include—if we date Bearheart from its 1990 revision—can be found here in part three.  
If I was more committed to a particular kind of genre study, I would have to explain why 
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a now outdated era of science fiction typifies the postethnic utopian future-writing.  That 
is, I would have to explain why these novels are more closely related to new wave 
science fiction than cyberpunk or later, more contemporary forms.  Perhaps it is the 
countercultural that draws me to the new wave; if Dick had survived and written into the 
1990s, I would have included him here: Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, with its 
meditations on ersatz identity, empathy, and ecological disaster, fits perfectly the themes 
of the postethnic utopia and my case for it.  But already I am pushing the temporal 
boundary of ―post-Cold War fiction‖ by including Vonnegut‘s 1985 Galapagos.  I will 
offer a defense of this decision and attend to a related but less problematic concern with 
the dates of Le Guin‘s Hainish cycle in the chapters on each of these writers. 
Here, let me stipulate that future-writing is not identical to science fiction, 
although all of the novels examined in the following chapters are either classified as such 
or closely associated with it.  Science fiction, from its roots in Shelley and Wells to its 
Americanization by Asimov and Clark, has to do with working out the human 
implications of technology or scientific discovery.
2
  While some of the novels below 
could be understood as working out the implications of the theory of evolution, I do not 
frame them in exactly this way.  Rather, these novels represent how the theory of 
evolution, by contradicting mythological creation stories, has profound implications for 
what we understand about living in a world with a mutable, mutating future.  Stuart Hall 
does not include the Darwinian revelation that man is an animal on his list of forces 
displacing our former notions about identity (11-12, 1989).  But I do: the Darwinian 
insight that human beings a part of the natural order rather than apart from it, I propose, is 
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the most important challenge to anthropocentric and ethnocentric modes of identity.  
Certainly, as Anne McClintock shows us, Darwinism was first co-opted into a colonial 
agenda characterized by the racism of the ―family of man‖ and the cruelty of social 
Darwinism (1995, 36-56).  This early abuse continues to raise reasonable suspicions, 
which confront Galapagos especially but also are a countercontext for all of these novels.  
This is because the novelists in this section take up the empty long-term of evolution as 
part of their future-writing, as a problem and solution to finding the meaning of life.  To 
ask whose imaginary future might really come to pass misses the point, because, to the 
postethinc mind, the future is empty and available to everyone.  The real question is what 
the consequences are of believing in an empty future and what such a position lets us say 
about living today. 
I am assuming here that there are basically two kinds of futures: the destined 
future that may be fulfilled and the empty or open future that cannot be known but only 
welcomed.  In the destined future, the purpose of life in the present is to reach a given 
destination, whether this is the completion of a god‘s plan or the full actualization of 
human potential.  In the empty future, there is no goal already set, marked as if with a 
tape across a finish line.  The empty future does not exist as a metaphysical constant in 
the way that a teleological end, purpose, or potential is thought to exist. One of the major 
dividing lines, then, in any attempt to categorize imaginary futures must be the writer‘s 
stance vis-à-vis the end of time as it marks the purpose of moving forward through time.  
In order to imagine what the empty future means (if it means anything), the novelists in 
this chapter imaginatively fill it in particular, inventive, and surprising ways.  We shall 
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see that these futures fall along a spectrum from the seriously speculative to the satirically 
absurd to the fantastic.  In every act of imagining the future, however, at stake is what it 
means to live in an onrushing universe.  Hence any act of future-writing touches on, or at 
least strongly implies, the themes of eschatology.  Does the world get better and better 
until the dialectic of history gives way to a utopia?  Does it get worse and worse until the 
coming of Armageddon or Ragnorok?  In the postethnic imaginary, these questions are 
simply not worth asking because the whole paradigm of progress or decline has been 
unthought. 
 Just as we can no longer legitimately represent our past or present worlds only in 
self-same (ethnocentric) terms, so too we can no longer imagine the future as the destiny 
of just one ethnic group.  For pragmatic, practical reasons this cannot work, and it makes 
little difference if the proposal was for one group to lead the rest or for the consolidation 
and homogenization of ethnic diversity.  Either scenario is equally insufficient.  Nancy‘s 
inoperative community is precisely the loss of a parochial group projection into the future 
under the sign of an oeuvre, a great work.  In an operative utopian mode, individuals 
imagine themselves as cosmic workers and normalize their behaviors for the sake of the 
completion of their work.
3
  In contrast, as we have seen in previous chapters, there is a 
contradicting position that represents the past as a series of contingent events and the 
present as a negotiable map.  Those who entertain or endorse this politico-aesthetic 
position would not agree that any such metaphysical thing as a god or human nature calls 
us to a revealed standard.  In other words, in the postethnic, nothing like ―god‖ or 
―history‖ or ―human potential‖ requires us to achieve a future as it should-be.  
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In Platonic utopian engineering, Popper has argued, a total vision of the ideal 
future is required to know the right step to take next in the present (1963, 157).  This is 
why the king must be a philosopher, someone who can comprehend the Ideal.  Postethnic 
utopian futures, however, work something like Popper‘s view of social logic, where there 
is not only a transmission of truth from inferences to conclusions but also a 
retransmission of falsity from the conclusions to the premises (1992, 75).  In other words, 
we can reject our inferences about the future as false if they lead us to repulsive 
conclusions about what to do now.  Likewise, in postethnic future-writing, the 
representation of a world to come shapes and is shaped by how we think we ought to 
behave in the present.  We will see, in this section, how by entertaining certain futures 
and certain attitudes towards the future, Octavia Butler, Kurt Vonnegut, and Ursula Le 
Guin create literary artifacts, manifest perceptions, about living into the future, of 
postethnic identity as becoming-future.  We will consider the striking and, to my mind, 
important differences in each perception in due course.  First, we need a closer look at 
why ethnocentricity, or humanism, is an issue for future-writing.  We need to understand 
the rhetorical mechanisms by which representations of the future have been used or could 
be used to exhort people to behave themselves.  
I recognized this directive as the ―prophetic voice,‖ which is approximately what 
Cornel West means when he espouses ―the prophetic‖ in the forms of ―prophetic 
pragmatism‖ or ―prophetic witness.‖  Reading the Old Testament, West finds that the 
prophetic ―not only put justice at the center of what it means to be chosen as a Jewish 
people but also made compassion to human suffering and kindness to the stranger the 
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fundamental features of the most noble human calling,‖ and the act of prophecy that he 
calls ―prophetic witness consists of human deeds of justice and kindness that attend to the 
unjust sources of human hurt and misery.  It calls attention to the causes of unjustified 
suffering and unnecessary social misery and highlights personal and institutional evil, 
including the evil of being indifferent…‖(113-114).  West has in mind specifically the 
writings and actions of Major and Minor Prophets in the Judeo-Christian tradition.
4
  In 
this practice, the prophetic is not only a way to speak truth to power but also to those 
disinclined to hear it.  That is, through artful language and creative indirection, prophets 
use rhetorical strategies capturing the attention of a disinterested audience.  There is more 
to prophecy, however, than the kind of performative attention-grabbing that secular 
pragmatists can admire.  There is also a good deal of fire-and-brimstone, and most 
prophecy can be summed up as a call to return to the true Way of the Lord.  Which raises 
the question, Is the prophetic voice relevant without recourse to some notion of the ethno-
religious center to which the wayward listener must return? To put it in terms from 
West‘s definition, can you have prophecy without God or Jewishness?  Rhetoric of this 
kind assumes that there is a ―should be,‖ and the role of the speaker is to close the gap 
between how people actually behave and the way they ought to behave.  West theorizes 
about the prophetic as if the warnings of the prophets were only figurative devices; many 
fundamentalists, however, see such visions as allegorical or literal truth, a more or less 
coded prediction of the ―known‖ future.  Whether a warning is a revelation of the future 
or merely an ordinary prediction of likely consequences, to speak a warning is to speak 
from a position of knowing what-is-to-come.  In the postethnic turn, this very possibility 
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has been fragmented so that no one point of view can be supposed to know the future for 
all of us.  Yet must we have an image of what the future will or should be in order to 
exhort people to behave a certain way?  If knowing the future is a necessary condition for 
the prophetic voice that calls us to attention—with compassion, against injustice—then 
what hope is there if the postethnic future is undetermined or unknowable?  Can we know 
(or be told, or tell ourselves) how we ought to behave in this present world without 
knowing what the future is supposed to be?  
Chapter 1: Octavia Butler: God is Change 
Octavia Butler‘s Parable novels imagine the formation of a radical new religion 
in the face of social catastrophe.  The novels are written in a ―near future‖ that is, as we 
shall see, more speculative in nature than the future-writing of Vonnegut and Le Guin.  In 
fact, the Parable of the Sower (1993) reflects post-Cold War social anxieties so vividly 
that reviewers attributed it the authority of verisimilitude (Dubey and Potts, cited in 
Philips, 2002, 300).  Sower tells the coming of age and survival narrative of Lauren 
Olamina, a young black woman with ―hyperempathy syndrome,‖ a psychological 
condition caused by her mother‘s use of intelligence-enhancing drugs.  Hyperempathy 
syndrome means that Lauren feels any pain she sees as if it were happening in her own 
body.  This psychosomatic condition, in the face of a world in which the national 
structures of civil society have collapsed, partially explains why Lauren formulates a 
revolutionary religion called Earthseed.  The doctrines she composes speak directly to the 
192 
concerns introduced above, the need for the firmly located (ethnocentric) prophetic voice 
to say what God want or human nature requires.  Lauren as prophet redefines God as 
―Change‖ and humanity as ―Earthseed,‖ a life form whose purpose is to ―take root among 
the stars.‖  Sower concludes with the founding of Acorn, a racially diverse intentional 
community centered in a shared neo-religious belief.  The story resumes with Parable of 
the Talents (1999), which is presented as a pastiche of texts by Lauren, her brother Mark, 
her husband Taylor, and her daughter Asha.  Talents imagines a fascist ―Christian 
America‖ regime stepping into the social-political vacuum created by the societal 
collapse imagined in the first book.  The sequel places Lauren‘s notion of God in direct 
conflict with traditional Christian concept of God‘s unchanging nature.  Throughout, 
Lauren is clearly a messianic figure, but insofar as she does not call for a return to an 
unchanging deity, her religiosity is clearly different from the Judeo-Christian tradition 
with which it is so strikingly contrasted.  The flexibility of a shapeable God gives her 
religion an air of the postethnic; its multicultural pragmatism has appealed to many 
readers and critics.  But, as we shall see, pragmatism and racial diversity does not mean 
that the Parable books offers a thoroughly postethnic idea of the prophetic or the future. 
Both Parable novels can be contextualized in several closely related traditions.  
Set in an apocalyptic future of ecological, economic, and social catastrophe, when global 
communications have broken down and small communities work with simple technology, 
the novels resemble collapse narratives such as Kunstler‘s World Made by Hand or 
Richard Heinberg‘s ―Letter from the Future‖ chapter in Peak Everything.  The Parable 
novels can also be placed, along with Butler‘s other fiction, at the juncture of African 
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American literature, women‘s literature, and the fantastic: Kindred is a time-travel 
narrative that comments on the legacy or memory of slavery in ways that have garnered 
comparison to Morrison‘s Beloved; Fledgling is a vampire story in which supernatural 
otherness is used to comment on racial othering; Wildseed uses the story of a shape 
shifter to meditate on the historical transformation of African peoples transported, 
converted, and changed at the hands of an Other.  The racial and gendered reading of the 
Parables, however, is not obviously suggested by the novels themselves, except in the 
surface details of Lauren‘s race and gender.  As we will note, the novels do touch on 
racism and misogyny in passing, but their deeper concern is the nature of change, the 
progress of revolution, and the uses of political power, especially by a charismatic leader. 
Thus, although the Parable novels are not incommensurate with Butler‘s 
continued exploration of the themes of feminism, African American literature, and the 
fantastic, they are not emblematic of it either.  Frances Smith Foster observes that 
Butler‘s early novels are not focused on race or racial conflict (1982, 42) and may not 
have feminist assumptions at their core (38).  Both Jerry Philips (2002) and Gregory 
Hampton (2005) see the Parable novels, Sower especially, as a critique of deteriorating 
social conditions under the consumerist systems of late capitalism, which marks racial 
and gender differences with commoditization–slavery and prostitution.  The books would 
be interesting if they did no more than raise these issues; certainly, gender domination 
has been richly addressed in the feminist utopian tradition, most notably in Gillman‘s 
Herland and Atwood‘s The Handmaid’s Tale.  I have already mentioned the importance 
of African American utopianism in Morrison‘s novels.  Yet the Parable novels are not 
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only conventional utopian/dystopian texts or conventional utopian treatments of 
feminism or race.  Through the use of multiple internal texts, Talents, in particular, 
displaces the utopian concern away from either race or gender identity alone.  Moreover, 
Butler‘s Earthseed would seem to make a religious belief out of the postethinic utopian 
imagination of cyclical, perennially changing chronologies that belong to more than one 
narrative point of view.  In summation, Butler‘s contribution to postethnic future-writing 
is a particular ideology of change. 
Lauren‘s dogma that ―God is Change‖ can be seen as the deification of postethnic 
―empty time‖ in a radical break with the medieval belief in ―full time‖ already 
determined by a creator.  Because Lauren exhorts responsiveness and adaptability, 
Earthseed appeals to pragmatists.  Nevertheless, while the novels reject the ideology of 
an unchanging god in favor of postethnic, pragmatic engagement with empty time, 
Lauren does not see fit to let this time remain empty.  She fills it with a prophecy that 
humanity, as ―Earthseed,‖ is destined to spread to other worlds.  The logic of this 
assertion a major challenge for understanding what the novel might say about living in a 
world with a future.  Living, in the Parable novels, is explicitly defined in terms of 
belonging to a series of organized, centrally defined communities: Lauren‘s fortified 
neighborhood, the Acorn collective, ―Camp Christian‖ and so on.  We may begin, then, 
by observing that the novel makes no postethnic assumptions about the inoperative 
community.  As it turns out, Butler strongly indicates that a pragmatic community, as a 
community of problem-solvers, needs a problem to solve, a work to do.  This valuable 
assertion, which we need not agree with, helps distinguish a pragmatic community from 
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an inoperative one.  A pragmatic community has a particular ethnic location in relation to 
particular problems—in Butler‘s novels, the problem of surviving to reach the stars.  This 
is not a postethnic inoperative community, which would not be centered on communal 
oeuvre.  This does not mean that an inoperative community is not pragmatic, only that the 
problems it addresses are of a different order. 
The importance of ―big solutions,‖ and the recurring religious language in future-
writing, is related to the apocalyptic (revelatory and eschatological) traditions.  The 
Exodus narrative of escape from slavery and the Gospel promise of salvation in the 
hereafter have been a major part of American and African American culture, but in 
different ways.  Kimberly Ruffin observes that the Bible ―is perhaps the most preeminent 
written text in African-American culture‖(2005, 89) and that Butler‘s ―biblical re-
writing‖ (88) resembles the critical assessment of Christianity found in African American 
authors such as Honorée Fanonne Jeffers, Opal Moore, and, perhaps most notably, Alice 
Walker.  In Ruffin‘s reading, Butler‘s ―Afrofuturist‖ story fuses science and religion, a 
move which ―comes from Lauren‘s union of critical thought, scribal literacy, and 
religious commitment‖ (95).  Although Lauren ironically uses the Bible as a writing desk 
to pen her own Earthseed verses, the novels imagine ―a nexus of religion, critical 
thinking, and scientific progress [that] suggests that ancient texts, with new readings, can 
become the framework for human survival‖ (99).  Thus, according to Ruffin, although the 
Parables imagine the rejection of a certain kind of religion, they do not reject religion or 
religious tradition per se.  This is the also the conclusion of Donna Spalding Andréolle, 
who characterizes Earthseed as a reformist rather than revolutionary movement, 
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―seek[ing] to overthrow those Judeo-Christian values which have lead to intolerance and 
oppression, and to reinstate a humanitarian faith which returns to Christ‘s teachings for 
inspiration‖ (2001, 121).  That Butler needs to uncouple oppression from 
humanitarianism begs the question of why the two are joined together at all: in 
Andréolle‘s reading, this is the cultural legacy of ―the positive influence of Christian 
fundamentalism—and more generally speaking Judeo-Christian values—on New World 
order as implemented in the original Puritan project‖ (114).  The Parable novels imagine 
the power of one religious faith—ethnocentric in is singularity— to rebuild and reform 
society in apocalyptic times, an image that echoes the Puritan‘s vision of the new world 
and ―reinterat[es] Manifest Destiny‖(121).  According to Ruffin and Andréolle, then, the 
Parable novels do not reject the mono-religious traditions of either African American 
Christianity or Puritan Christianity.  While the former may be regarded as the Christianity 
of emancipation from sin and suffering, and the later the Christianity of order and 
righteousness, both of these Christianities are, importantly, monoteleological myths.  
They see the story of human life as one story, going from one beginning to one end.  
Whether the goal is salvation or righteousness makes little difference, since in both cases 
there is only one truth and only one position that can speak the truth.  The Parable 
novels, I propose, attempt to contradict this monotheistic mythology by reimagining an 
God as change.  Change, as Popper shows extensively, is inimical to Platonic notions of 
the unchanged Ideal.  In some ways, Butler is attempting to make the principle of rupture, 
the utopian ―new,‖ in a fundamental status quo.  I write ―attempt‖ because, as the critics 
above illustrate, the novel‘s success in negotiating this paradox is ambivalent at best. 
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This mixed result arises from differences within the imagined Earthseed religion 
and between the two novels, Sower and Talents.  Earthseed contains two major 
components, and their articulation in Sower raises important questions about postethnic 
pragmatism, empathy, and eco-mindedness.  First, the central tenant of Earthseed is the 
often-repeated formula ―God is Change.‖  In Sower, Lauren develops this creed in 
response to life in small fortified neighborhood: she grows up watching people negotiate 
cooperation for survival.  From her singular point of view, survival is cooperation, and 
only intelligent and resourceful being-with can cope with the ongoing threat of chaotic 
destruction.  That is, problems have to be solved from multiple points of view, 
postethnically.  Lauren then creates Earthseed as her particular expression of her point of 
view: the world will change, and it is a person‘s responsibility to survive change as 
successfully as he or she can.  Emphasis changeability and responsibility can remind us 
of the Native cultural expressions of Silko and Vizenor, but the gospel of change also has 
connectivist implications, as seen in its principle expression: 
All that you touch  
You Change 
All that you Change 
Changes you. 
The only lasting truth 
is Change 
God 
Is Change 
I call this connectivist in the spirit of Powers‘s revelation that ―each metaphor already 
modeled the modeler that pasted it together‖ (1995, 328).  In the doctrine of Earthseed, 
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people are both the product and the producers of change.  This dogma creates interesting 
consequences, both for the characters in the novel (bringing them into conflict with 
mainstream religion) and for the reader.  Earthseed‘s God is not an object of worship, but 
rather a kind of final term or ultimate fact that must be faced.  The purpose of the faith is 
not to worship this truth, but rather to cope successfully with it: 
 We do not worship God. 
We perceive and attend God. 
We learn from God. 
With forethought and work, 
We shape God. 
In the end, we yield to God. 
We adapt and endure, 
For we are Earthseed, 
And God is Change. 
So, the paradox here is that Butler is imagining a world where many different people 
have to work together postethnically, but at the same time she is welding them together as 
a single faith community, an operative community that sees change in a particular way, 
Lauren‘s way. 
In previous chapters, we have seen that a non-teleological imagination values a 
free, compassionate connection among people; Earthseed verses such as the one above 
extend this value in the direction of the future.  A non-teleological sense of the past 
means understanding the world as something other than the product of historical 
determinism: Roth‘s young protagonist Philip learned that, in such a world, what matters 
is paying attention to others and the formation of a certain kind of community in which 
each member could be a ―prosthesis‖ to another.  Likewise, a sense of the present that 
sees the world as wonderfully indeterminate – available for all kinds of imaginative 
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mapping—comes to value human freedom and love.  Earthseed suggests that, when this 
point of view contemplates the future, it would do so not in terms of fated progress or 
decline, but in the terms of adaptation and endurance.  Combining ―hyperempathy‖ and a 
pragmatic gospel of change, Lauren cultivates a particular kind community, which we 
may admire, but which achieves ethno-racial diversity, and other pragmatic inclusivities, 
through the communal consolidation of an single ethno-religious position.  Her 
―survivalist cult‖ seems to fulfill the ideas of postethnic, pragmatic sentimentalism, but 
only when we limit our conception of ethnicity to particular kinds of identities.  There is 
certainly something attractive about a religious doctrine that teaches people to survive 
together cooperatively with the widest possible notion of who is eligible to join the 
community.  But Earthseed can only do that by operationalizing the community in 
service, albeit voluntary, to Lauren‘s prophetic vision. 
As future-writing, the Parable novels embrace of evolutionary change presents 
radically different articulation of how people move forward in time, but they still insist 
on the need to know what kind of future humanity ought to work towards.  Earthseed 
defines the terms for success in advance, specifically as the biological dispersal of human 
life to other worlds, a project that not only survivalist but also expansionist.  This is not, 
on its face, an imperial aspiration, like the galactic empires that appear many science 
fiction stories.  Rather, it is presented as an evolutionary drive: to migrate, to expand, to 
continue on.  We might ask, though, if aside from the (arguable) distinction between the 
mind‘s will and the body‘s drives, is there any difference between being an imperial 
conquistador and an invasive species? That this question remains unexamined in the 
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novel only makes it more imperative to readers who admire Earthseed as a ―practical‖ 
ideology.  It is certainly important that the novel represents humanity as a species that 
moves forward in time according the laws of evolutionary biology rather than 
eschatological destiny.  The ―naturalizing‖ of people is one step towards postethnicity in 
the form of a post-anthropocentrism.  But the deeper implications of the novel‘s 
expansionism and purposefulness also need to be critiqued.  
Butler‘s novels help us begin to see how future-writing imagines the world in 
terms of the passage of time rather than the unfolding of history, but in Earthseed, the 
purpose of humanity is still the accomplishment of a great work, albeit a biological rather 
than divine one.  Thus the question of moving into the future, accomplishing the work of 
biology or a divine plan (or both), replaces the question of achieving humanity.  In this 
way, any critique of the future is also a critique of the criteria for ―becoming human.‖  
The postethnic identity here pushes past the merely nonracist—although this has been 
important—to insist on the posthuman.  The question of a ―destiny among the stars‖ 
returns as a question of interiority: what, if anything, are human beings destined to 
become, as individuals and/or as a collective?  Butler creates an opening for this critique 
of Earthseed in the multi-textuality of Parable of Talents. By giving the story from 
multiple points of view, Talents comes closer than Parables to a thoroughly postethnic 
utopianism.  Asha‘s critique of her mother‘s ―positive obsession‖ shows the ways in 
which commitment to a supreme mission is not easily reconcilable with commitments to 
individual people. 
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Talents works through, with no subtlety, the clash between believers in a timeless, 
destiny-making God and believers in ―God is Change.‖  It is clear that, for Butler, the 
worship of a destiny-making God brings about oppression tending toward totalitarianism, 
while the worship of God as Change occasions personal liberty and interpersonal 
cooperation because these are the best ways to successfully cope with ongoing change. 
The core issue in Talents is the conflict between Lauren‘s ―paganism‖ and the belief in 
the traditional unchanging God of the Christian doxology.  The Warner Books edition 
describes the novel‘s antagonists as ―violent bigots who consider the mere existence of a 
black female leader a threat.‖  At best, this overstates minimal emphasis on race and 
gender in the text itself.  More accurately, Lauren‘s enemy is the ―Christian America‖ 
movement, and it is clear that, while racism and sexism are part of the issue, the real 
―ethnic‖ conflict is between two religions. Even though reviews of Talents claim that the 
novel is about racial conflict, Butler herself suggests that it is more about a critique of 
Lauren as a revolutionary zealot.  In an interview for the reading group guide included 
with the Warner Books edition, she writes that ―I hadn‘t liked Olamina when I began 
Parable of the Sower because in order for her to do what she was bound to do, she had to 
be a power-seeker and it took me a long time to get over the idea that anyone seeking 
power probably shouldn‘t have it‖ (410).  By the time she finished the novel, she had 
grown so attached to the stasis of its resolution that she had difficulty introducing further 
change in the sequel, even though change is the main tenant of Earthseed.  The pull 
towards stasis and resolution, inherent in the novel as a narrative form, frustrated the 
continuation of the story until Butler began writing a pastiche of several texts presided 
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over by Lauren‘s daughter.  These  texts include Lauren‘s journals, but also the writings 
of her husband and brother as well as Asha‘s commentary.  Ruffin sees this dialogic form 
as key to the Parable’s integrity, ―invok[ing] the kind of critical literacy that Lauren 
wishes to cultivate with her religion… [i]t encourages readers to see Lauren as a religious 
leader with human shortcoming and invites multiple interpretations of events‖ (98).  
While this kind of critical literacy works well with the anarcho-syndicalist tone of 
Lauren‘s Acorn community, and could potentially give rise to a dialogic postethnicity, it 
is not clear to me that Talents focuses on ―multiple interpretations of events‖ in a way 
that brings into question the Earthseed‘s particular and singular ideal for human destiny. 
Lauren‘s principle antagonist and interlocutor in Talents is her brother Mark.  In 
many ways, the novel can be seen as a series of pseudo-Socratic dialogs on Earthseed, 
interspersed with action and adventure sequences.  This structure is in keeping with many 
utopian novels in which we are presented with discursive arguments for this or that 
utopian ideal. Siding with the ―Christian Americans,‖ Mark rejects Lauren not because 
she is a women preacher (although he does repeat misogynistic Pauline doctrine), and 
clearly not because of her race.  Rather, it is Lauren‘s ―paganism‖ and the teaching of 
Earthseed that are offensive to the ―CA‖ status quo. 
The important issue here is not whether destiny is set by god or human beings; 
likewise it makes little difference if the philosopher king uses religious propaganda, such 
as The Myth of Blood and Soil, or if he proposes an ideal in secular terms.  The sense 
having a greater purpose or destiny at all predisposes us to make certain kinds of 
judgments.  Having an already determined ideal located in the future means having a 
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future-written criterion by which to judge the unfolding present.  A destiny is a metric for 
temporal success for failure, and as an enunciated ideal—because it must have been 
enunciated by someone in particular—destinies are ethnic projects of the interests or 
intentions of one particular way of seeing the world.  Moreover, any destiny is a 
teleological story, one that narrates the future from one perspective, the same way that 
teleological historiography narrates the past.  In the Parable novels, Lauren‘s Earthseed 
destiny is recommended because it focuses human behavior, categorically, on a species-
wide, long-term goal.  In doing so, it requires a welcome tolerance and cooperation; wars 
and oppressive governments are not denounced as evil, but rather as inimical to achieving 
the unified ideal. 
Lauren argues that people need a destiny, a ―positive obsession,‖ to structure their 
behavior, and Earthseed is desirable because it structures this behavior in a productive 
way.  This circular argument holds that we need to behave virtuously (with empathy, 
critical thinking, democracy) in order to reach the stars, at the same time we need to try to 
reach the stars so that we will have a reason behave virtuously.  This begs the question: 
do we have to have a temporal narrative, with a goal located in the future, in order to 
behave ourselves?  Already we have examined novels that question whether human 
beings need a sense of themselves as the intended products of history, and we found a 
particular kind of ethics in the postethnic imagination of historical contingency, accident, 
and possibility.  We have also asked if human beings need fixed, ascribed ethnic location 
in the world, and we found that avowing one‘s own subjective map of the world is as 
important as being attentive to objective material circumstances.  The question now, 
204 
raised all along and given focus in Butler‘s novels, is whether people need a singular 
sense of what the future ought to be in order to live successfully into it. 
Earthseed challenges some aspects of traditional destiny stories by revoking the 
destiny-making god, putting in its place ―change,‖ or temporal contingency and ongoing 
possibility.  But the novels do not challenge the notion that people need someone to 
imagine a future ideal so that we know what to strive for.  Thus these stories are not 
completely ―postethnic‖ because they do not challenge the sufficiency of a single position 
to address all the risks, needs, and problems that face human communities.  Lauren tells 
her followers what the future should look like.  Certainly, her ethics are attractively 
pragmatic and libertarian, but these virtues serve of a totalitarian obsession.  An 
alternative kind of prophecy would speak to human behavior not out of a known future, 
but out of the unknown.  The future would be left ―wide-open,‖ available for any arrivant 
and not foretold by a prophet who would be necessarily grounded in a particular ethnic 
tradition.  This more radical kind of future-writing might turn on a satirical inversion, 
presenting a future of progress that is in fact decline, or decline that is in fact progress.  In 
Galapagos, Kurt Vonnegut writes that the best future for humankind in terms of survival 
and happiness might not be the expansionist march of progress that Lauren‘s Earthseed 
proclaims.  Rather, as we shall see in the next chapter, Vonnegut‘s novel imagines that 
humans would do very well do leave their cerebral and celestial aspirations aside.  His 
future humanity dwindles instead of increasing, and fishes among the rocks of a small 
island rather than taking root among the stars. 
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Chapter 2: Kurt Vonnegut: Getting Through This Thing, Whatever It Is 
―And how should we behave during this Apocalypse?  We should be unusually kind to 
one another, certainly, But we should also stop being so serious.  Jokes help a lot.‖ 
—Kurt Vonnegut at Clowes Hall, Indianapolis, April 
27, 2007 (Armageddon in Retrospect, 2008, 31) 
Kurt Vonnegut‘s Galapagos was first published in 1985, four years before the end 
of the Cold War.  I include it here, in a study of post-Cold War utopian discourse in 
American fiction, with the following defense.  First, Galapagos imagines a catastrophe 
that annihilates the human race, and it is not the only Vonnegut novel to do so during the 
1970s and 80s.  This fear is an inflection of the threat of nuclear war that shadowed the 
second half the twentieth century.  Although we are still rightly concerned about the 
proliferation of nuclear arms and terrorist acquisition of fissile material, we are less and 
less haunted by the possibility of everything going suddenly dark.  That version of the 
apocalypse is germane to the time of the Cold War; and so, in an indirect sense, 
Galapagos is the imagination of post-Cold War life if not a novel of the post-Cold War 
era.  Second, and more substantially, Galapagos is one of Vonnegut‘s final novels, 
followed by Bluebeard (1987), Hocus Pocus (1990), and Timequake (1997).  It represents 
a ripening of his humanist position, one that he did not contradict through the remainder 
of his writing career—mostly speeches, essays, and short story collections—until his 
death in 2007.  That position was vitally outspoken against the hubris of the post-Cold 
War ―New World Order,‖ and harshly critical of the ―neo-Conservative‖ position in 
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American politics.  It is a voice that offers an important contrast to Butler‘s version of the 
future and an important piece of evidence for the emergence of a postethnic utopianism in 
American literature and culture in the wake of the Cold War.  That Vonnegut grew 
disgusted with status quo and began imagining a way past it as early as 1985 only means 
he was ahead of the game, as were many other writers in the counterculture and new 
wave movements.  
A million years in the future of Kurt Vonnegut‘s Galapagos, human beings have 
evolved into a seal-like ―fisherfolk‖ whose habitat is limited to the small island featured 
in Darwin‘s On the Origin of Species.  Like all the novels in this section, the postethnic 
here is inflected in the posthuman, although more literally and absurdly so.  The novel‘s 
proposal that human beings might be better adapted to survival as marine mammals is, of 
course, satiric on the order of Swift‘s proposal to eat Irish infants.  An imaginary future in 
which people turn into seals, for the better, suggests that what is at stake in how we view 
the future is closely related then to how we value identity as human or biological beings.  
In Butler‘s Parable novels, Lauren redefines human life as ―Earthseed,‖ a species whose 
biological purpose is to ―take root among the stars.‖  The Parable novels do not question 
whether humanity is good for the universe; they only propose that human beings can be 
effectively united in community by embracing an evolutionary drive to survive through 
expansion.  In other words, they do not challenge the ethical necessity of an ethnocentric 
(anthropocentric) vision of the future in which human civilization works toward a greater 
expression of itself.  In short, Lauren‘s philosophy is expansionist and domineering.
5
  
Vonnegut‘s prophetic voice, like Butler‘s, hinges on an the articulation of humanity as a 
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biological species in a world that changes constantly, but Vonnegut adheres to a non-
anthropocentric view of a mechanistic universe in which biological life functions 
according to the laws of natural selection.  The fixity of time would be the subject not 
only of Galapagos, but also Timequake, the last novel published in his lifetime. While 
Earthseed is survivalist and expansionist, Vonnegut‘s future-writing decouples survival 
from any selfish progressivism.   
The rejection of a grand intergalactic future is not limited only to Galapagos: as 
Donald Morse points out in the context of Galapagos and Bluebeard, Vonnegut‘s novels 
contradict the norms of science fiction with ―a resounding no! to any such unearthly faith 
in populating future worlds‖ (1997, 293)  But even this misanthropic ―no‖ is 
paradoxically affirmative of human communication.  One does not write for people one 
does not care about.  Like the trickster performances of Vizenor and Peña, the ―writing‖ 
of Galapagos is a kind of a slapstick gag: the narrating ghost of Leon Trout claims ―I 
have written these words in air—with the tip of the index finger of my left hand, which is 
also air‖ (318).  The novel is ostensibly the gesture of a ghost a million years in the 
future.
6
  The novel, then , is a left-handed, ―sinister‖ story that can‘t exist in any number 
of ways: it is, according to Peter Freese, ―a hoax, a verbal game built on the premise of its 
very impossibility, and a fictional exercise in alternative history that implicitly denies its 
constitutive thesis by storifying it‖ (1995, 170).  Comparing Vonnegut‘s apocalyptic 
imagination with Bernard Malamud, Freese notes that the act of writing the apocalypse, 
no matter the tone or attitude of the story, marks a faith in human beings even in the face 
of ultimate disaster.  ―By existing and being an imaginative tale,‖ writes Freese, ―the 
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novel articulates faith in the redemptive power of language and the sense-making ability 
of story-telling, thereby affirming the distinctive faculties of man that it so ironically 
purports to get rid of‖ (171).  In other words, the novelist has written a very clever novel, 
indirectly pointing out that humans are far too clever and would be better off as much-
less-clever marine mammals.  Ultimately, however, Vonnegut must be critiquing one 
kind of intelligence, the kind that builds and deploys firebombs, while at the same time 
recommending another, the kind that writes left-handed novels. 
Vonnegut comments significantly on Swiftian misanthropy and satirical 
indirectness in a rejected introduction to Gulliver’s Travels, included in Palm Sunday.  
He makes a belated response to a teacher who observed that  
…a person has to be at least a little insane to harp on human disgustingness as 
much as Swift does.  And Swift does harp on it long before Gulliver has gone 
insane.  I would tell that teacher now… that his harping is so relentless that it 
becomes ridiculous, and is meant to be ridiculous, and that Swift is teaching us a 
lesson almost as important as the one about our not being lambs: that our 
readiness to feel disgust for ourselves and others is not, perhaps, the guardian of 
civilization so many of us imagine it to be. Disgust, in fact, may be the chief 
damager of our reason, of our common sense–may make use act against our own 
best interests, may make us insane. (1981, 237)  
Vonnegut goes on to speculate that many of the atrocities of the twentieth century could 
be related to an over-enthusiasm for feeling disgust for certain kinds of people.  In this 
model, it is the ethno-parochialism of disgust as well as stingy solidarity that harms 
human community.  Although the protagonists and narrators of Vonnegut‘s future-
writings mock the ultimate silliness of humankind‘s pretensions and cruelty, they also 
speak to the absolute necessity of and capacity for human kindness and love.  According 
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to these novels, people are disgusting especially when they indulge self-righteous disgust: 
to be a less hateful person, they say, one must start by loving other people.  This openness 
to others, in postethnic terms, would be founded on an internal recognition of the 
limitedness, exposure, and fragmentation of being. 
This returns us to question of what it means to be human in the context of the 
―end‖ of humanity.  Vonnegut is thoroughly misanthropic towards bomb-making 
humanity, and yet deeply committed to novel-reading humanity.  The problem, it seems, 
is the humanity of soulless technological innovation and grand historical purpose: the 
fault lies not with the bomb, but with the bomb-maker.  ―We may prefer to blame our 
nuclear predicament on an unbridled technology‖ writes Daniel Zins, ―but Vonnegut 
suggests that it is out failure to be fully human that especially endangers us‖ (1986, 171).  
This bifurcation appears in Player Piano, his 1952 novel in which people are replaced by 
autonomous processes and machinery to the extent that humanity is rendered redundant 
and unnecessary to its own projects.  Sirens of Titan (1959) grants its hero a perspective 
on humanity that might come from the revelation of an entirely mechanistic universe in 
which all events are fixed.  The destruction of the world by ice at the end of Cat’s Cradle 
(1963) goes hand in hand with the joke inscribed in the title: there is neither cat nor 
cradle in the familiar pattern of string and fingers.  His most celebrated novel, 
Slaughterhouse 5 (1969) includes the ―accidental‖ destruction of the universe by an alien 
test pilot, light-years away from not only the earth but from the events of the novel.  In 
these future-writings, humanity is not essential to the universe, nor are the purposes of the 
universe necessary to being human. 
210 
But the end of humanity is different in the later novels, of which Galapagos is the 
first.  The Cold War nihilism of sudden, ridiculous doom is replaced with a posthuman 
survival, which recalls Vizenor‘s postindian survivance not only syntactically but also in 
its unexpected, tricky representation.  The slapstick endings of ―humanity‖ only serves to 
show life is not about identity, or, in other worlds, our lives may be lived postethnically.  
The end we must live for is not at the end of time, but rather the end (what Nancy would 
call that limit) of our own point of view where we interact with the others around us, in 
proximity. Whereas Butler‘s novels replace grand divine destiny with an equally grand 
evolutionary one, Vonnegut‘s imagination of the future turns more often towards the 
pathetic limits and painful exposures of human life.  These are apocalyptic whimpers 
instead of eschatological culminations.  In other words, in the postethnic future that 
Vonnegut writes, not only is there no sentient divinity guiding human destiny, there is 
also no ―lasting truth‖ that can be shaped, appealed to, or invoked as a criterion for good 
behavior.  There is no total Ideal that some may perceive and not others.  Vonnegut‘s 
view of the universe as contingent, vast, and utterly non-anthropocentric is more radical 
than Butler‘s vision of human evolutionary destiny, because Vonnegut‘s view of the 
future raises the question of how to live in the universe without a master plan.
7
 
It is not difficult to conclude that such novels express a despair produced by their 
materialist assumptions.  This is the critique of Galapagos by Gilbert McInnis, based on 
his observation that the novel replaces ―the mystery element of God‖ with ―the chance 
element in natural selection‖ (2005, 383).  McInnis objects to Vonnegut‘s ―evolutionary 
mythology‖ not because it embraces change, but rather because it validates the chance or 
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random nature of that change with desperate consequences: ―If the myth of chance is 
allowed to govern our beliefs, then there is no meaning to life‖ (386).  In this view, 
teleological meaning is a necessary condition for virtue.  There is no way to decide what 
counts as good behavior in the absence of any transcendent ideal goal: ―when the 
characters believe in the evolutionary mythology, they live according to it materialistic 
principles or the chance mechanism of natural selection‖ (385).  McInnis worries that 
human behavior will tend towards the amorality of animals if we adopt a world view that 
sees natural selection rather than God‘s plan as the shaping principle of human evolution.  
While he is absolutely right about Vonnegut‘s meaningless universe, the consequences 
for human behavior need not be so dire.  A rejection of anthropocentricism means a 
letting go of teleological myths of human creation and destiny.  It is postethnic insofar as 
most of those myths are ethnocentric productions.  The rejection of anthropocentricism 
can be expressed in the terms of a biological nondualism: for Vonnegut human beings 
live in exactly the same universe as everything else, governed by the same laws of 
physics and biology as all other matter.   
McInnis objects because he thinks that if we see ourselves as evolutionary 
creatures to whom only survival matters, sooner or later we stop caring for the weak and 
infirm.  He concludes that in Vonnegut‘s version of the universe ―the resulting moral 
order, making individual interest the supreme goal, negates human connectedness to a 
larger pattern or the human community‖ (390).  This seems so completely wrong on the 
face of it, given Vonnegut‘s ubiquitous affirmations of human solidarity, that it is hard 
initially for me to understand what McInnis is talking about.  I can only conclude that he 
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means Vonngut‘s universe does not contribute to the formation of an operative 
community, apparently the only kind of community McInnis conceives of.  This becomes 
clear when McInnis insists that ―Natural selection impels us to reduce all the workings of 
the universe to materialistic ends, so there can be no mention of ―spirit‖ or any 
teleological element in science per se‖ (396).  To the contrary, it is specifically for the 
rejection of teleology and ―spirituality‖ that Vonnegut writes, over and over, the 
accidental, absurd end of human kind as we know it.  It is very easy to see how a glut of 
such fantasies, which against a belief in divine purpose must seem like a riot of abject 
humiliation and failure, can be read as a utter lack of faith in humanity.  Again, this all 
depends on what we mean by humanity or human community.   For McInnis, the 
―workings of natural selection [are] hardly enough to keep a community together‖ (396), 
but this is true only of a certain kind of community.  We can stipulate that the workings 
of natural selection do not keep an operative community together.  But Vonnegut is not 
rejecting essential, teleological community in favor of abject meaninglessness.  Rather, 
his novels offer, in many ways, the alternative form of inoperative community that makes 
its own meaning despite (or even by) limitations in a material, contingent universe.  In 
this postethnic community, each individual finds their purpose not in the commitment to 
a future goal, but rather the commitment to those other individuals who presently 
surround her. 
In this way, Vonnegut‘s apocalyptic imagination contradicts future-writings that 
use teleological topics of decline or progress or imply essentialist or metaphysically 
foundational ideas of humankind or human community.  This is similar to contradictions 
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that we have seen previously, but Vonnegut‘s vision of humankind‘s place in time is very 
different from the view advanced by ―alternative histories‖ like Roth‘s and Chabon‘s.  In 
alternative history fiction, the work contradicts the notion of a grand historical narrative 
by imagining that things could be different, i.e. there is no narrative plan being unfolded.  
Vonnegut‘s view of time is the opposite: it is not that the sequence of events can unfold 
in any possible direction, but rather that all the events in all of history are already set in 
an unchangeable sequence of cause-and-effect.  In Sirens and Slaughterhouse and 
Timequake, Vonnegut creates a prophetic character who glimpses or experiences this 
unchangeable sequence of events.  Yet, several commentators have noted that part of the 
absurdity of Galapagos is that the survivors of human kind come together in random, 
accidental, or coincidental ways.  At first glance, the view of a universe in which 
accidents happen seems to be in conflict with the view of a universe in which everything 
that ever happens has already happened.  But, although Vonnegut does not, in his fiction, 
write a future of infinite possibility, neither does he suggest that the ―set‖ future amounts 
to a teleological progress.  In Vonnegut‘s fictionalizations of time, according to his 
recurring epigraph, ―all persons, living or dead, are purely coincidental.‖  What his 
imaginary set-in-stone universe contradicts or removes is not the question of chance and 
pointlessness, as would a doctrine such as Christian Predestination.  What it contradicts, 
instead, is the possibility of grand scheming, such as Butler imagines for Earthseed‘s 
manifesto.
8
  So, Vonnegut writes a future in which all ethnocentric blueprints are 
pointless because the death or survival of humanity, or even the end of the universe, 
cannot be affected by human intentions.   
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In the same way that Judith Butler‘s unaccountable self, Nancy‘s inoperative 
community, and Chakrabarty‘s community of proximity find ethical commitments in the 
lack of stable or foundational identity, Vonnegut‘s humility before the inhumanity of the 
material cosmos requires a compassion for all people who are likewise humbled.  
Because there is no god or grand design that might promise well-being, people have to 
promise this to each other.  For Vonnegut, the message of a mechanistic universe, in 
which human beings may survive or perish for no divine or metaphysical purpose, can be 
summed up as ―Help is not on the way‖ (Palm Sunday,184).  Which means, generally, 
that people will have to help each other.
9
  Even though many of his fictions suggest that 
human intention does not matter to the universe, Vonnegut affirms that the forms of 
community we engage in matter a great deal to human beings: ―Hitler and Lenin and 
some others…chose abominably, as we know.  It matters how we chose‖ (189).  And that 
choice is not already made for us, by a god or by utopian prophets, but rather must be 
made by individual people.  That individuality, in the wake of several disruptions to 
former concepts of identity, must now be thought through in postethnic terms.  
Communities no longer make or break utopia on the merits of their philosopher-prophets, 
but rather effect compassionate interventions in the spatial proximities, at the limits 
where each being comes into contact with others. 
A teleological narrative, either religious or scientific, usually appeals to us 
because it confers not only a romantic identity but also a dignity in a purpose located in 
the future.  Postethnic identity is not about dignity, but rather limitation, fragmentation, 
and exposure.  People who can commit to a master narrative do so in order to know 
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where they fit in the master plan.  Part of the absurdist humor –the trick or the joke—of 
Galapagos is the suggestion that our place in the grand scheme is as an intermediate form 
in the evolution of a seal.  This kind of reversal and comeuppance shows up again in 
Hocus Pocus (1990), in which a university professor is changed into a prisoner in a jail, 
and then the warden in a university converted to a prison.  Time may be fixed in these 
novels, but it is not a linear narrative.  But this cannot reduce the human beings in his 
fictions to meaningless pawns of causation because ,Vonnegut insists, people are not 
given dignity from knowing their place (ethnos) in a grand scheme: ―Giving dignity, the 
sort of dignity that is of some earthy use, anyway, is something that only people do. Or 
fail to do‖ (195).  It is the spontaneous presumption of dignity that leads to a 
compassionate imagination
10
 in ways similar to Butler‘s ―hyperempathy‖ syndrome and 
Nussbaum‘s emphasis on imaginative compassion.  In some ways, Vonnegut points to 
nothing more than an expanded form of survivalism, one informed not only by 
evolutionary but also ecological science.  Ecologically speaking, postethnicity sees 
human life as a single node in an interconnected web of living systems.  It may be that 
the purpose of life is no more than to live, and that empathy, cooperation, ―seeing 
dignity,‖ and so on are only the best ways for sentient beings to use their sentience in 
order to survive.  But pure survival, or life-for-itself, is not enough if it promises nothing 
more than irresponsible hedonism.  The limit of Vonnegut‘s satire, the place where the 
irony fatigues
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 and breaks, is that people cannot behave mindlessly (like seals) if we 
want to deal with the very complex challenges confronting human, or even planetary 
survival.  There needs to be commitment to the future that is not the same as knowing 
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how the future is supposed to turn out.  Although we might to well to stop thinking in 
terms of destinies, it would be perilous to refuse to consider the possibilities of risk or 
unintended consequences. 
Vonnegut‘s communities, then, are non-operative in the sense that they don‘t 
require any project or plan, any big-picture or long-term narrative.  In Galapagos, the 
posthuman community does not require sentience at all; we can read this as a satirical 
comment that sentience is only useful in certain ways, and superfluous or deadly in 
others.  The question, though, for we who do still have our big brains, is how to use 
sentience in a way that commits to the future in a way different from the sentience that 
would seek to determine the future.  The making of this commitment is the work of 
postethnic future-writing.  Any ethnocentric future-writing, even when the ethnic ―we‖ is 
drawn as widely as possible, cannot help but try to determine the future.  This is true even 
if for no other reason than that the ―we‖ tends to implicitly be restricted to ―we the 
living.‖  Any truly post-ethnic future would also have to be post-present.  That is, it 
would not be conceived only in terms of those alive today (not that we can even do that 
much).  Rather, it would be a future that is also imagined by those who have yet to come, 
those who are still arriving, the unmet and the unborn.  Vonnegut has us meet the seal-
people of the future only to shake us up, to remind us that we do not know who we may 
become. 
Is this radical openness, this unknowing, too exhausting for us to live with? Can 
we continue to care for one another while at the same time always leaving some open 
door, somewhere in our minds and our lives, for the arrivant?  Vonnegut says, as clearly 
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as I think any writer has, that caring for others is not a problem of epistemology.  He 
repeated, on several occasions, an aphorism that his son Mark wrote to him in a letter in 
1985.  He recounted it for the last time in his final speech in 2007: ―I asked Mark a while 
back what life was all about, since I didn‘t have a clue.  He said, ‗Dad, we are here to 
help each other get through this thing, whatever it is.‘  Whatever it is....  Not bad.  That 
one could be a keeper‖ (2007, 30-31).  Although in other speeches and novels, Vonnegut 
imagines a world in which all events past and future were already fixed, this is not the 
projection of a purposeful universe—and importantly, should not be considered a sincere 
statement of metaphysical belief, not from a jester like Vonnegut.  Imagining that the 
absurd, ridiculous, or accidental end of the universe is already given, Vonnegut is able to 
write about living without the comfort of committing to a guaranteed metaphysical 
project, an identity.  But although, in such a universe, right and wrong cannot be defined 
as they conventionally are, against a standard of judgment based on an monoethnic ideal, 
Vonnegut tells his readers that there are still criteria for knowing good actions from evil.  
We do not have to know ―what it is‖ or ―what it should be‖ to decide that we will help 
each other get through it.  Which says also, I think, that we do not have to know whom 
we are through and through, which is knowledge that Judith Butler convinces me we will 
never have.  Even if we do not have an identity project to strive for into the future, there 
is no reason that we cannot be each other‘s purposes.  Thus, Vonnegut‘s non-
anthropocentric universe is so only in the sense that human beings are not the center of 
creation.  It does not mean that human beings cannot be important for each other, the 
center of our concerns and affections. 
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Galapagos may be Vonnegut‘s most nuanced statement of this theme, since it 
writes a future of human happiness that depends on evolving away from certain human 
qualities.  The best hope for human beings, in the novel‘s satiric logic, is to stop being 
human.  Natural selection depends on the development of durable mutations, and 
Galapagos plays with the idea that the evil in human beings is less durable than the good.  
It is, of course, not serious to think that we would be better off as marine mammals.  But 
it is the shock and absurdity of this non-serious vision that makes it effective as a 
postethnic utopia.  Whereas Butler‘s Parable novels participate in the prophetic 
exhortation to an ideal, Vonnegut‘s wacky impossible apocalypses make use of 
prophecy‘s penchant for stunts and showmanship.  Both Butler and Vonnegut prophesy a 
need for human beings to get along together.  Although each has some non-postethnic 
traces, both writers empty the future in one way or another.  In any case, the postethnic 
cannot itself be a particular program, only a diversity of programs.  Butler‘s fills in an 
empty future with a celestial agenda, composed in the circular logic of a galactic destiny.  
Vonnegut, on the other hand, pictures an empty future through the conviction that human 
kind does not matter at all to the universe, and so the only thing that we can commit to is 
each other.  Both writers develop an ethos of compassion/empathy and pragmatism, albeit 
for very different reasons, by creating ―new‖ futures to replace the old, familiar, 
ethnocentric narratives of apocalypse.  To round out our examples of postethnic utopia, 
though, we should consider future-writing less connected to actuality.  After all, the 
postethnic imagination of the future cannot be limited to speculating on the effects of 
current causes, because this only goes so far in opening up the future to what cannot be 
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anticipated.  Because fragmentation and opacity are, as I argued in the introduction, 
important characteristics of the postethinic utopia, the postethnic future must exceed 
connections to the known by suggesting the potential arrival of something that none of us 
sees coming.  In other words, it sometimes requires a utopian mode that is closer to the 
fairy tale than science fiction.  Such is the mode of Le Guin, who, we shall see, is also 
committed to human compassion, yet in a way distinguishable from both Butler and 
Vonnegut. 
Chapter 3: Ursula K. Le Guin: The Ecology of Soulmaking 
If one is a stickler for detail and ―continuity,‖ as many fans of fantasy and science 
fiction tend to be, then Le Guin‘s science fiction is not as ―fairy tale‖ in nature as, for 
example, Star Wars, which bears no relation to the actual planet earth or human history.  
The ―Hainish cycle,‖ as most of her science fiction has come to be called, is set in a 
consistent imaginary universe that is connected, especially in early novels, to our planet 
Earth.  Most of the novels, however, are set on distant and very different worlds, either 
populated by or in contact with human beings who were planted throughout the galaxy by 
a common ancestral race, the Hainish.  More exactly, the ancestors of the Hainish did the 
seeding, and in the time of the novels, Hainish Historians work to rediscover the various 
colonies and civilizations their ancestors fostered.  To this end, the Hainish establish a 
cooperative, loosely structured group called ―the Ekumen.‖  The notion of an 
interplanetary government is a familiar science fiction trope, most recognizable in Star 
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Trek‘s ―Federation.‖  The Ekumen, however, is distinguished by a particular kind of 
political imagination based on egalitarian curiosity.  It is this curiosity, I propose, that 
makes the ecumenical future a sufficient cause for committing to the unknown-to-come.  
Le Guin considers, with more deliberation than is widely appreciated, the effects that the 
vastness of time and space might have on the ideology of a very old race like the Hainish.  
By considering several works from the Hainish Cycle, we can see that such fantastic 
future-writing can do prophetic work similar to, yet importantly different from, novels 
such as Butler‘s and Vonnegut‘s 
As I mentioned briefly at the beginning of part three, the dating of Le Guin‘s 
fiction requires some comment.  The main body of the Hainish novels are written during 
the 1960s and 70s.  Many of these, and especially The Dispossessed, are cited by Tom 
Moylan as examples of a then-new critical utopianism.  While I will mention some of the 
pre-1989 novels in this chapter, my ultimate focus is an overlook trio of stories in the 
1994 collection Fisherman of the Inland Sea.  These ―churten‖ stories deal with the ways 
in which we require interactions with others to form a working sense of the world around 
us.   These interactions, seen in the Hainish cycle as a whole, are thought to take place in 
a loose confederation of open-ended affiliations, a postethnic ecumenicalism.  It is worth 
noting that Le Guin last added to the Hainish cycle in 2000 with The Telling. 
By focusing on the Hainish stories, I am setting aside other branches of Le Guin‘s 
prolific writing.  There is the fantasy branch, the Earthsea novels, and the ―teaching 
stories,‖ a series of fabular young adult novels including Gifts and Powers.  There are 
several conventional literary works, often called her ―California Fiction,‖ and at least one 
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widely regarded performance poem.  Le Guin‘s writing, as a whole, repays attention to its 
remarkably consistent eco-feminist ethos, but it is her science fiction that offers the best 
expression of how this ethos confronts time, space, and human community. Like Octavia 
Butler, Le Guin has often been noticed as a writer who uses the ―metaphors‖ of fantasy 
and science fiction to articulate a feminist critique or project.  In several essays, Le Guin 
makes it clear that her project aligns with feminism in several integral ways.  But it seems 
clear to me that the Hainish novels have done the most to systematically work through 
multiple categories of identity, rather than remaining focused on gender.  Le Guin‘s 
future-writings interpolate a community of postethnic kinship, committed to human well-
being, that draws its energies from the very lack of a knowable, transcendent human 
nature. 
Le Guin‘s fiction has often explored the importance of dreaming, especially the 
ways in which the ability to dream unreal things marks an ability to change things as they 
really are.  We have already seen the importance of imaginary spaces to the living 
occupation of actual spaces.  The places we live in are as much imaginary as they are 
actual: out homes are both brick-and-mortar and the beliefs we have about them.  One 
early novel, the Lathe of Heaven, is a prolonged meditation on this very theme.  In that 
story, George Orr discovers that his dreams have the power to change reality.  But this 
discovery only occurs when Orr falls under the influence of his psychiatrist, who can 
direct Orr‘s dreams with hypnotic suggestions.  As Lathe follows the development and 
exchange of many possible worlds, Le Guin is able to comment on the futility of utopian 
scheming that uses manipulative or coercive means.  It is this rejection of the 
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masterminded utopia that Jameson cites as an example of the impossibility of imagining 
utopia at all (2005, 293-4). 
The power of dreaming is also invoked, and theorized, in The Word for the World 
is Forrest, which tells of the colonization of the Athsheans—short, green, furry human 
beings—by Terrans, humans from earth.  Aside from the color and stature of the ―aliens,‖ 
the general storyline of ecological exploitation and native insurgency is echoed in the 
2009 film Avatar.  One difference, which will become important to Le Guin‘s postethnic 
ecumenicalism, is that the little green Athsheans are not entirely nonhuman.  They are a 
very distant, divergently evolved product of the Hainish diaspora.  Before their contact 
with Terrans, the Athshean society has no interpersonal violence.  Given their nonviolent 
culture, they suffer passively under colonial domination by Terran settlers who harvest 
their planets ubiquitous forest to supply lumber to an ecologically desolated Earth.  The 
novel tells the story of a successful violent uprising lead by an Athshean named Selver, 
who is often referred to as a ―god,‖ although the novel does not make clear until the end 
what counts as a god in this particular culture.  At the end of the story, as the Terrans 
depart, an ambassador from the Ekumen asks Selver why incidents of murder have 
appeared for the first time in Athshean society.  He replies, 
Sometimes a god comes… He brings a new way to do a thing, or a new thing to 
be done. A new kind of singing, or a new kind of death. He brings this across the 
bridge from the dream-time to the world-time. When he has done this, it is done.  
You cannot take things that exist in the world and try to drive them back into the 
dream, to hold them inside the dream with walls and pretenses.  That is insanity. 
What is, is. There is no use pretending now, that we do not know how to kill one 
another. (168) 
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This statement offers an interesting gloss on the importance of the imagination and 
pragmatism to effecting social change and also facing up to those effects.  Selver‘s 
―dream time,‖ much like the dreaming in Lathe, is the imaginative ―world‖ of fiction but 
also the ―imagined relationships to lived conditions‖ of Althusserian ideology.  In terms 
of Scarry‘s thesis that the imagination counterbalances pain, something must be needed 
to ease human pain before it is shaped in the mind‘s dreaming imagination and artificed 
into actuality.  Once made actual, in the world-time, this new thing becomes an ongoing 
part of human action and interaction.  To appreciate the ―reality‖ of dreams does not 
mean losing perspective on the reality of the world, it only means having a nondualist 
model of reality in which dreaming is a ―real‖ thing that ―real‖ people do.  Selver‘s 
speech insists that dreaming is a real and crucial part of how newness enters the world.  
The interaction between the dream-time and the world-time is heightened by the story‘s 
setting—a planetary forest—and the agrarian-pastoral society of the Astheans.  In 
pastoral terms, the novel‘s comment on the nondual connection between ideas and the 
world is strategically set in a hyper-naturalized world, one in which the all the world is all 
―country‖ with no ―city‖ to be found. 
This brings us to Le Guin‘s pastoralism, which has important implications for the 
postethnic imagination, if we can take rural and urban, agrarian and technologic identities 
to be kinds of ethnicities.  Andy Sawyer suggests that Le Guin‘s science fiction is closer 
to the pastoral than the arcadian, precisely because it uses the teaching methods that I 
have been describing as part of the prophetic voice.  Whereas Arcadias, in the Virgilian 
tradition, according to Sawyer, create ―self-consciously other region[s] that could be used 
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by sophisticated artist for a sophisticated audience under a guise of simplicity‖ (2006, 
399), the pastoral ―explores imaginative effects to didactic ends‖ in a way that ―oscillates 
between metaphor and pseudo-mimetic creation‖ but ―eschews allegory‖ (410).  As we 
noted above, the future-writings of Butler and Vonnegut are more explicitly tied to actual 
human history than Le Guin‘s, but as Sawyer sees it, history in imaginative literature 
does not have to be actual in order for the work to thematize living in a historical world 
or a world with a future.  ―A fantasy history,‖ he writes, ―may not connect the fictional 
world with ours, but the story itself is often to do with history itself: the passing of an 
age, or a sense of time.‖  The creation of a sense of very long time in Le Guin‘s Hainish 
novels marks, then, a departure of innovation from the pastoral in the direction of science 
fiction, since ―Pastoral…is rarely historical: it is ‗out there,‘ out of time, isolated‖ (414).  
I would add that the population of this long time line—the human diversity of the 
Ekumen that exceeds the recording keeping capacity of the Hainish Historians—makes 
this a postethnic future.  Le Guin‘s postpastoral, which connects to the historical world 
and is not isolated outside of time through idealized conventions (nymphs, shepherds, 
etc.), echoes the ―new pastoral‖ described by Glen A. Love: 
The redefinition of pastoral, then, requires that contact with the green world be 
acknowledged as something more than a temporary excursion into simplicity 
which exists primarily for the sake of its eventual renunciation and a return to the 
―real‖ world at the end.  A pastoral for the present and future calls for a better 
science of nature, a greater understanding of its complexity, a more radical 
awareness of its primal energy and stability, and a more acute questioning of the 
values of the supposedly sophisticated society to which we are bound. (1996, 235) 
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The didactic pastoralism that Sawyer finds in Le Guin, with its emphasis on living 
historically in the world in a particular way, closely tracks Love‘s description of a 
redefined, critical pastoral.  Notably, Love is explicitly moving the pastoral away from 
the sophisticated city/simple country motif characteristic of the sophisticated artistry 
―under the guise of simplicity‖ that Sawyer attributes to the classical form.  This shaking 
up of city/country identities is, in a sense, a postethnic move. 
Sawyer‘s key example is a novel closely related to The Word for the World Is 
Forrest, one that illustrates how the ―more acute questioning of the values of supposedly 
sophisticated society‖ unfold along eco-feminist lines.  Always Coming Home is set on a 
fantasy future earth and tells the story of a young woman taken from her native society, 
educated in an urban center, and released to return home again.  The novel contrasts 
modern-technological civilization with primitive (for want of a better word) traditional 
society.  In relating the movement between these two contexts, Le Guin evokes the 
pastoral town/country paradigm, as Sawyer explains, but also makes an epistemological 
comment on frames or ways of knowing.  The totalizing cyber-knowledge in the city, 
relayed via computer networks in virtual space, contrasts with the localizing knowledge 
of tribe and settlement, grounded in the crisscrossing paths and trails worn into the land.  
According to Alice Jenkins, not only does the Keshian practice of greeting everything in 
the world—rocks, trees, and people—with the word ―heya‖ indicate a worldview counter 
to the abstract knowledge of the city‘s cyberminds, the novel‘s focus on the physical 
journey gestures toward an appreciation of ―embodied‖ and ―local‖ knowledge.  Jenkins 
observes that both Butler‘s revolutionary hero Lauren and Le Guin‘s less epic protagonist 
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are travelers who walk the land, and by paying ―a principle attention to the physical facts 
of long distance walking and its effects on human bodies and minds,‖ both novelists 
represent, in fiction, the ways in which a feminist ―understanding of the situatedness of 
knowledge includes attention to a variety of factors, including a recognition of the impact 
that embodiment and the relationship of the knower to other knowers may have on the 
prosecution and validation of knowledge‖ (2006, 322).  This final point, on the 
relationship between knowers, is helpful because it points toward the mind/body split that 
must be undone to some extent in the postethnic utopia.  This is partly because bodies 
and embodiment offer several ways to resist the total, operative utopian engineering of 
the philosopher king.  Plato‘s idealism dismissed material reality as imperfect, and yet it 
is bodily imperfection (again, our refrain of limit, exposure, fragmentation) that calls us 
to a compassion and hope for each other.  Attention to the lived, embodied experience of 
the singular being, and the recognition that that experience is incomplete and unable to 
see a total picture of itself or the world, is the beginning of postethnic inoperative 
community. 
We should pause briefly to note that embodied knowledge runs throughout all the 
novels we have considered, even though those novels may not be framed in any obvious 
ways by feminist counter-epistemologies.  In A Mercy, the telling of Floren‘s story is not 
only the cognitive work of rememory but also the physical labor of inscription on the 
walls of her closet—reaching the door to the closet, she has literally as well as 
figuratively written to discover her line of escape.  In The Plot, the sum of Philip‘s 
coming of age is the ability to become a prosthesis to those around him—rather than the 
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autonomous disembodied or essential sovereign subject that conventional buildungroman 
produce, The Plot produces a human being whose subjectivity is contingent upon the 
bodies in proximity to itself.  In The Yiddish Policeman’s Union, Meyer Landsman 
chooses the familial home of his wife‘s body rather that the idealistic messianic 
homeland of Zionism.  Vizenor‘s trickster use bodily tricks and teases, along with 
transgressive and enthusiastic sexuality, to live wildly and survive.  In Galatea 2.2, it is 
the lack of the experience of a physical body that separates Helen from a human reader; 
and in Plowing the Dark, the imagination shapes and is shaped by the body‘s position in 
virtual space or a prison cell.  As Jenkins explains, Earthseed can be read as the story of a 
bodily progress walking towards the future; but also, Lauren experiences the pain of 
others in her own body, due to her hyperempathy syndrome.  Vonnegut‘s Galapagos 
suggests (with deep irony) that the key to human happiness lies in a change in human 
bodies–from the ―big brains‖ to something that lives with an animal‘s balanced 
naturalism.  In these novels, taken together, there is very clearly a knotting together of the 
issues of temporal perspective, literature‘s place in society, and humankind‘s (bodily) 
place in the world.  All of these subarguments can be configured as movements away 
from total identity, which trend I have been calling the postethnic.  Although these 
fictions can be arranged on a temporal axis, as I have done, and doing so reveals how 
each contradicts the ideologies of teleology, this contradiction does not exhaust their 
revolutionary energies.  The stories concern the myth of purposefulness in time insofar as 
this myth has consequence for the way people live bodily in the world.  That is, in 
resisting ethnocentric narratives, historicism, or grandiose destinies, these novels return 
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their readers to the here-and-now, even if they do so by the indirect method of imagining 
fanciful ―nowheres.‖  This attention to the here-and-now is also a quality of situated 
knowing which is both cognitive and physical.  In other words, even this centrism is 
exceeded in a post-Cartesian identity that is neither all-body nor all-mind.  This scattered 
and fragmented attention is refracted through many identity positions in each singular 
being, and then multiplied again in the interactions between many singular beings.  
Moreover, if these postethnic interactions are a ―literature,‖ then the web they form 
would be a literary ecology. 
In this way, when we reconfigure these novels of postethnic utopianism in terms 
of embodied knowing, we can also incorporate the redefined or postpastoral as an 
occasion for the practice of a complementary reading strategy.  This ecology is defined 
on the jacket copy of Glotfelty and Fromm‘s The Ecocriticism Reader as ―the study of 
the ways that writing…both reflects and influences our interactions with the natural 
world.‖  In the spirit of the new pastoral, we would have to insist that ―natural world‖ is a 
tautology, but the phrase is useful in light of the ubiquity and persistence of a modern-
pastoral mode that divides the artificial town from the natural country.  That division 
mirrors, in important ways, the division between the artful mind and the natural body.  
And so the epistemologies of embodied or situated knowledge are, for many writers, 
post-Cartesian and predisposed to an attention to the natural world in a way that resists 
the simple subject-object duality of old-school pastoralism. 
The postethnic nondualism most pointedly at stake in Le Guin‘s fiction is the 
continuity of the world we dream with the world we live in.  In other words, our 
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experiences and interactions are not centered in the waking or dreaming worlds, but in 
their interplay.  This continuity is explored most directly in a trio of short stories 
collected in The Fisherman of the Inland Sea.  These ―churten‖ stories imagine the 
effects of an invented technology, one that completely frees a person‘s location in time 
and space from the confines of actuality.  Of course, as throughout this study, I use 
ethnicity to name located identity, and hence this churten stories are an experiment, in my 
reading, of a radical postethnicity.  In the introduction, we saw that there are several 
objections to postethnicity on the grounds that it would isolate individuals from needed 
relationships and traditions.  In the first of the churten stories, we see chaos resulting 
from such a radial severing of place, a nonlocation or nonidentity.  In the second and 
third stories we have, instead, a postethnicity that is reinforced by interactions with 
others, what the characters call entrainment or ―dancing.‖  Thus it is a process of 
identification that operates through both a postethnicity and a consubstantial 
interethnicity.   
We have already seen the relationship between the world we live in and the way 
we use language to create imaginary maps of that world.  Le Guin‘s churten stories build 
on the same theme: 
Having the name [churten], I plunged into the experience, and spent quite a lot of 
time, good time, too, on the vocabulary. I needed words to demonstrate fictionally 
what instantaneous travel, transilience, might feel like, finding out in the process 
that what it feels like is the only explanation of how it works, and that where 
words in themselves are inadequate, syntax can take you straight to another world 
and home again in no time. (1994, 9) 
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We should notice, here, that this account of the creation of the churten stories touches on 
the issue of language and the world in telling way.  Certainly, words are inadequate.  
Post-structuralists tell us that words do a very poor job at connecting us to the real world: 
language is a closed system, a prison house, a labyrinth.  But, when words are fitted 
together in syntax, something else seems to happen.  Such articulatiosn can, Le Guin 
implies, take you both ―to another world‖ and ―home again.‖  (Is to too much to think 
that this play within and between words is like the play within and between people I have 
been arguing for?)  It is precisely the detachment of language from the real world—the 
detachment of signifier from signified—that allows for this kind of travel.  If language 
really did connect referentially to things in this world rather than ―metalinguistically,‖ to 
other verbal constructions, then it could never point anywhere else.  It could only point to 
the real in a very narrow and restricted way.  But language is not restricted: writers can 
create names, like ―churten,‖ that do not refer to any ―real‖ thing.  And this ability to 
indicate the unreal gives language, or more specifically literature or fiction, significant 
power.  Such freeing up of language can also be the freeing up of identity to be a process 
rather than a fixed product. 
In the churten stories, experimental flight crews experience strange phenomena 
after making the instantaneous jump to other worlds.  Le Guin summarizes them,  
All three churten stories are also metafictions, stories about story. In ―The 
Shobies‘ Story,‖ transilience acts as a metaphor for narration, and narration as the 
chancy and unreliable but most effective means of construction a shared reality.  
―Dancing to Ganam‖ continues with the theme of unreliable narration or differing 
witness, with a hi-tech hubristic hero at its eccentric center, and adds the lovely 
theory of entrainment to the churten stew. And finally, ―Another Story‖—one of 
my very few experiments with time travel—explores the possibility of two stories 
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about the same person in the same time being completely different and completely 
true. (9-10) 
In the first story, the crew experiences different versions of reality as they momentary 
lose touch with each other.  The second story is a cautionary tale in which an egocentric 
explorer construes himself as receiving the kind of welcome among a ―primitive‖ society 
that echoes and comments on many account of colonial exploration, especially Cortes‘ 
posture as a returning god.  The hyper-masculine Commander Dazul creates a wish-
fulfillment perception of the world around him from his point of view alone, and he lives 
in it alone, blind to the world as others see it.  As it turns out, the reality of the situation is 
starkly different when seen from the point-of-view of the native population, who believe 
the captain has made a traditional pilgrimage to their land to die in a ritual sacrifice.  
Commenting on the captain‘s death, a crewmate speculates, ―No, I don‘t know if had 
anything to do with the churten effect, with perceptual dissonance, with chaos. We came 
to see things differently, but which of us knew the truth?‖ (157).  The defining premise of 
the postethnic utopia—its core difference from utopias of total social engineering—is that 
no one of us can have the whole truth.  In the third churten story, a young man working 
on churten technology, transported back into his own past, is able to live his life both 
having left his home (to work on churten theory) and having remained there, marrying 
and keeping house.
12
  Taken together, these stories tell us that shared acts of imagination 
define the world we share, our places in it, and even who we are.  More importantly, they 
do not do so against the measure of an absolute narrative like god‘s will or human nature.  
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There is no ethnocentric ―way the world should be,‖ only the postethnic ways in which 
we imagine and cause it to be. 
This makes the perception of injustice as unnatural an act of invention.  Future-
writing can represent the future as something-to-be-invented, rather than as a something-
to-be-realized or -fulfilled.  If living towards the future is a matter of inventive discourse, 
then we can devise an ethics without a blueprint or an ideal world.  That is, we can make 
it up, piecemeal, as we go.  Butler writes a species-level ideal as a way to forge a species-
wide community; Vonnegut writes a universe in which human kind can be definitely said 
not to matter, as a way to contradict the hubris that leads to human suffering.  But both 
these future-writings are limited and do not fully account to the ways in which an empty 
future rejects progressivism and risks hedonism, a lack of responsibility to the future.  Le 
Guin‘s future-writing avoids these problems because her future is very long and very 
strange, and so becomes an occasion for curiosity.  She marries the postethnic and the 
interethnic in a thoroughgoing nondualism.  (This cannot be unrelated to her personal 
Taoist beliefs.)  Her future is empty because there may dwell there forms of living that 
have yet to be invented—a future in which lives will be invented, but postethnically, not 
according to a philosopher‘s Ideal of essential human identity.  It is a future in which 
people may become androgynous (on the planet Gethan, in The Left Hand of Darkness) 
or marry in sets of four (on the planet Io, passim), or experience any other number of 
mutations and permutations.  They may invent and abolish slavery (on Werel and Yeowe 
in Four Ways to Forgiveness), or achieve an anarcho-syndicalist revolution (on Anarres 
in The Dispossessed).  There may be a secular revolt against a mystical tradition in which 
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both the secular and the mystical are at turns corrupting and healing (on Aka, in The 
Telling).  The writing of the Hainish Ekumen imagines that all of time and space can be 
made a ―home,‖ but only if the diversity, strangeness, and mutability of human 
experience is not only fully accepted, postethnically, but enthusiastically loved.  Le 
Guin‘s most extensive description of the culture on Hain itself, aside from hints in the 
churten stories, is the novella ―Man of the People,‖ part of the Four Ways to Forgiveness 
cycle. 
Although the Hainish are imagined as the oldest and maybe originary human 
culture, Le Guin does not imagine life on Hain as a hyper-advanced, techno-utopia.  
―Man of the People‖ is an imaginary biography of a Havzhiva, a Hainish ―mobil‖ who 
comes to play a key role in the ending of slavery in the Werel-Yeowe system.  But, even 
though Havzhiva is supposedly an eminent ―Historian‖ of one of the oldest and wisest 
human cultures, the first section of his biography imagines him growing up in a ―pueblo‖ 
called Stse, in a traditional animistic culture that features, among other surprising 
characteristics, a coming-of-age ceremony in which a wedding couple become ―gods 
together.‖  After three years of education in the Hainish school at Kathhad, training to be 
a Historian, 
Havzhiva knew that everything he had learned in Stse, all the knowledge he had 
had, could be labeled: typical pueblo culture of northwestern coastal South 
Continent.  He knew that the beliefs…of the different pueblos were entirely 
different one from another, wildly different, totally bizarre… and he knew that 
such systems were to be met with on every Known World. (146) 
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At first, Havisha is angered that the historians kept the ―truth‖ from the people in the 
pueblos.  He assumes that there is one truth, that the Historians are like Plato‘s 
philosopher king who knows the truth but keep the people in ignorance.  He is upset that 
the people in the pueblos choose to live in ignorance of the truth the Historians know.  
But his teachers correct him, and he comes to understand that ―Local knowledge is not 
partial knowledge. There are different ways of knowing‖ (147).  In other words, local 
knowledge may only be fragments, but that does not mean that somewhere there is a 
whole.  What the Hainish know is not the ―truth‖ of history, but only the vast, fragmented 
and diversity of human experience.  This is clearly presented as consequence of 
perceiving how long time can be:  ―For instance… historians did not study history. No 
human mind could encompass the history of Hain: three millions years of it… What the 
historians mostly did was explore, in an easy and unhurried fashion, the local reach and 
moment of the river [of time]‖ (145).  These historian-explorers move throughout the 
known worlds with ―no motive in these contacts and explorations other than curiosity and 
fellow-feeling. They were getting in touch with their long-lost relatives. They called that 
greater network of worlds by an alien word, Ekumen, which mean ‗the household‘‖ 
(146).  This movement is the connective tissue of most of Le Guin‘s science fiction: her 
readers visit her novels in much the same way the Hanish historians visit the worlds 
imagined within them.  Their movement forward to the next world is not for the sake of 
consolidating a whole.  Rather, this living towards the future is a postethnic way of 
being-together in time that is distinct from the consolidation and erasure of individuality 
in a communal project.  ―All I did was go learn in Kathhad what I couldn‘t learn in Stse,‖ 
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Havisha concludes at the end of the story, ―What the rules are.  Ways of needing one 
another.  Human ecology‖ (193). 
An ecosocial ethos, this human ecology shares important characteristics with the 
compassionate communities described by Octavia Butler and Vonnegut.  It is also 
familiar to us from the communities written into the other novels in parts one and two.  
We may even say that the postethnic utopian imagination distinguishes itself from 
utopian engineering by the creation of this very ethos.  This is a postethnic process of 
identification that cannot sacrifice people in the present for the sake of a future ideal, 
because the purpose of living, in this view, is located in the living beings presently 
existing all around us.  But it does give rise to a curiosity about other people and a 
concern for their well being, both of which are located in a realization of one‘s own 
postethnic condition, one‘s own fragmentation.   
This fragmentation makes Le Guin‘s prophetic voice slightly different from the 
other novelists in part three, each of whom is different from the Jewish prophetic 
tradition that Cornel West identifies as a useful paradigm for contemporary advocacy of 
human rights and social justice.  All forms of future-writing, however, can be called 
prophetic insofar as they call for attention to human well-being from a disinclined 
audience.  But the traditional prophetic voice, according to West, calls for reform by 
exhorting conformity to either the will of God or an essential Jewish character as the 
chosen people of God.  Butler does not prophesy that God has any plan for humankind – 
in her novels, God is change and will inflict all of the meaningless sufferings of chaos on 
people who do not actively seek to ―shape‖ God.  Butler does, however, ground her call 
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for pragmatic survivalism in the common project of a shared human destiny—Earthseed 
depends upon the ideal that human kind has one important role to the play in the 
universal scheme of things.  It is this ethno-religious ideal that Vonnegut writes against 
when he imagines a universe in which humanity matters very little.  For Vonnegut, there 
does not have to be a grand purpose, realized in an eschatological culmination or ―end‖ of 
the universe, for people to act with caring attention to each other and the world.  We can, 
instead, commit to ―help each other through this thing, whatever it is.‖  But Vonnegut‘s 
biting absurdist satire can grow wearisome, suffering from irony fatigue, and it can be 
hard to care about people seen through a misanthropic lens.  His imagination of a fixed 
universe in which human caring matters precisely because all else is pointless does not 
strongly motivate a commitment to the future; it is just as likely to remove the future 
from consideration.  If the universe cannot be effected by human actions, there is no 
reason to make counterfactual wishes: what will be will be.  While this kind of fatalism 
brings a kind of peace, it does not help us motivate the kind of transformative action that 
will be needed to mitigate ongoing risks to planetary survival (climate change, epidemic 
disease, nuclear proliferation, to name a few).  To motivate a commitment to the future, 
we have to have an interest in it, but at the same time we need a kind of interest different 
from the interest of utopian engineering, the vested interest in total control.  We need a 
compassionate investment in other people and the future, and this kind of tie can be 
cultivated through postethnic curiosity and ―fellow feeling‖ for a vast and wondrously 
mutable humanity—structured by neither a transcendent deity nor an essential human 
nature—as imagined in the Hainish cycle.   
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The Hainish view the universe as the Ekumen, the household, and it is from this 
Greek word that we get our terms ecology and economy.  In this view of things, 
ecologists and economists (concerning both monetary and textual economies) are kinds 
of housekeepers.   This housekeeping ethos attends to human beings as part of a world, 
and so it is not merely concerned with social or ecological justice, but rather ―ecosocial‖ 
well being.  Moreover, it is the well being of everyone in the household, a community 
defined postethnically by proximity rather than identity.  Whereas traditional prophets 
may have called for a return to an unchanging transcendent or essential measure of 
righteousness, Le Guin‘s prophetic voices calls for an attention to the ever-changing 
world around us.  That literature is suited to do this work is the basic assumption of 
Kenneth Burke‘s essay ―Literature as Equipment for Living‖ and also Le Guin‘s ―carrier 
bag theory of fiction.‖  That our literary artifacts are part of our world and not (only) 
reflections or representations that stand apart from, I propose, is the most revolutionary 
claim for a ―literary ecology‖ or ecocriticsm that attends to the ways in which writing 
shapes and is shaped by living.  ―A book holds words,‖ Le Guin reminds us, starting like 
Sartre with the phenomenological.  She continues, ―Words hold things. They bear 
meanings. A novel is a medicine bundle, holding things in a particular, powerful relation 
to one another and to us‖ (1996, 153).  While there may be some poststructuralist 
misgivings about the phrase ―words hold things,‖ she has chosen this metaphor less for 
its theoretical precision and more for the female connotation of the container, the non-
phallic.  Le Guin is right that novels ―bear meanings‖ and literary arrangements 
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(economies) are about the relations not only between words, as poststructuralists would 
agree, but also between words and people.  She insists that 
Science fiction properly conceived, like all serious fiction, however funny, is a 
way of trying to describe what is in fact going on, what people actually do and 
feel, how people related to everything else in this vast sack, this belly of the 
universe, this womb of things to be and tomb of things that were, this unending 
story. (154) 
 We have already considered many, theoretically diverse, differently committed and 
aligned ways to reach this same conclusion.  It recalls Lina making up her own pastiche 
of beliefs in A Mercy, and Philip learning how he relates to those around him in The Plot 
Against America.  It recall‘s Chabon‘s imaginary creation of a homeland of choice, 
Power‘s connectivism (which he attributes uniquely to fictional discourse).  The native 
paradigm of ceremonial magic, in Silko, and trickster stories, in Vizenor, are also ways of 
maintaining and challenging the sociocultural balance.  Additionally, Le Guin‘s metaphor 
complements, expansively, the prophetic novels of Butler and Vonnegut, finding in the 
mutability of human existence neither a call to impose a destiny nor a bleak existential 
absurdism.  
This is the future in the postethnic, ecosocial imagination: not something to be 
known, nor something to be produced, but rather something to be prepared for, to invent, 
and to explore with open curiosity.  The attention that is paid in the terms of an ecosocial 
imaginary must be the attention to the existant world.  (This must include not only that 
material world, but also real immaterial objects, such as works of art, problems, 
theoretical paradigms.)  In other words, rethinking a utopia postethnically would mean 
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not only letting go of foundational or essential ideas about human identity, but also a 
naturalizing of discourse in a difference sense than the reification of ideology.  It would 
take an existential-pragmatic view of experience and perception, or society as 
communication, and see linguistic discourses as secondary to the discourses of living.  It 
would take a new, post-anthropocentric kind of attention to human beings as natural 
creatures, an attention that is the answer and demand of impending environmental and 
social catastrophes looming at the start of the twenty-first century.
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AFTERWORD / ON UTOPIA, ECOLOGY, AND HOUSEKEEPING 
In the preceding pages, I have offered evidence that utopia has gone postethnic 
across representative American novels in the late twentieth and early twenty first century.  
I have argued throughout that our utopias can no longer be formulated or pursued only 
within or from the exclusive perspective of any one identity position or ethnicity.  The 
recognition of the fragmentary limitations of our interior experience of self and our 
collective experience of society means that we must of necessity pursue any program for 
betterment in a piecemeal rather than ―total‖ fashion.  In this afterword, I retrace this 
main argument, which has stitched together a series of subarguments about history, 
naturalism, and the future.  That my claim should be refracted and transformed through 
each temporal scene is itself a consequence of the argument, that is, my position that no 
one point of view can tell us what we should know, who we should be, or how we should 
behave. 
As I retrace my evidence for this thesis, I need to provide two further 
clarifications about it.  First, the fragmentation of poststructuralism is open to a charge of 
astructural bias.  If no one point of view is structurally privilege as the philosopher king 
of the world, then it may seem difficult to imagine what we can do to resist those systems 
that continue to oppress human lives.  This doubt is an echo of the suspicion that 
postethnicity robs us of the ethnic grounds from which to stage our revolutions.  But this 
choice between being or becoming is a false one, and from what I can see, the postethnic 
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can be either revolutionary or reformist partly because it approaches the question of 
structure and action differently than these alternatives suggest.  In the introduction, I 
offered the allegory of a housekeeper in light of Chakrabarty‘s proposal for a theory of 
fragments without a whole and the ongoing practice of proximity that would be the 
politics of such a theory.  This figure should be held in contrast to the utopian engineer, 
the master architect who wants to draw up blueprints, build upon solid foundations, and 
someday cease working when the building is complete.  This architect is a logocentric, 
masulinized, and product-orient representation of what it means to try to improve the 
world‘s being.  We can now begin to oppose it with a poststructural, feminized, process-
oriented paradigm of the housekeeper who tends to the world‘s becoming.  This, then, is 
my second point, for which I take the next few pages to enlarge and support: because it 
assumes a never-whole process of identification, postethnic utopia can be theorized 
through the economic, ecological, and ecumenical chores of keeping house. 
When we have ruled out, through theoretical argument or direct observation, 
identity as a stable and essential possession, what remains is a process of identification 
that occurs in the numberless connections between singular beings.  We can call these 
connections ―literature,‖ as Nancy does, if by literature we mean a broad practice of 
symbolic interaction through human artifacts including literary texts.  These interactions 
are generally future-directed expressions of, as Scarry names them, counterfactual 
wishes.  In the postmodern, globalized world of the late twentieth century, such wishes 
can no longer credibly be made only for the sake of a community of others held to be 
identical to oneself: oneself is estranged from oneself, and one‘s community comprises 
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many different kinds of others who, we assume, are themselves likewise limited and 
circumscribed by history.  If there is any common identity, it is difference, but even so 
there are different kinds of difference and open-mindedness serves as the guiding 
principle.  As Butler puts it, reading Adorno, ―Our responsibility is not just for the purity 
of our souls but for the shape of the collectively inhabited world‖ (110).  That we are all 
in the world together and all faced with the similar if not identical experiences of being 
singular can issue a call for compassionate interactions that ―participate in the remaking 
of social conditions‖ (135).  Yet that participation must be contingent, without one master 
architect in charge: it must be Karl Popper calls ―piecemeal‖ and not ―utopian‖ 
engineering.  It can even be as small, in The Plot Against America, as a zipper for a pant 
leg.  It can be as large, in The Parable of Sower, as a new version of God.  But even when 
it is very large, it will not be total. 
With the help of the preceding novels, I have argued that a rethinking of 
community and utopia would occasion a rethinking of the human as a natural creature, 
and that an attention to human beings in the natural world would lead us to an ecological 
framework in general.  Such an ecology is both the alarm and the response to global risks 
and challenges in the postmodern, postindustrial world.  Accordingly, Jameson‘s Seeds of 
Time links the utopian and the natural together through the altered temporality of what is 
―natural‖ in postmodernity.  First, the temporality of the world is affected not only in 
terms of space-time compression but also in terms of what we recognize as the passage of 
time.  Back when time moved at a medieval pace, ―items descended so slowly to acquire 
a patina that seemed to transform their contingencies into the necessities of a meaningful 
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tradition‖ (1994, 11).  To this sense of continuity and growth, Jameson contrasts the 
hectic pace of modernity, in which ―even the past comes to seem like an alternative 
world‖ rather than the predecessor of the present (11).  Indeed, we can now rupture the 
patina of reification with an unnatural utopian imagination, as when Roth can imagine 
America‘s greatest generation swept up in Nazism.  The temporality of modern 
production, Jameson continues, isolates us from the cyclical-linear temporality of nature: 
―our seasons are of the post-natural and postastronomical television or media variety,‖ 
because we watch the weather on TV and attend to fashion seasons more so than the 
actual felt conditions of our ecosphere (17).  Powers describes such a feeling, being lost 
in the virtual reality of the cave, but also explores how even so we can arrive back in the 
(natural) world through the mystery of contact with other people. 
Artificial nature, according to Jameson, stifles revolution by giving us alteration 
without change: ―where everything now submits to the perpetual change of fashion and 
media image, nothing can change any longer‖ (18).  As time stops, the spatiality of the 
world is homogenized and made available to ownership: ―it is a peculiarly ambivalent 
mystery that mortal beings, generations of dying organisms, should have imagined they 
could somehow own parts of the earth in the first place‖ (25).  This hubris gives voice to 
cataclysmic proclamation in Lina‘s story about the eagle, the claim of ownership that 
causes the eagle‘s eggs to fall and the chicks to live on alone.  In the capitalist utopian 
imagination, nature is transformed into real estate.  Change is no longer change, and land 
is no longer land, because these categories of space and time have now become fashion 
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and property rather than what I can only call existential categories for the process of 
identification named living experience. 
To resist this does not require some naïve back-to-nature pastoralism such as the 
environmentalism inscribed in colonial images of the ―Indian,‖ which Vizenor‘s 
Bearheart mocks and teases. It is rather a recognition that utopian engineering 
architecturally degrades every kind of lived environment.  ―The disappearance of 
Nature,‖ Jameson writes, ―now begins to sap its other term, the formerly urban‖ (28).  
Any meaningful change in the social environment, then, would entail a change to both the 
urban and the rural.  In the same way, Le Guin shows how the postethnic ruptures not 
only races and identities, but all dualisms that could be mistaken for the one true axis of 
the world.  Urban identity and rural identity, and their cognates, are localized, decentered, 
deposed, and post-ed along with all others.  We can no longer imagine the good only in 
terms of the social or the environmental, anymore than we can hold legitimately an idea 
only for the interests of one particular segment of humanity.  Postethnic utopianism 
upsets, ruptures, displaces identity wherever and in whatever form in tries to settle down.  
The process of identification never stops, never reifies, but continues on ceaselessly at the 
limits where singular beings meet each other. 
In the postethnic, global situation, nature returns to us as both a problem and a 
solution.  Ulrich Beck‘s theory of cosmopolitanism based on shared risk is useful here.  
―How,‖ Beck asks, ―can coexistence in multi-religious, multiethnic and multicultural 
societies work,‖ and, moreover, ―can Western societies obtain realistic, non-utopian, 
namely disappointment-proof‖ solutions to such a question?‖(2002, 71).  If we accept 
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piecemeal and compassionate cooperation as a sufficient form of coexistence, then we 
can very likely obtain a postnational or postsolidarity commonground in the context of 
shared, globalized risks such as environmental crises.  Beck includes, importantly, risks 
that I consider ecological but which are not traditionally associated with ―green‖ 
environmentalism, including migratory labor, human rights, and pandemic diseases.  (But 
I do not know if even this proximity praxis will be ―disappointment-proof,‖ a criterion of 
the architect who wants to know if the building will stand up forever.)  Any problem that 
does not respect identitarian boundaries (national, cultural, racial, etc) can be grounds for 
postidentity coexistence.  The shared earth is both a problem, because we cannot ignore 
what appears as the other‘s crises, and also a solution, because we can pledge an 
affirmation of co-suffering and hence co-operation.  Thus compassion and proximity 
respond through praxis, and not the authority of paternalism, leadership, or the 
commands of a detached theoretician.  Does this mean that our global community 
becomes coordinated to the extent that it cannot be called inoperative in Nancy‘s sense?  
It could only be so if we limit it to the human community (and even then it would be 
unlikely).  But this is generally untenable given that the risks which cross national and 
ethnic boundaries tend to affect the whole of the natural world and not just people. 
Thus ecology and postethnicity can each recommend a cosmopolitanism of one 
kind or another.  ―A postethnic perspective,‖ David Hollinger tells us, ―is alert for 
opportunities to construct global solidarity capable of addressing ecological and other 
dilemmas that are global in their impact‖ (2000, 12-13).  Of practical necessity, then, the 
ecological can be a productive way to think about the intersection between a non-
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essential view of ethno-identity and a non-foundational view of utopia.  Both 
―antifoundationalism and its distant gendered cousin antiessentialism,‖ Jameson 
observes, ―in effect turn centrally on the question of Nature‖ (1994, 33).  The ecological, 
biotic world offers both a ground for the inoperative community, a paradigm for personal 
wellness, and an occasion of political urgency and call to action.  Whereas existentialism 
projects the refutation of metaphysical certainty into the interior of our individual beings, 
pragmatism projects the refutation of objectivist foundational epistemology into our 
interactions or discursive practices.  Certainly, existentialism in its Sartrean formulation 
places too much emphasis on individual freedom and responsibility without due attention 
to limits that material, historically emergent circumstances place on individual 
experiences and capacities.  A better account of unfreely chosen community can be read 
in Silko‘s Gardens in the Dunes if we understand Indigo as a kidnapped cosmopolitan, 
who nonetheless survives postethnically through the resilience of her perennial 
imagination, her ability to cultivate a new allegiance to Hattie without forsake her older, 
tribal allegiances. 
I do not want to overemphasize the instrumental value of the postethnic.  I am 
warned here by the abuses of the pseudo-pragmatist motto to ―do what works.‖  This 
operational motto has had its ruthless applications: one recent example has been former 
American Vice-President Dick Cheney‘s apologia for the use of torture.  I maintain that 
such amoralism does not represent the core realizations that both existentialism and 
pragmatism can offer, a non-foundational, anti-essentialist invitation to choose 
opportunity or hope.  These approaches are future-directed and emphasize our ability to 
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make something good, or at least better, of ourselves and the world.  Pairing a kind of 
loose version of each of these traditions allows us to unite the personal and the 
interpersonal, the private and the public, the social and the political in a unified non-
metaphysical ecology.  But this materialism does not, surprisingly and importantly, result 
in a mechanization of human life as a mesh of chemical or physical processes.  This is the 
point of Vonnegut‘s extended joke in Galapagos—that what is ―good‖ for humans might 
not be the same was what is good for their ―big brains.‖  In this way, human identity is 
embodied as much as it is a quality of the Cartesian cogito.  When the essentialist or 
foundational props have been knocked out from under all Western epistemic platforms, 
what we are left with are both a crisis and an opportunity.  Into this occasion steps 
literature. 
In the introduction, I argued that Scarry‘s theory of the artifact allows us to 
rethink utopianism as a material inscription, the codification of our compassionate 
sentience and counterfactual wishes.  One could easily see how this act of sharing the 
world could be thought to lead inevitably to cooperation for a better world: Sartre 
certainly makes this leap when he claims that no true writer could write against human 
freedom (1991).  Scarry does not make this jump, however, and explicitly resists relying 
on literary humanism to improve human behavior through the process that Rorty calls 
―sentimental education‖ (1999, 73-74).
1
  In ―The Difficulty of Imagining Other People,‖ 
Scarry insists that goodwill fostered through literary contact with the other is not enough: 
we also need laws that make it difficult for people to harm each other.  And if we can 
only have laws or sentiment, then laws would be better albeit less powerful than both 
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forces taken together (1996, 107).  This inclusion of constitutional rule—an operative 
form of community—is not a rejection of the inoperative, existential-sentimental model, 
but rather a point that reminds us how the discursive artifact is a broader category than 
literature.  Scarry reminds us that while literature may create a sensory world in the mind 
of the reader, and this may indeed do significant work towards creating a shared 
intersubjective world, other non-sensory writing also articulates the world we hold in 
common.  In fact, in The Body in Pain, her ultimate example of a counterfactual 
discursive wish is the rendering of an award in a civil suit: it is an express wish that harm 
had not been done.  Scarry thus points us to the limits of literature even as she explains 
the substantial powers of discursive world-formation. 
I return here for a closer look at Scarry‘s theory and its implications because we 
need to define very carefully the intersection of ethnicity and utopia on a 
nonmetaphysical ground.  Carelessness here can lead to an ―astructural bias‖ that silences 
political action with a mix of  Romantic sentimentalism and case-study particularism.   
Scarry‘s counterfactual wish offers us a way into the intersection of the non-foundational 
and the non-essential, the pragmatic and the existential, because it marks the material 
inscription (in artifact or discourse) of the possibility of a desirable alternative.  It locates 
the utopian at the moment of discursive interaction, and it is the interactionist version of 
pragmatism that most informs my rethinking of literature and community.  If we 
understand pragmatism as a kind of amoral practicality, we cannot reliably avoid crimes 
and outrages that ostensibly ―work.‖  The kind of pragmatism I find more useful is the 
socially conscious (if often conservative or reform-minded) version that takes as its 
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starting point the interactions of individual people.  When these interactions are linguistic 
–discourse, I should clarify, is not limited to the interlocutive in this model—then they 
can be named ―symbolic.‖  Interactionism works well with the recurring claim that what 
we read and write has consequences for the way we live.  We can say concisely, if too 
simply, that literature is ―symbolic interaction among singular beings.‖ 
If not pragmatism in general, then certainly the interactionist tradition insists on 
starting with material immediacy.  This rules out the position of the pragmatist like Mead, 
who hold that consciousness of the world determines our existence.  Norman Denzin‘s 
call for a political interpretive interactionism is helpful here; he aligns this methodology 
with ―Marx, Mills, Sartre, and the Critical school‖ for whom ―human consciousness does 
not determine existence; nor does existence determine consciousness. Between 
consciousness and existence resides communication and culture‖ (1992, 164).  This 
nondualism would resist, on the one hand, a historicist overestimation of the powers of 
ideological systems, such as capital, which might produce a fatalistic apathy.  On the 
other hand, it resists a Romantic-existential overestimation of individual freedom to 
choose regardless of very real and powerful systems that do exist, albeit not as 
metaphysical constructs but rather as certain habits of interaction.  Denzin rejects non-
interventionist interactionism (162) on the grounds that ―Despite its imagery of the free 
human agent, the interactionist self is free only within the constraints set by the 
ecological collective order‖ (163).  This means that just because culture is made up of 
individual interactions, we are not required to critique culture astructurally on a hyper-
individuated level.  Roth‘s novel imagines this paradox vividly, as the slide into 
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American Nazism is represented through as series of individual choices in particular 
relationships reiterated to a national scale.  The distinguishing if fine point is that for the 
interactionist, the structure that limits choices is made up of other choices, other people‘s 
interactions.  As Powers would say, in the language of connectivism, it is the ―model 
modeling the modeler.‖  Persons, viewed postethnically as singular beings, and collective 
human community as a literary articulation, are thus mutually-shaping, consubstantial 
entities.  We cannot believe exclusively in the power of either the personal or the 
structural, but instead we must balance our interpretive critique ecologically between 
them.  While we might apply such analysis to all manner of discourses, my examples 
here have all been of one particular kind of interaction, the novel.  When we add to our 
existential theory of literature an interactionist theory of interpretation, what emerges is 
the literature‘s embeddedness in the world, or literary ecology. 
Thus ecology comes to our attention from several directions.  It involves a new 
sense of community that we have from Nancy, but with a particular attention to the 
articulation of a being together, the interactive network by which an inoperative 
community is constituted.  If those points of communication each depend upon a set of 
linguistic conventions—a common language—then we will not get very far 
postethnically speaking.  That is, we will still be relying on language mastery as a 
measure of discursive participation, the act of contributing to community.  The postethnic 
utopian perspective assumes that everyone can work out her counterfactual wishes with 
anyone; the person‘s identity as a speaker of a particular language is subject to the same 
rupture as every other kind of identity.  (National identity, at one point, was tied to 
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language, and to some extend still is.)  Here, language is not a product to be possessed.  
Just as we rethink identity as a process of identification, so too we must rethink language 
as a process of enunciation.  This not only opens up participation in discourse, it also 
opens up an opportunity where there is a need—a gap, a rupture, a pain—for 
compassionate invention. 
If we claim too blithely that our language constructs our reality, then, as Stephen 
Yarbrough has argued, we leave ourselves no opportunity for new ideas or experiences to 
enter our world.  He proposes interactionism as a non-constructivist and non-
conventionalist stance hinging on the claim, first made by Donald Davidson, that there is 
no such thing as language (2006, 9-11).  What this really means, Yarbrough explains, is 
that communication does not depend upon both interlocutors having a shared language in 
common.  I would add that neither is a shared identity, of any kind, a prerequisite.  What 
is needed is only that leap of ―interpretive charity‖ (xii), of faith that, as Nancy and Butler 
tell us, we take as much for our own sake as for the sake of the other. 
When we have revised our idea of community so that its sufficient condition is the 
contact among limited beings, we see that interaction is another word for discourse that 
does not assume language or even humanity: ―‗discourse‘ is… purposeful interactions 
between and among people and things. In this sense, the hermit crab manipulating an 
empty shell to determine whether to adopt it as its new home is engaged in discourse‖ 
(2006, xiii).  Discourse (again, including but not exhausted by literary discourse of the 
novel) can be a name for that third space between experience and consciousness, which 
includes the experience of other consciousnesses, e.g. when we interact with other 
252 
people.  As Denzin points out, it is not simply the case that one conditions the other.  
They are, according to Yarbrough, entangled by definition because 
…in our interactions with things in the world, including our intercourse with 
others using signs, we and other things in the world mutually condition one 
another: when anything or anyone does anything, including when what they do is 
speak, write, or gesture to me, these interactions becomes part of the situation to 
which I can respond, just as I can respond to any other stimulus. Discourse is part 
of the world in the same way that an organism is part of its environment. Remove 
an organism from an environment or add an organism to an environment and you 
alter the environment…. (14) 
This relationship between what we could rename the individual and society is imagined 
postethnically in recent novels, several of which I have offered in this project.  In 
particular, each of these novelists imagines a new kind of community in which all the 
member of the community and their immediate (proximate) surroundingss shape one 
another.  The relational web of living systems is well known to environmental science.  
And following this line, Yarborough proposes that an environmental-interactional model 
of discourse leads importantly to a discursive nondualism: 
…Understanding an organism is to understand its interactions with its 
environment. In the same way, there is no difference between the way I 
understand, for instance, this desk at which I sit, and the way I understand these 
marks with which I write about this desk. There is no difference between the laws 
governing how I can use this desk and those governing how I use these marks to 
interact with you and this desk. (14) 
This nondualism dovetails with what I have been calling a non-metaphysical or 
materialist approach.  There are two important consequences of adopting such a view of 
discourse: first, as Yarbrough points out, ―Of these pragmatic claims, the most important 
is that we must believe that there is but one world, a world that we can share‖ (xiii).  But 
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if there is only one world, then how do we account for the difference, in literature, 
between the natural and the fantastic?  A novel about a horse makes one kind of sense, 
and novel about a unicorn appears to make a different kind of sense.  If there is not one 
real world of material facts and a separate world of ideas, then how can we account for 
our awareness of the nonexistent unicorn?  If we are to maintain a nondualist or 
ecological model of discourse, we must include another interactionist claim, that our 
ideas are real.  This is Popper‘s claim for ―world 3,‖ the world of art and ideas.  ―I 
assume,‖ he says, ―that there exist immaterial inhabitants of world 3, which are real and 
very important; for example, problems‖ (1992, 9).  In other words, although the horse and 
the unicorn are not the same kind of real and we will not be able to interact with each in 
the same ways, they are both actually part of our discursive ecologies. 
What catches my eye here is an intersection between Dewey‘s notion of society as 
communication, Nancy‘s inoperative community, constituted through communication 
and not communion, and then again the intersection between interactionist emphasis on 
points of contact with Nancy‘s emphasis on the shared limits at the boundaries of each 
singular being.  The interactionist community and the inoperative one seem, to me, to be 
much the same thing, with the important expansion that interaction offers to widen our 
sense of community in a non-human direction, an opportunity that Nancy leaves open by 
eschewing ―human‖ being.
2
  Ultimately, I maintain, when the writing of our utopian 
stories becomes inclusive or postethnic, then our social imaginations become both 
inoperative and ecologically minded.  That is, we undergo what Yarbrough defines as an 
ethical shift, a move that ―changes in our apperception of social relationships‖ (155).  The 
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most important of these shifts are, in his analysis, the cause for invention, for the ―new‖ 
that is also central to utopian theory.  Relationality emerges here as the principle factor, 
as Nancy tells us that community is a spatial relationship.  In Chakrabarty‘s terms, our 
communities might be based on our proximity to our neighbors rather than our identity 
with them.  This proximity and neighborliness, this spatial and ecological mindset, seems 
to not only open our utopian imaginations towards other groups of people, but also other 
things that live or exist in our community broadly defined, that is, our ecosphere.  
Every novelist in this study has been concerned in one way or another with the 
natural world.  In Morrison‘s A Mercy, Lina‘s resolution to piece together her own 
identity is associated with her housekeeping duties, which include a companionable 
chicken that nests in the kitchen.  Roth‘s Plot Against America imagines the Nazification 
of American life through the imprint of a swastika over stamps commemorating the 
national parks.  Silko‘s Gardens in the Dunes is as much about different ways to cultivate 
of human community as it is the cultivation of a garden.  Chabon‘s Sitka Jews are shaped 
by the cold and isolation of Alaska.  Powers‘s virtual reality ―cave‖ is as much about the 
perception of the world as representation as it is the representational powers of artificial 
systems technological and artistic.  Vizenor‘s tricksters rely on a natural reason that is 
something other than noble savage environmentalism.  Octavia Butler‘s survivalists must 
live close to natural cycles in a recognizable agrarian ideal, while Vonnegut imagines 
human beings drastically reintegrated into the natural world through evolutionary 
transformation.  Le Guin‘s novels are more anthropological than ecological, but they 
represent the location of human community in a nonhuman material order that structures 
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and sustains human life in a myriad of forms.  Certainly, these novels are not nature 
writing, nor are they ecological utopias.  Yet they all follow the track of inoperative 
community in returning human beings to the web of living systems, a move that, I 
propose, is the ultimate extension of the postethnic turn. 
Keeping in mind the broader sense of literature as symbolic interaction, what 
these novels offer is a postethnic literary ecology.  This would not be merely a theory 
tailored to nature writing, or even an ecocriticism that focuses critical inquiry on 
ecological problems.  Rather, it would be an ecological theory of literature, of symbolic 
interaction as one kind of discourse within living systems.  The word ecology is felicitous 
here to my concluding remarks as it originates from the Greek οίκος, or household, which 
also gives use our terms economy and ecumenical.  Economy, here, retains not only its 
fiscal sense, but also a stylistic one, a textual economy.  Of special importance is the 
figure of the housekeeper, the οίκονόμος.  The practice of housekeeping, of arrangement 
or ordering of things in spatial proximity, is, I think, our best model of critical, process-
oriented, or ―pragmatic‖ utopianism.  It contrasts with the architecture of blueprint 
utopianism: a building may be ―finished,‖ but the chores that make life livable within it 
never are.  As the conditions of postmodernity bring us into unavoidable contact with 
every kind of person, our postethnic household expands until soon we will most correctly 
think of it as the planet itself.  It becomes imperative to communicate our utopias across 
ethnic lines not only because it lets us encounter the other, but also because it allows us to 
cultivate critical solutions to transethnic problems and, thus, teaches us how better to 
keep house. 
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NOTES 
                                                                
PREFACE / REFOUNDING UTOPIA AFTER IDENTITY 
1
 Schillinger illustrates his point with the case of ―Marcel Theroux, who was born in Kampala, Uganda, and 
now lives in London [and who] has produced a post-apocalyptic fable called Far North, written in an 
American idiom but set in Siberia. Its net effect recalls Yevgeny Zamyatin‘s We, Jack London‘s White 
Fang, and The Road by Cormack McCarthy.‖ 
2
 Anderson notes the creation of academic chairs in history as part of a new understand of the novel‘s 
―empty‖ time as also ―serial‖ (194).  In other words, in pre-modern Christendom, when time was ―full‖ 
(fully ordained by God), the future could affect the past, as when ―types‖ of Christ were thought to have 
occurred in the Old Testament.  In empty time, the events of history are thought to occur as a ―series of 
causally related events,‖ like the plot of a novel.   
3
 One well-known example of this phenomenon is the apocalyptic title image of Rachel Carson‘s 
movement-defining Silent Spring. 
INTRODUCTION / UTOPIAS, IDENTITIES, COMMUNITIES 
1
 Popper writes that ―Plato‘s work…was meant by its author not so much as a theoretical treatise, but as a 
topical political manifesto‖ (153). 
2
 As always, the righteousness of ideological conservation is based on the doxology-like authority of the 
past.  I mean here, specifically, the Doxology, a short verse which is sung by the congregation in many 
Christian worship services: ―As it was in the beginning/is now and ever shall be/world without 
end/Amen/Amen.‖ 
3
 On the necessity and impossibility of disentangling personal utopian ―riffs‖ and the objective, scholarly 
study of other people‘s utopian discourse, see Levitas ―The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society‖  (2007, 
47-50). 
4
  This is the position of Engels in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. (1970) 
5
 ―That is why we always propose to speak of a democracy to come, not of a future democracy in the future 
present, not even of a regulating idea, in the Kantian sense, or of a utopia…‖ (1994, 81) 
6
 See also Keith Booker The Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature (1994).  Booker makes an interesting 
claim, in a note, that dystopias neither critique the status quo nor warn of a future that might come but 
rather critique a contemporary utopia – a contemporaneous hope or idea, expressed or implied; he does not 
expand on this idea, but one could easily see 1984 as the nightmare version of National Socialism and 
Brave New World as the nightmare of Fordism, etc. 
7
 Pordzik attributes the term to Moylan and to Foucault with no distinction between the very different uses 
each makes of the coinage (2001, 1-4).  Moylan addresses literary representations that are heterotopic, 
whereas Foucault uses the term to name materially occurring spaces that mix different categories of 
experience, e.g. a cemetery that spatially relates the living to the dead. 
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8
 It is worth recalling here the impossibility of knowing the future and the ethics of that impossibility 
outlined by Derrida at length in Spectres of Marx and underlined with the statement, ―without this 
experience of the impossible, we might as well give up on both justice and the event‖ (82). 
9
 This necessity of seeing the present as a possibility rather than an inevitability is precisely what Paulo 
Freire means when he writes, in the context of the pedagogy of critical literacy, ―In problem-posing 
education, people develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and 
in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality but as a reality in process, 
in transformation… A deepened consciousness of their situation leads people to apprehend that situation as 
an historical reality susceptible of transformation. Resignation gives way to the drive for transformation 
and inquiry, over which men feel themselves to be in control, if people, as historical beings necessarily 
engaged with other people in a movement of inquiry, did not control that movement, it would be (and is) a 
violation of their humanity‖ (1970). 
10
Vaihinger groups utopias with ―schematic fictions,‖ (2000, 24-27).  Although the as-if method is 
generally optimistic about the power of fictive language to find real solve real problems, Vaihinger never 
intends to reduce the world to a fiction.  On the topic of total theory, he tells us ―the desire to understand 
the world is therefore ridiculous, for all understanding consists in an actual or imaginary reduction to the 
known‖ (171), i.e. the world is bigger than the images we can hold in our heads.  This humility before the 
world is precisely what the most dangerous kind of utopian revolutionary lacks. 
11
 One such reduction is Edward Steichen‘s a pan-cultural photography project The Family of Man, the  
insufficiency of which Hollinger describes in Postethnic America: ―Steichen‘s pictures of Asians and 
Africans growing up, marrying, and struggling through their adult lives at work and at home seem to reduce 
the population of the globe to a set of mirrors for the narrower world of middle-class liberal males of 
Steichen‘s milieu. Steichen…achieved a specieswide view by limiting the range and depth of human 
differences.‖ (1995/2000, 53, my emphasis).  
12
 The language here recalls Kwame Anthony Appiah‘s well known ―Not Universalists or Pluralists: The 
New Cosmopolitans Find Their Own Way.‖  And indeed, Hollinger goes on to connect the postethnic and 
―rooted cosmopolitanism‖ (1995/2000, 5).   
13
 Take this passage for example, which articulates an exceptionalism as the result of attentive observation 
to the specificity of historical circumstances: ―Within the population of the United States today, blacks are 
the only ethno-racial group to inherit a multicentury legacy of group-specific enslavement and extensive, 
institutionalized debasement under the ordinance of federal constitutional authority. Indian also have a 
strong claim for special treatment, but the legal standing of tribes as sovereign entities invites, and indeed 
provides the basis for, a differently configured response to the historic mistreatment of Indians‖ (176-177).  
Whatever we think of the claim, we cannot say that the writer has conflated the two histories of oppression 
here. 
14
 Nussbaum‘s fancy is mostly empathetic, but it has its utopian qualities from time to time.  For instance, 
―We see it in the ways of contemplating possibilities for political change—for even when the ways of the 
world are ‗stony,‘ fancy can imagine a garden growing there‖ (40). 
15
 In an key passage in The Location of Culture, Homi Bhabha extends ―contingency‖ to mean not only 
temporal give and take, but also spatial contact: ―The contingent is contiguity, metonymy, the touching of 
spatial boundaries at a tangent, and, and the same time, the contingent is the temporality of the 
indeterminate and the undecidable‖ (1994, 267).  Spatial contingency more often appears, in Location of 
Culture and at large, as liminality, as in: ―What is striking about the theoretical focus on the enunciapatory 
present as a libratory discursive strategy is its proposal that emergent cultural identifications are articulated 
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at the liminal edge of identity…‖ (256).  This liminal edge at which we make contact is what Nancy calls 
the limit of our experiential-perceptual horizons as singular beings. 
PART 1 / ALTERNATIVE HISTORIES 
1
 It goes almost without saying that the Eden myth continues to have consequences for belief and behavior 
in the US, for example in debates over teaching evolution or legalizing gay marriage. 
2
 Because of prevailing uses of the term alternative in the context of anti-traditional progressivism (e.g. 
―alternative lifestyle‖), we tend to feel that calling conservatism a form of ―alternative‖ utopianism is 
oxymoronic at best.  I myself often fall into the habit of combining the terms conservative and progressive, 
normative (ideal) and subversive, status quo and alternative in the conventional pattern. 
3
 On the importance of Beowulf as a fantasy story (with monsters) rather than a historical record of Anglo 
Saxon life, see Tolkien‘s ―Beowulf, the Monsters and the Critics,‖ reprinted in Poems and Stories (1992).  
The revision of literary history, and the cultural politics of such revision, could of course offer enough 
examples to fill another chapter. Epics and novels serve as foundational cultural texts as much, albeit in 
different ways from, historical records or governing documents.  Imaginative writers can wonder what we 
would be like if our literary history had as one of its cornerstones not the story of Jane Eyre, but rather The 
Story of the First Mrs. Rodchester (a working title for what Jean Rys would call Wide Sargasso Sea).  Or if 
our mythic founder was not Aeneas, but rather his Latin wife Lavinia, as is the proposal in Ursula Le 
Guin‘s Lavina.  Le Guin‘s literary contradiction, like Rhy‘s novel, seeks to ―make a life‖ for a woman at 
the margins of a literary-historical ur-text (whether it be an ur-text of ―western civilization,‖ or an ur-text of 
feminism).  These kinds of interventions also offer a counter-history, doing similar work as A Mercy and 
The Plot through the articulation of something that had been left unwritten.   Like a remarking of histories 
of persons conventionally unmarked by historiography, or a counterhistory invented in dialectic antitheses 
to the prevailing myths of that historiography, alternatives to ―great works‖ of literary history offer an 
alternative to the cultural hegemonies that function through those works. 
4
 Morrison‘s later work Paradise exhibits the interweaving of narratives that Rhodes identifies with the 
―disorienting, disjointed function[ing]‖ of memory.  But in this case, two communities – one African 
American, and the other a community of women— are formed side by side and put into tension with each 
other.  The work of communal memory, through storytelling or written record, comes to the foreground 
when there are not two individuals at stake but rather two communities with different utopian longings. 
5
 The 2008 novel coincided with the election of the first African American president.  The campaign 
occasioned no little reflection on different versions of America‘s past, but this was not always affirmative.  
When Michele Obama commented that she was proud of her country ―for the first time,‖ she was roundly 
criticized for feeling otherwise before.   
6
 Normally, if they were recorded at all, it would only be in relations to the white husband/owner Jacob.  
Although ―Sir‖ is a major presence in the book, Morrison places his death early in the text to emphasize 
that other character‘s existence exceeds his presence. 
7
 One could even go so far as to say a particular configuration of ―self‖ and ―society‖ (or, identity and 
community) is used to distinguish American liberal democracy from its popular hobgoblins, fascism and 
communism.  As the well-worn story goes, the liberal democrat is someone who champions the rights of 
the individual, which fascism or communism would subvert to national authority or social collectivity. 
8
 Roth has often satirized the pastoral, nostalgic, idyllic, age-of-rest or rural simplicity that marks many 
version of the American dream.  But The Plot, as a dystopic arcadia, does so in a different way.  Insofar as 
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it is pseudo-autobiographical, the novel seems to belong with the ―Roth books.‖  But, because it also seems 
to pry into the ethos of a particular decade in ―the American Century,‖ it is related to the American Trilogy. 
9
 These sufferings are not interchangeable without serious damage to those involved: comparative ethnic 
studies always risk of erasing its subjects by homogenizing experiences.  But at the same time, the demand 
to always and only attend to each experience in it uniqueness undermines any attempt to find common 
ground and can lead to an astructural particularism, which prevents critique of ideological systems of 
domination.  I comment at length on this double bind in the afterword. 
10
 This is something like Roth‘s self-identified right to ―be an American first and a Jew second.‖ 
11
 To be exact, this is not the trauma-and-nostalgia scheme that Brauner analyzes, although trauma plays a 
role.  By ―adult‖ I do not mean to evoke the child/adult dynamics of psychoanalysis, but rather the 
development of a fully responsible human ethos, a more fully formed (but not necessarily complete or 
finished) stage of social development, marked by being able to have others depend upon oneself rather than 
only depending on others. 
12
 While this care ethos could be seen as a reification of family, with the potential for replacing the Nation 
with the Family as the sublime communal being, Roth carefully delineates the each member of this 
community and the ways in which family does and does not mark their boundaries. 
PART 2 / NEGOTIABLE GEOGRAPHIES 
1
 The general assumption we make, is that attending to the world is coextensive with attending to the 
world-as-it-is.  This is especially characteristic of American discourses which conflate the practical, the 
pragmatic, and the objective.  Of course, even such a discourse is not immune to the lures of utopian 
fantasy, as Rand‘s objectivist philosophy and severe utopian vision amply demonstrate.   
2
  Such observations are not unimportant, and the essays collected byVinay Dharwadker in Cosmopolitan 
Geographies: New Locations in Literature and Culture (2000) are particularly helpful in thinking through 
the geophysical expressions of what I would call postethnic culture.  
3
 I am adopting Frye‘s use of the word naïve to indicate a genre text that has no ironic distance from its 
own genre convections, e.g. no self-awareness, sophistication, maturity, etc. 
4
 The Amazing Adventures of Cavalier and Clay recounts the invention of quintessential ―Escapist‖ 
American superhero fantasy in the 1930s.  Late in the novel, Chabon counters the famous claim by 
Frederick Wertham that Batman and Robin presents a coded, pedophilic homosexual fantasy.  Through the 
thoughts of ―indifferent father‖ and comic-book creator Sammy, the novel contends that ―…Wertham was 
an idiot; it was obvious that Batman was not intended, consciously or unconsciously, to play Robin‘s 
corruptor: he was meant to stand for his father, and by extension the absent, indifferent, vanishing fathers 
of the comic-book-reading boys of America‖ (631).  Thus escape is also a supplement, something that is 
needed or that we would wish for, perhaps counterfactually. 
5
 Outside literature, in utopian politics, the failed experiment of Esperanto indicates the close relationship 
of glossopoeisis and intentional community. 
6
 ―I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many 
philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born 
with,‖ (2001, 446). 
7
 Myers considers it a weakness in the novel that the final act of violence would have more meaning for 
real-world readers, familiar with real-world Middle-Eastern violence, than it would for the fictional 
characters imbedded in the ignorance of Chabon‘s imaginary world without Israel: ―the reader is expected 
to shudder in recognition: even if Jewish history had turned out differently, you see, the results would have 
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been the same.‖ However, as I point out in the introduction, utopian fictions are by definition designed to 
make their meanings in comparison to the real world. 
8
 Once sanctified, these thresholds allow individuals inside them to move about during the Sabbath without 
transgressing laws that limit certain activities to one‘s own home.   
9
 Not to mention Emerson‘s ―transparent eyeball‖ in which the transcendental self can see all because it is 
nothing. 
10
 These are certainly the themes of much postmodernist fiction – again Auster‘s New York Trilogy comes 
to mind, with its scenario of a young boy isolated in a locked room in a misguided attempt to develop a 
―perfect‖ (natural rather than nurtured) language in order to undo the curse of the Tower of Babble and 
usher in a new golden age.  However, the ―novel of ideas,‖ whether a utopianist exhortation like Bellamy‘s 
or a metaphysical meditation like Auster‘s, has left many readers cold.  Very often, these readers are the 
same literary humanists who praise the warm bloodedness of naturalism, which is not exactly like the 
warmth of sentimentalism but is related to it.  The reality of feelings and emotions, rather that ideas, we are 
told, equips naturalism for the cultivation of social empathy. 
11
 Ursula K. Le Guin‘s ―medicine bag theory of fiction‖ is an instructive blending of Burkes ―literature as 
equipment for living‖ and traditional cultural roles of storytellers and bards. 
12
 Silko is also known for her critique of ―postmodern‖ apolitical narcissism in Louise Erdrich's work.  
Erdrich, like Vizenor, is of Anishinaabe descent, and it is probably no coincidence that Anishinaabe 
traditions lend themselves to retelling in a narrative style that resembles postmodernism and verse style, 
that also resembles haiku.  Nor is it likely an accident that Silko, who claims the Laguna pueblo tradition 
instead, at one time found that this style did not authentically or, at least, effectively perform the cultural-
political work on behalf of native sovereignty proper to Native American literature.  The differences in 
Anishinaabe and pueblo traditions, and the literary sensibilities informed by them, goes to the point made 
in Bearheart, that ―there are too many exceptions‖ to use a homogenizing term such as Indian.   
13
 The title of Hiroshima Bugi: Atomu 57 contains an intercultural neologism: ―bugi‖ is used to indicate 
both American disco boogie and an invented traditional Japanese dance. 
PART 3 / EMPTY FUTURES 
1
 Futurism means other things in other contexts, of course.  For example, the Russian Futurists comprised a 
set of attitudes and expectations about the future of revolutionary Soviet society.  Italian Futurism is more 
like the Russian version than the American, but configured differently in a non-soviet culture.  American 
futurists, as good capitalists rather than good political revolutionaries, tend only to anticipate the next 
patent or invention.  On this point, we should note, that American progressive discourse has been known to 
mythologize scientific innovation and capitalist entrepreneurship, represented in the American science-hero 
typified in the figure of Thomas Edison. 
2
 Conventionally, science fiction can also name an adventure story that contains fantastic technologies, like 
robots and spaceships, without necessarily meditating on what these technologies say to the human 
condition.  These are not science fiction in the terms I apply here, although they bear a strong ―familial 
relation‖ to it.  Scientific or otherwise, adventure has much in common with utopia.  There are notable 
geographical utopian adventure stories, mostly related to the discourses of the British Empire, such as 
Robinson Crusoe, King Solomon’s Mines, Lost Horizon.  There are also dystopian adventure stories that 
mark the ending of the empire, The Man Who Would Be King, Handful of Dust, and Heart of Darkness, to 
name a few.  The alliance of utopian imagination and imperial adventure can be reasonably attributed to the 
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writing of More‘s Utopia in 1516.  It is not coincidence that the modern utopia is written in the Age of 
Exploration, only a quarter century after Columbus‘s ―discovery‖ of the new world. 
3
 Given their view of a great work as temporally transcendent, those who commit themselves to such a 
project of ten tend to articulate this commitment as a moral rather than practical imperative.  There is a 
question of whether one can have morals if one does not believe in a truth by which behavior can be 
measured at any time in any place.  It may be that if one gives up the notion of a true destiny, one is bereft 
of morals and must rely on pragmatic ethics instead. 
4
 Two examples of which will illustrate the rhetorical characteristics of the prophetic voice.  First, when 
Nathan rebukes Daniel for sins of adultery and murder, he does so by telling him a story about a rich man 
who wrongs a poor man by taking the one lamb he cherishes.  David, thinking that he is presiding over a 
legal proceeding in his role as king, condemns the rich man vehemently.  Nathan turns on David, 
pronouncing ―You are the man!,‖ and the king is deeply convinced of his own injustices – his attention has 
been redirected through the indirect method of imaginative storytelling. (While Nathan, a storyteller, can be 
thought of as a writer of fictions, other prophets, such as Isaiah, wrote poetry.)  Another tactic, which will 
be key to understanding Vonnegut‘s prophetic voice, is the shock tactic of a sufficiently strange and 
interesting stunt.  Perhaps the best known example from the Jewish prophets is Hosea‘s marriage to the 
prostitute Gomer, which was meant to symbolize God‘s covenant with an unfaithful Israel.
4
  But the satiric 
stunt is better known from a different tradition of truth-tellers, the Cynics.  Whereas the prophets were 
sometimes clothed in rags and fed on locusts in the wilderness, the cynics would sometimes go about naked 
to show their disregard for social convention (noumen) vis-à-vis natural states of being (phýsis).  The best 
known cynical prank is attributed to Diogenes of Sinope, who according to tradition lived in a barrel rather 
than a house and wondered around Athens with a lantern.  If anyone asked him what he was looking for, he 
would reply that he was trying to find an honest man.  This kind of practical joke, and the ability of 
absurdity to license challenging speech, is part of a long tradition of satire and jesting.  The ability of non-
serious behavior to make an opening for serious communication is related to the literary tactic above.  Just 
as a joking cynic is able to say outrageous things because she is just kidding, the storyteller and poet can 
speak difficult truths under the excuse of making-up stories or putting together pretty words for the 
inconsequential purposes of mere entertainment.  In both these tactics, the prophetic voice relies on an 
indirect method to side-step a listener‘s reticence to have a given issue addressed directly. 
5
 It is worth noting that, like Butler, Vonnegut has used a religion invented by one of his characters to 
comment on the human condition.  But in Vonnegut‘s case, in Cat’s Cradle, the religion of Bokonanism is 
based on telling better and better lies to comfort believers who must live in a an uncaring cosmos. At the 
end of the novel, the world freezes solid because someone accidently drops a science experiment. 
6
 Oliver Ferguson notes the showmanship of this narrative technique: ―Vonnegut has provided two equally 
plausible solutions to the problem of how to contrive a credible plot that must span a million years: the 
unambiguously supernatural one of Leon as ghost, and the less fanciful but no less ingenious one of him as 
madman‖ (1999, 234).  I am not sure that this distinction makes a difference. 
7
 Of course, this question might only be important to ethno-cultural traditions who have assumed a 
particular kind of importance of God and destiny in the first place.  It is precisely such a culture – Western 
culture in general and American culture in particular—in which Butler and Vonnegut intervene.  As 
utopian narrative in American literature goes postethnic, we should not be surprised that other points of 
view enter into the picture, with the consequence that not only the possible answers but also what counts as 
the questions at hand undergo revision. 
8
 We should note it also removes the desire for nonliterary manifestos like Manifest Destiny, or ―spreading 
democracy‖ 
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9
 Specifically, insofar as well-being depends on a healthy environment, a commitment to ecological 
preservation is in order.  ―Might we not go farther,‖ Vonnegut proposes, ―and say that anything which 
wounds the planet is evil, and anything which preserves it or heals it is good?‖ (1981, 185).   
10
 And, moreover, because people are only ―coincidental‖ to the universe, this presumption of dignity does 
not have to be, and maybe even should not be limited to human beings: ―If you see dignity in anything, in 
fact—it doesn‘t have to be human—you will still want to understand it and help it. Many people are now 
seeing dignity in the lower animals and the plant world and waterfalls and deserts—and even in the entire 
planet and its atmosphere. And now they are helpless not to want to understand and to help those things.‖ 
(1981, 195) 
11
 For an instructive account of the limits of trickster jesting and the risk of ―irony fatigue,‖ see Will 
Kaufman The Comedian as Confidence Man: Studies in Irony Fatigue (1997).  Kaufman includes a chapter 
on Vonnegut. 
12
 The importance of these dual lives, one as a career scientist and one as a domestic caregiver, speak in 
obvious ways to the concerns of feminist writers.  See especially Adrienne Rich, ―When We Dead 
Awaken,‖ on the patriarchal ideologies of domesticity and intellectual or creative work.   ―The 
discontinuity of female life, with its attention to small chores, errands, work that others constantly undo, 
small children‘s needs‖ (1993, 173) is the source, in Rich‘s essay, of both a fragmented aesthetic (in her 
poetry) and something like a crisis in her identity (as a wife and mother, as a poet) , leading to a 
politicization of both.    
AFTERWORD / ON UTOPIA, ECOLOGY, AND HOUSEKEEPING 
1
Rorty points toward the postethnic shift when he writes, ―We have come to see that the only lesson of 
either history or anthropology is our extraordinary malleability. We are coming to think of ourselves as the 
flexible, protean, self-shaping animal rather than as the rational animal or the cruel animal‖ (1999, 69). 
2
 Note that interactions are not limited to the anthropocentric: Yarbrough writes that ―most strangely… we 
are necessarily in ethnical relationships with all creatures and things, not just other human beings‖ (2006, 
xiii). 
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